US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4807

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FALLUJAH MUFTI, A COALITION ALLY, KILLED

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD4807
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD4807 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-12-01 19:18:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PTER KDEM IZ XL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004807 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, KDEM, IZ, XL 
SUBJECT: FALLUJAH MUFTI, A COALITION ALLY, KILLED 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD, REASONS 1.4 
(B) AND (D) 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY:  Sheikh Hamza Abass Muhna al-Esawe, 
Fallujah's universally respected mufti and senior imam, was 
killed November 29, 2005.  He had functioned as an 
effective coalition ally since Operation Al Fajr.  Initial 
reports from local Iraqi police indicate masked gunmen shot 
Hamza as he left his mosque mid-afternoon.  His death 
represents a blow to U.S. interests in Fallujah, but could 
serve to galvanize area Sunni-Arabs to beat back 
extremism.  A new mufti reportedly has already been 
identified.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------- 
APOLITICAL IMAM; QUIET BUT 
EFFECTIVE COALITION ALLY 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (C) As the city's most revered leader (religious or 
otherwise), Sheikh Hamza had been an effective coalition 
partner since Operation Al Fajr in November 2004, when he 
and other senior imams first returned to Fallujah.  The 
mufti told Fallujah Poloff then that he preferred to stay 
"above politics" and stick to religious matters, noting 
that the city's political scene remained dangerous.  He had 
been an early member of the transitional Fallujah City 
Council, but later allowed other imams to speak for the 
city's powerful cleric class in the well-functioning 
municipal body. 
 
3. (C) Tens of thousands of Fallujans gathered early 
November 30, 2005, in the city center for the mufti's 
funeral procession.  The city's approximately  80 mosques 
broadcast news of the mufti's death throughout the day. 
The gathering progressed peacefully.  (NOTE:  Senior 
religious figures are expected to visit Fallujah in coming 
days to pay their respects.  END NOTE) 
 
---------------------- 
OUTSIDERS RESPONSIBLE? 
---------------------- 
 
4. (C) Mr. Ibrahim, a reporter from Fallujah's city paper 
Al Bishara, told Poloff and Marines in a brief meeting 
November 30, 2005, at the downtown Civil-Military 
Operations Center (CMOC) that the mufti had been killed for 
two reasons: to create unrest in the city, and to stir-up 
Sunni-Shi'a problems.  Ibrahim added that the attack 
clearly had a "political dimension" and, he believed, had 
been committed by outsiders (implying a Sh'ia hit squad). 
 
5. (C) Ibrahim relayed that the city's new mufti would be 
Sheikh Khalil Mohammed Al-Fayadh, currently resident in 
Jordan.  An alternative would be Sheikh Jamal, Hamza's 
"blood brother."  Mufti selection, he pointed out, stemmed 
from certain qualities:  religious education, character and 
people's love for the cleric.  "All imams have this 
religious education, but one will have more than the rest." 
 
6. (C) Poloff and Marines conveyed initial condolences and 
asked Ibrahim to pass the same message to Fallujah Mayor, 
Sheikh Dhari, and City Council Chairman, Sheikh Kamal -- a 
senior and very political imam.  (NOTE: Both Sheikhs Dhari 
and Kamal are running in the December 15 election; Kamal 
had previously told Poloff that he did not fear anyone in 
Fallujah, "only Allah." END NOTE.) 
 
7. (C) COMMENT:  Sheikh Hamza's killing represents a blow 
to U.S. interests in Fallujah.  Imams represent the most 
important group in the city (alongside U.S. Marines).  The 
mufti had implicitly supported strong relations between the 
coalition and residents since November 2004.  Fallujah 
Poloff had developed a close working relationship with 
Hamza.  In July 2005, city clerics issued a fatwa calling 
on all Fallujans to vote in the upcoming referendum and 
election.  They did. 
 
8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Slow but steady progress in 
Fallujah -- especially on the political front (mobilized 
population), in combination with a stable security 
environment (increasingly ISF-led under effective Marine 
mentorship) -- became tied to the senior cleric, despite 
his desire to stay above Iraqi politics and delegate that 
file to Sheikh Kamal.  Sheikh Hamza's death also 
underscores that Sunni Arab extremists who once called 
Fallujah home -- some still do -- remain focused on 
destabilizing the strategic city.  The attack likely came 
from within the Sunni community, not outside it, and from 
among Zarqawi and Al-Qaida-linked terrorists and 
supporters. This probable linkage, however, is not 
confirmed and no group has yet claimed credit.  Given the 
current dynamic, the mufti's death should serve to rally 
Fallujah residents rather than to intimidate them. 
KHALILZAD 

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