US embassy cable - 05ANKARA7070

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, TU, POLITICAL PARTIES 
SUBJECT: BAYKAL USES NATIONALISM TO CEMENT CONTROL OF 
LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 006878 
 
     B. ANKARA 000501 
     C. ANKARA 000581 
     D. ANKARA 004042 
 
(U) Classified by POLCOUNS Janice G. Weiner, , E.O. 12958, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Party Chairman and former Foreign Minister 
Deniz Baykal was re-elected chairman of the main opposition 
Republican People's Party (CHP) on November 19, solidifying 
his dictatorial control over the party.  The convention also 
showcased the continued evolution of CHP from a progressive, 
center-left party into an undemocratic, nationalistic, pro 
status-quo party with a penchant for anti-Americanism.  End 
Summary. 
 
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THE CHP CONVENTION: BACK TO THE FUTURE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) On November 19, Deniz Baykal was reelected chairman of 
the Republican People's Party (CHP).  He received all 1,158 
of the valid votes, out of a total of 1,223 votes cast. 
Candidates for the party leadership needed 262 nominating 
signatures to be become an official candidate at the 
convention and new CHP rules required everyone who wanted to 
nominate a candidate to personally walk to the front of the 
convention hall and sign their name to the nomination in 
front of everyone.  It was well known that anyone who 
nominated a challenger to Baykal would later be purged from 
the party.  As a result, Baykal was the only candidate on the 
ballot. 
 
3. (C) The atmosphere at the CHP convention was designed to 
remind the participants and television audiences of CHP's 
nationalistic and republican credentials.  The CHP convention 
hall had pictures of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of both the 
Turkish Republic and the CHP, wearing the type of hat popular 
during the War of Independence that Turkey fought against 
European powers.  Many youngsters were running around the 
convention hall wearing similar hats.  A short film 
juxtaposed the War of Independence with Baykal's trips around 
the country.  (Comment:  The intent was to suggest that 
Turkey now faces a new war of independence against foreign 
powers trying to break-up the country and undermine the 
secular republic.  End comment.)  One of the banners hanging 
from the rafters proclaimed, "March First is Our Honor," a 
reference to 1 March 2003, when CHP MPs voted en masse 
against a resolution in the Turkish parliament that would 
have authorized U.S. troop deployment into Iraq through 
Turkey. 
 
4. (C) Baykal delivered a three hour speech at the 
Convention, repeatedly asserting that CHP is the defender of 
the secular and unitary Turkish Republic.  He claimed that 
forces were attempting to break up the country and turn it 
into an "Islamic theocratic state".  He accused PM Erdogan, 
the leader of the governing and pro-Islam Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), of being a member of the "Taliban." 
He also stressed the importance of holding early elections in 
2006 so that Erdogan does not become president in 2007 (ref 
A). 
 
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BAYKAL'S PARTY 
-------------- 
 
5. (C) Baykal and his inner circle exercise nearly complete 
control over CHP, despite widespread dissatisfaction with, 
and criticism of their leadership among the rank and file. 
POLOFFs have heard repeated criticism of Baykal and his inner 
circle from a variety of current and former CHP members, 
including dissident CHP MPs Hasan Aydin, Memet Tamanbay, Inal 
Batu, and Zenep Damla Gurel; former CHP MPs Erol Tuncer and 
Serafettin Elci; and former senior CHP leaders Erol Cevikce 
and Ertugrul Gunay.  Baykal has systematically purged all 
opponents from positions of power within the party according 
to Batu, Cevikce, Tamanbay, and others.  All the delegates 
who opposed Baykal at the January 2005 party convention have 
been punished by the party.  All local and regional party 
leaders who backed Sisli mayor Sarigul for the party 
leadership earlier this year (refs B and C) have been 
replaced. 
 
6. (C) Baykal and his cronies have used a variety of dirty 
tricks to retain control of CHP.  A common tactic is to 
advertise that local party meetings will be held at a 
specific time, date, and location to elect deputies to 
regional or national conventions, and then hold the meetings 
with a small group of loyalists at a different time, date, 
and place -- and select pro-Baykal candidates.  Baykal's 
dictatorial tactics have undermined CHP's popularity and 
caused many grassroots supporters to desert the party (ref 
D). 
 
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INCREASING NATIONALISM AND ANTI-AMERICANISM 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Although CHP MPs continue to describe their party as a 
contemporary, European-style, social democratic party, CHP's 
leadership is increasingly using nationalistic, 
anti-Islamist, anti-EU, and anti-American rhetoric to defend 
the statist status-quo.  CHP's leaders reject accusations 
that their party is anti-EU because CHP MPs have routinely 
supported EU reform legislation in parliament.  At the same 
time, however, CHP's leaders have engaged in anti-EU rhetoric 
and contributed to conspiracy theories alleging that the EU's 
real goal is to break up Turkey.  In conversations with 
POLOFFs, CHP MP Fuat Cay, CHP MP Sinan Yerikaya, and other 
senior party leaders close to Baykal 
 
-- talk endlessly about their perceptions of corruption, 
mismanagement, and Islamic extremism within AKP; 
 
-- rail against the EU and IMF; 
 
-- criticize U.S. foreign policy, especially in Iraq and the 
lack of U.S. military action against the PKK; and 
 
-- spin conspiracy theories about supposed repeated U.S. 
interventions in domestic Turkish politics, including 
allegations that the USG supported AKP's rise to power in 
Turkey. 
 
8. (C) Comment. Although Baykal's strategy has garnered him 
complete control of the party, he has alienated many Turks 
who are ideologically inclined to support a secular, social 
democratic party.  Baykal, moreover, has failed to attract 
nationalistic voters to the party, despite blatant attempts 
to pander to that portion of the population.  CHP received 19 
percent of the vote in the November 2002 election, but an 
October 2005 ANAR poll published in Turkiye newspaper on 
November 24 indicated that CHP's support had dropped to 14 
percent.  Whatever the specific poll numbers, there is wide 
agreement here that CHP,s support has declined.  The future 
of the Turkish left will remain dim, unless CHP, one of the 
other leftist parties, or a new left-of-center party is able 
create internally democratic structures, develop policies 
that address the real concerns of average Turks, and build a 
grassroots party base.  Despite CHP,s weakness, its anti-EU 
and anti-American rhetoric will exert a negative domestic 
influence on Turkish, European, and American interests.  End 
Comment. 
MCELDOWNEY