US embassy cable - 05PARIS8171

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, IZ, SY, IR, FR 
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 28-29 VISIT OF IRAQI FM ZEBARI 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary and comment: MFA contacts described the 
November 28-29 visit of Iraqi FM Zebari as a success, but did 
not suggest that the visit will herald an increase in modest 
French assistance levels to Iraq.  FM Douste-Blazy reportedly 
stressed to Zebari GoF support for an inclusive political 
process and Arab League-initiated Iraqi reconciliation 
efforts.  The French FM also called for more regular 
interaction with the GOI and stressed GoF readiness to help 
with reconstruction, largely in the context of existing GoF 
exchange programs and the EU JUSTLEX program.  The two sides 
addressed the long-stalled French offer to train Iraqi police 
in France, for which MFA officials said the GoF is still 
awaiting an Iraqi response, while Zebari suggested publicly 
that the GoF was responsible for the delay.  MFA officials 
were struck by the depth of Zebari's negativity on Syria, in 
contrast to his more positive remarks on Iran.  While FM 
Douste-Blazy did not question Zebari's assessment of the 
malicious Syrian role in Iraq, he stressed to the Iraqi FM 
that France would not use UNSCR 1559 as a weapon against 
Syria.  MFA officials praised Zebari's effectiveness as an 
interlocutor, which they contrasted with perceived 
incompetence of other ITG ministers.  End summary and comment. 
 
2. (C) Iraqi FM Hoshyar Zebari visited Paris November 28-29, 
at GoF invitation, and met with FM Douste-Blazy, French 
Senate President Christian Poncelet, and members of the 
French Senate and National Assembly.  MFA DAS-equivalent 
Antoine Sivan briefed us November 30 on the visit, describing 
it as a success and long-overdue.  Sivan stressed the 
significant timing of Zebari's visit, coming just two weeks 
before Iraqi elections and on the heels of the successful 
Arab League-sponsored reconciliation meeting in Cairo.  He 
expressed hope that the Zebari visit would help France 
establish better relations with Iraq's permanent government, 
and herald more regular high-level Iraqi visits to France. 
 
POLITICAL PROCESS 
----------------- 
 
3. (C) On the November 28 meeting between Zebari and 
Douste-Blazy, Sivan reported that the French FM's main 
message was one of support for Iraq's political process, and 
a desire for more regular, high-level interaction between 
France and Iraq.  The French FM commended the October 15 
referendum, especially the high voter turnout, as well as the 
Arab League initiative on Iraqi reconciliation, which he 
hoped would help result in a new parliament "more 
representative" of Iraq's population.  Zebari, for his part, 
briefed Douste-Blazy on the evolution in Iraq's political 
process since 2004 and the crucial run-up to December 
elections.  According to Sivan, the Iraqi FM emphasized that 
Iraq's next government would be one of "national unity," 
which would be more stable than its predecessors and maintain 
the unity of the country.  Sivan said Zebari sought to 
emphasize his support for Iraq's unity and greater Sunni 
inclusion in the political process, important points of 
agreement with the GoF.  Sivan reported that Zebari also 
thanked the GoF for its support for Arab League efforts to 
promote Iraqi reconciliation, which he described as a joint 
Iraqi-Arab League initiative. 
 
FOCUS ON EXISTING ASSISTANCE, TRAINING OFFERS, ASSETS, DEBT 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
4. (C) According to Sivan, Douste-Blazy also stressed to 
Zebari the GoF's readiness to assist Iraq's reconstruction 
within the context of existing programs, such as the EU 
"JUSTLEX" program (under which 40 Iraqi police have attended 
gendarme courses in France), as well as cultural exchanges 
(through which some 500 Iraqi students have studied in 
France, usually for two to six months).  Asked about 
prospects for increased or new GoF assistance to Iraq, Sivan 
claimed that Zebari did not press the issue, though the Iraqi 
FM did stress the need to speed up the JUSTLEX program. 
 
 
5. (C) Sivan confirmed that the two sides had discussed the 
long-stalled GoF offer to train up to 1,500 Iraqi police in 
France, though there were no breakthroughs.  Sivan stressed 
that the training offer remained on the table, and that 
Zebari's visit hopefully would prompt movement on the Iraqi 
side.  At the same time, Sivan conceded that prior to the 
Zebari visit, the GoF had rebuffed a proposed visit from an 
Iraqi Vice Minister for Security to discuss the offer, based 
on doubts about the official's competence and GoF inability 
to secure ministerial level meetings.  Sivan concluded that 
the GoF wanted participant names from the GOI, not another 
MOI delegation visit, to finalize the training.  Poloff 
questioned Sivan's dismissive attitude to the MOI follow-up 
visit, and stressed the need to be responsive to Iraqi 
training needs and work constructively with the ITG to 
implement the offer.  In press remarks, FM Zebari stressed 
Iraqi readiness to accept the French training offer, and 
suggested that the delay was on the French side, noting that 
the ITG had sent senior officials and diplomatic notes to 
discuss the training and in what country it might take place. 
 Asked about Zebari's suggestion that the French training 
could take place somewhere other than France, Sivan 
emphasized that the GoF training offer was intended to take 
place in France only. (Comment: When France first floated the 
training proposal in 2003, it left open the possibility that 
training might take place somewhere in the region, outside 
Iraq; this past year, GoF officials have increasingly 
suggested that the training would be possible in France only 
in the near term, with prospects for training in the region, 
such as Qatar, much further down the road.  End comment.) 
 
6. (C) Sivan reported that Zebari and Douste-Blazy also 
discussed Iraqi assets frozen by France, for which transfer 
to the Development Fund to Iraq (DFI) requires new French 
legislation.  Sivan explained that the French Ministry of 
Finance was on the verge of finalizing the draft legislation 
for submission to the National Assembly, and conceded that 
the progress had been slowed by interagency coordination. 
Sivan added that the GoF had hoped to sign the bilateral 
accord formalizing cancellation of Iraq's debt during 
Zebari's visit, but was unable to do so.  According to Sivan, 
the agreement was "not quite ready" to be signed at the time 
of Zebari's visit, but it would be finalized shortly, with 
signature taking place within a few days. 
 
HARSH CRITICISM OF SYRIA, BUT NOT IRAN 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Sivan was struck by the vehemence of Zebari's 
criticism of Syria, which the Iraqi FM described as Iraq's 
number one problem and the main source of terrorist 
infiltration.  Zebari stressed to Douste-Blazy that the SARG 
harbored malicious intent towards Iraq and that it was not a 
case of lack of Syrian capacity in securing its border. 
Sivan reported that Zebari made an interesting comparison 
between Syria and Iran, and posited that the SARG, based on 
its hard-core Ba'thist character, was seeking to demolish the 
political process in Iraq; Iran, by contrast, supported 
Iraq's political process to the extent that it sought to 
promote its political proxies within Iraq.  In the end, 
Zebari concluded that Iran wanted a stable Iraq, albeit one 
susceptible to its influence, while Syria did not.  Asked how 
Douste-Blazy responded to Zebari on Syria, Sivan affirmed 
that the French FM did not disagree with Zebari's assertions. 
 At the same time, the French FM stressed to Zebari that the 
GoF remained insistent on Syrian compliance with UNSCR 1559, 
"nothing more" than that, and that it would not use UNSCR 
1559 as a weapon against Syria. 
 
PRAISE FOR ZEBARI, CRITICISM OF HIS COLLEAGUES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
8. (C) Sivan concluded by praising Zebari's effectiveness and 
shrewdness as an interlocutor, which he viewed as an 
exception among ITG ministers.  He observed that Zebari's 
presentation to the National Assembly foreign relations 
committee impressed the audience of some 40 MP's, who, while 
perhaps not totally convinced of his arguments, deferred to 
his views on prospects for the political process and the need 
for U.S. troop reductions to be conditions-based. Sivan 
asserted that, in contrast, other ITG ministers who had 
visited France in the past year, including the Ministers of 
Culture and Education, had done a "disservice" to Iraq by the 
ineptitude with which they handled meetings with the GoF.  He 
ascribed the situation to an overwhelming lack of capacity 
within the ITG, where he asserted, with the exception of 
Zebari, most ministries operated as personal fiefdoms of 
incompetent ministers.  Sivan expressed hope that formation 
of Iraq's permanent government would herald a more competent 
administrative corps, to which poloff stressed the need for 
France to offer more help, on the ground, in building Iraqi 
capacity. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton