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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD4807 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD4807 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-12-01 19:18:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PTER KDEM IZ XL |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004807 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PTER, KDEM, IZ, XL SUBJECT: FALLUJAH MUFTI, A COALITION ALLY, KILLED Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Sheikh Hamza Abass Muhna al-Esawe, Fallujah's universally respected mufti and senior imam, was killed November 29, 2005. He had functioned as an effective coalition ally since Operation Al Fajr. Initial reports from local Iraqi police indicate masked gunmen shot Hamza as he left his mosque mid-afternoon. His death represents a blow to U.S. interests in Fallujah, but could serve to galvanize area Sunni-Arabs to beat back extremism. A new mufti reportedly has already been identified. END SUMMARY. -------------------------- APOLITICAL IMAM; QUIET BUT EFFECTIVE COALITION ALLY -------------------------- 2. (C) As the city's most revered leader (religious or otherwise), Sheikh Hamza had been an effective coalition partner since Operation Al Fajr in November 2004, when he and other senior imams first returned to Fallujah. The mufti told Fallujah Poloff then that he preferred to stay "above politics" and stick to religious matters, noting that the city's political scene remained dangerous. He had been an early member of the transitional Fallujah City Council, but later allowed other imams to speak for the city's powerful cleric class in the well-functioning municipal body. 3. (C) Tens of thousands of Fallujans gathered early November 30, 2005, in the city center for the mufti's funeral procession. The city's approximately 80 mosques broadcast news of the mufti's death throughout the day. The gathering progressed peacefully. (NOTE: Senior religious figures are expected to visit Fallujah in coming days to pay their respects. END NOTE) ---------------------- OUTSIDERS RESPONSIBLE? ---------------------- 4. (C) Mr. Ibrahim, a reporter from Fallujah's city paper Al Bishara, told Poloff and Marines in a brief meeting November 30, 2005, at the downtown Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) that the mufti had been killed for two reasons: to create unrest in the city, and to stir-up Sunni-Shi'a problems. Ibrahim added that the attack clearly had a "political dimension" and, he believed, had been committed by outsiders (implying a Sh'ia hit squad). 5. (C) Ibrahim relayed that the city's new mufti would be Sheikh Khalil Mohammed Al-Fayadh, currently resident in Jordan. An alternative would be Sheikh Jamal, Hamza's "blood brother." Mufti selection, he pointed out, stemmed from certain qualities: religious education, character and people's love for the cleric. "All imams have this religious education, but one will have more than the rest." 6. (C) Poloff and Marines conveyed initial condolences and asked Ibrahim to pass the same message to Fallujah Mayor, Sheikh Dhari, and City Council Chairman, Sheikh Kamal -- a senior and very political imam. (NOTE: Both Sheikhs Dhari and Kamal are running in the December 15 election; Kamal had previously told Poloff that he did not fear anyone in Fallujah, "only Allah." END NOTE.) 7. (C) COMMENT: Sheikh Hamza's killing represents a blow to U.S. interests in Fallujah. Imams represent the most important group in the city (alongside U.S. Marines). The mufti had implicitly supported strong relations between the coalition and residents since November 2004. Fallujah Poloff had developed a close working relationship with Hamza. In July 2005, city clerics issued a fatwa calling on all Fallujans to vote in the upcoming referendum and election. They did. 8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Slow but steady progress in Fallujah -- especially on the political front (mobilized population), in combination with a stable security environment (increasingly ISF-led under effective Marine mentorship) -- became tied to the senior cleric, despite his desire to stay above Iraqi politics and delegate that file to Sheikh Kamal. Sheikh Hamza's death also underscores that Sunni Arab extremists who once called Fallujah home -- some still do -- remain focused on destabilizing the strategic city. The attack likely came from within the Sunni community, not outside it, and from among Zarqawi and Al-Qaida-linked terrorists and supporters. This probable linkage, however, is not confirmed and no group has yet claimed credit. Given the current dynamic, the mufti's death should serve to rally Fallujah residents rather than to intimidate them. KHALILZAD
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