US embassy cable - 02ANKARA8873

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DECISION-MAKING IN TURKEY: AK'S INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Identifier: 02ANKARA8873
Wikileaks: View 02ANKARA8873 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2002-12-10 10:09:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008873 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: DECISION-MAKING IN TURKEY: AK'S INTRODUCTION TO 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 8252 
     B. ANKARA 8586 
 
 
Classified by CDA a.i. Robert Deutsch.  Reasons: 1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: As disparate and well-placed sources had 
predicted, Islam-influenced AK Party government received a 
lecture on the dangers posed by "reactionary" Islam at the 
Nov. 29 meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), the 
first since AK assumed power. (On Dec. 9, AK P.M. Gul was 
treated to another briefing on the "reactionary threat" and 
other issues during a courtesy call on Gen. Ozkok, the TGS 
Chief.)  This lecture illustrates a facet of Turkish 
decision-making between elected governments and powerful 
elements of the State which has a direct bearing on how 
Turkey will respond on Cyprus, Iraq, reform and other issues 
of central interest to the U.S.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) According to reports we have heard, at the Nov. 29 
meeting the military, seconded by President Sezer, made clear 
to AK its view that the discussion whether to lift the ban 
against Turkish civil servants' wearing the headscarf is a 
non starter.  "The discussion is over," Sezer reportedly told 
P.M. Gul.  Before the meeting, Chief of the General Staff 
Gen. Hilmi Ozkok and the other TGS commanders limited to an 
abrupt three (3) minutes their "courtesy" call on new Speaker 
of Parliament Arinc, who had generated controversy when he 
had his headscarf-clad wife join him to see off Sezer on a 
trip abroad late last month.  Official photos showed a 
somewhat stiff, seated Arinc flanked on either side by Ozkok 
and others.  The visit stood in marked contrast to an earlier 
20 minute call on Gul, whom the military and other elements 
of the Establishment see as relatively more pragmatic and 
sensible. 
 
 
3. (C) The NSC, which according to the constitution has only 
an advisory role (ref A), is customarily the formal venue at 
which the Turkish military sets guidelines and, if deemed 
necessary, issues warnings to the elected government about 
what is fair or foul in Turkish politics.  For instance, 
after the rise to power of Turkey's Islamist Refah Party-led 
government in 1996, the NSC let it be known publicly that 
Islamic "reactionaries" constituted a primary threat to 
national security (alongside the then-active armed insurgency 
of the PKK).  A similar warning about the threat of 
"nationalist mafia" was issued in 1999, after the Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP) joined the coalition then led by Bulent 
Ecevit. 
 
 
4. (C) A former NSC staffer, who also served with the 
military's West Working Group that helped execute the 
"postmodern" coup against the Refah government in 1997, 
underscored what many others are also telling us: the 
military is especially concerned that AK might try to amend 
or re-write the 1982 constitution to change the "unamendable" 
preamble and articles 1-4, which are designed to freeze 
Turkey within narrow, if ambiguously defined,"secular" and 
Ataturkist bounds.  Our contact vividly described the 
atavistic fear among Turkish General Staff officers he knows 
that AK, rather than accommodating to the military and 
remainder of the Establishment, will try to transform THEM in 
an Islamist way. 
 
 
5. (C) A long-serving Justice of the Turkish Constitutional 
Court (the Turkish Supreme Court) spoke similarly about the 
approach of the military and other Establishment elements to 
AK.  According to the Justice, the biggest problem in trying 
to set guidelines lies in the ambiguous core of "secularism" 
and Ataturk's principles.  The military's broad-brush 
approach to defining (or avoiding definition of) its terms 
runs the risk of creating a crisis; AK could, in theory, 
cross a military "red line" without knowing where it is. 
 
 
6. (C) The Justice noted that such "guidance" runs contrary 
to democratic values and has an enormous impact not only on 
the elected political class but on judicial decisionmaking, 
which tends to focus more on preserving the ideological 
status quo than on individual rights and political liberty. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
7. (C) In assessing the developing relationship between AK 
and the military, the Ozkok factor will be as significant as 
the character of Erdogan.  Ozkok is reportedly among the more 
open-minded military leaders (among other things, he fasts 
during Ramazan).  Since 1996 Turkish dialogue between Prime 
Ministers and TGS Chiefs has been limited.  Despite the 
difficulty of establishing such a dialogue, it would be to 
Turkey's benefit if AK and Turkey's military leadership could 
establish an easier dialogue.  In that context, some AK 
leaders recognize that Arinc's actions -- designed to 
demonstrate not only his support for grassroots interests but 
his independence as Speaker from party leader Erdogan and AK 
government policies -- were ill-timed.  The headscarf flap 
not only stimulated angst among the generals, it also handed 
military hardliners an issue right at the gate. 
8. (C) AK sees itself as representing the aspirations of the 
majority of Turks for cleaner and more just governance, 
including on social policies.  AK also wants to get away from 
what it has characterized as an ingrained preference for a 
"no solution" approach on Cyprus and other foreign policy 
questions.  In the latter regard, Turkey seemed to take an 
initial step forward on the UN's Cyprus plan because AK 
leader Erdogan was willing to take a fresh look at what had 
become "policies of the State" in the MFA spokesman's words, 
i.e., policies which no government should touch.  AK is 
rapidly finding out that moving the entrenched interests of 
the Establishment is not easy and it remains to be seen 
whether AK can forge an active approach on reform, Cyprus, 
and other issues of central concern to the U.S. which is 
digestable by the military and other elements of the State. 
 
 
DEUTSCH 

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