US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4808

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004808 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, TU, IZ, Elections, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT TALABANI'S CHIEF OF STAFF  COMMENTS ON 
ELECTIONS, TORTURE INVESTIGATIONS 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 4776 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford 
for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY:  Kamiran Karadaghi, President 
Talabani's Chief of Staff, told PolOff on November 29 
that the Shia List was increasingly concerned about 
its prospects in the December elections, and predicted 
that former Prime Minister Allawi would fare even 
worse than he did in the elections last January.  In 
response to PolOff's query about the Kurdish Islamic 
parties' public split from the main PUK/KDP alliance, 
Karadaghi dismissed concerns that this harmed the 
Kurds' chances in the election.  Of more concern than 
the Kurdish Islamic parties, warned Karadaghi, was the 
ongoing threat of PKK activities in Iraq, citing two 
parties suspected to be fronts for the PKK.  Finally, 
Karadaghi expected nothing to come of the committee 
chaired by Kurdish Deputy Prime Minister Rowsch 
Shaways, citing Shaways indecisiveness.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------ 
(U) Election Predictions 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Kamiran Karadaghi, President Talabani's Chief 
of Staff, told PolOff in a meeting on November 29 he 
believed the Shia List was increasingly concerned 
about its prospects in the December elections.  The 
marja'iyah is getting active, he warned, pointing to 
recent comments by the son of Ayatollah al-Najafi 
calling for the faithful to support the Shia List. 
Karadaghi predicted the Shia Islamist list would not 
win a large majority of the votes this time.  He 
further opined that even an alliance with the Kurds 
would not result in the two-thirds majority needed to 
control the Assembly.  This means that the smaller 
parties will have a disproportionate amount of power 
as swing votes, remarked Karadaghi. 
 
3. (C) As to former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's 
chances, Karadaghi claimed that Allawi was 
increasingly unpopular with the Shia.  "The last time 
(in the January elections), Allawi got one million 
votes in the South, but he was in the government 
then," said Karadaghi.  Allawi's remarks about human 
rights being as bad as during the Saddam regime would 
cost him votes. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
(U) Splits Within the Kurdish Alliance? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) In response to PolOff's query about the Kurdish 
Islamic parties' public split from the main PUK/KDP 
alliance, Karadaghi dismissed concerns that this 
harmed the Kurds' chances in the election.  The 
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) and the Kurdistan 
Islamic Union (KIU) were both moderate groups, 
Karadaghi claimed, charactering the IMK in particular 
as the "Muslim brotherhood of Kurdistan." 
 
5. (C) Karadaghi went on to state that the Kurdish 
Islamic parties remain on very friendly terms with 
both the Kurdish Regional Governments (KRG) in Erbil 
and Sulaymaniyah.  The difficulty, he explained, was 
the Islamic groups did not agree with the main Kurdish 
parties on the distribution of seats within the 
Alliance.  In the last election, according to 
Karadaghi, the KIU was allocated six seats; this time, 
due to the likelihood that the Kurdistan Alliance 
would garner fewer seats overall they were only 
offered four seats.  This led to the split, since the 
KIU believed that they could do better on their own. 
However, Karadaghi stressed that the KIU still 
intended to ally themselves politically with the 
Kurdistan Alliance after the elections. 
 
-------------------------- 
(U) The Specter of the PKK 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Of more concern than the Kurdish Islamic 
parties to Talabani, warned Karadaghi, was the ongoing 
threat of PKK activities in Iraq.  The Turkish 
Ambassador had presented Talabani with information 
that two groups on the election registration list were 
actually fronts for the PKK: List 779 and List 713, 
the People's Democratic Party and the Justice and 
Reconstruction Party, respectively.  Karadaghi 
reported that these groups were banned in Kurdistan, 
but had apparently managed to slip past the monitors 
in the IECI.  (Comment:  As best we can tell, the IECI 
does no monitoring or even checking of such political 
entities.  End Comment.)  According to Karadaghi, 
Talabani remarked that "Iraq is still not a real 
state," and remains incapable of monitoring against 
overt foreign influence in internal affairs. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
(U) Torture Investigations Will Go Nowhere 
------------------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) PolOff brought up the increasing reports in the 
press on allegations of torture by elements in the 
Iraqi government, particularly stories about torture 
in the Ministry of Interior's "Bunker."  Karadaghi 
replied that Deputy Prime Minister Rowsh Shaways was 
asked to chair the government's committee 
investigating charges against the Ministry of 
Interior, but that he personally expected nothing to 
come of the investigations.  Shaways is weak and "not 
independent at all," confided Karadaghi.  Instead, 
Shaways belongs to KDP Leader Masud Barzani and will 
not stand for anything without direct instructions 
from Barzani, Karadaghi cautioned. 
 
----------- 
(U) Comment 
----------- 
 
8. (C) Karadaghi affects an attitude of detachment, 
repeatedly telling Embassy officials that he is 
neutral in Kurdish politics since he is not affiliated 
with either the KDP or the PUK.  However, Karadaghi is 
a fairly reliable interlocutor for the Embassy on PUK 
redlines, and is often used as a proxy by Talabani to 
relay Talabani's frustrations with the Embassy.  For 
example, Karadaghi reflected Talabani's frustration on 
the topic of turning over the NATO house to Talabani's 
control (over which Talabani and Prime Minister Jafari 
nearly came to blows.)  During the Ambassador's 
meeting with Talabani, Karadaghi interjected to remind 
Talabani about the house, and opened his meeting with 
PolOff by demanding the keys to the house. 
KHALILZAD