US embassy cable - 02COLOMBO2277

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002277 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA AND SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  12-10-12 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, PHUM, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  As leadership dispute flares, Sri Lanka's 
major Muslim party marginalized in peace process debate 
 
Refs:  Colombo 2267, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Dissension within the Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress (SLMC) continues to tear the party apart.  The 
two sides vying for leadership of the SLMC have taken 
their increasingly fractious battle to court and to the 
press.  Initial fears that the SLMC's internal turmoil 
would have a detrimental impact on the governing 
coalition's stability and the peace process have proven 
to be unfounded, thus far.  Rather, the primary effect 
of the turmoil appears to be the self-marginalization of 
the Muslim voice in the peace process debate.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Legal Maneuvering.  Dissension in the SLMC 
continues to tear the principal Muslim party in Sri 
Lanka apart.  The most recent upsurge in tensions began 
on December 1 when dissidents led by SLMC MPs A.L.M. 
Athaulla and M. Hafrath acted to remove Rauf Hakeem as 
party leader -- See Reftel.  After it became clear that 
both sides were not going to give in, the conflict moved 
to the courts and on December 3 a Colombo court granted 
an injunction request filed by the SLMC dissidents that 
effectively suspended Hakeem as leader of the party.  At 
this point, Hakeem seemed to be on the way out.  After 
rushing back from Oslo (where he had been participating 
in the third session of GSL-Tamil Tiger talks), Hakeem 
made a comeback however.  In response to a countersuit 
filed by Hakeem's camp, an appeals court overruled the 
initial decision and Hakeem was back as SLMC leader.  On 
December 13, another Colombo court is scheduled to hold 
hearings to determine who the leader of the SLMC is.  In 
the meantime, Hakeem is claiming that the dissidents 
have been expelled from the party. 
 
3.  (SBU) Battling in the Press.  Aside from the legal 
jousting, the two sides have increasingly taken their 
struggle to the press.  Barely a day goes by without 
front-page articles highlighting the dueling press 
conferences put on by the two sides.  Articles have 
cited the two camps as making the following shrill 
attacks: 
 
-- Hakeem has stated that the charges against him "are 
only a pretext for certain self-serving people who are 
bringing puerile arguments to get privileges and 
benefits for themselves at the expense of the 
community's long-term interest." 
 
-- Hakeem has also stated that the rebels in the SLMC 
are trying to "destabilize the government and the peace 
process." 
 
-- Athaulla on Hakeem: "He has a tendency of threatening 
anybody who bravely indicated his stupidity." 
 
-- Hafrath: "The party at present is in the hands of 
sincere and honest workers.  Several attempts have been 
made in not so pleasant terms to undo the stability of 
the party by certain elements." 
 
4.  (C) Ramifications for GSL and Peace Process.  Initial 
fears that the turmoil within the SLMC would have a 
detrimental impact on the governing coalition's 
stability (the SLMC is a key part of the United National 
Front coalition) and the peace process have proven to be 
unfounded, thus far.  Although five of the 12 SLMC MPs 
seem to be anti-Hakeem at this point, and the governing 
coalition only holds a slim majority in Parliament, the 
GSL is benefiting from the tacit support of the 16 MPs 
loyal to the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).  The TNA's 
support gives the GSL a significant cushion in 
Parliament and, as of yet, there is little sign that the 
government is close to falling or that it might lose any 
tight votes.  In any case, although some observers 
believe that they are in cahoots with the People's 
Alliance (PA) opposition, the dissidents have indicated 
that they would not abandon the government for now.  At 
the same time, while they have made some anti-peace 
process statements, the dissidents have not focused 
their fire on the government's peace initiative.  As of 
this point, their favorite target is Hakeem and what 
they see as his abuse of power in running the SLMC -- 
not the peace process. 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT:  The primary effect of the intra-SLMC 
turmoil appears to be the self-marginalization of the 
Muslim voice in the peace process debate.  When Hakeem 
was forced to withdraw from the Oslo talks, Muslims lost 
their direct voice in the negotiations.  In addition, 
with the two sides so busy attacking each other, Muslims 
have not fielded a coherent reaction to the Tigers' 
recent announcement that they would explore federalism 
options "in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil- 
speaking people" (See Reftels).  Although Muslims as 
Tamil speakers are included within the ambit of this 
construct, there is no sign that they are prepared to 
join the debate on federalism soon.  This, despite the 
fact that any decisions taken on this issue could have a 
significant impact on the large community of Muslims in 
the east.  END COMMENT. 
 
6.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS