US embassy cable - 05ANKARA7068

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UPDATED SCENESETTER FOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) DIRECTOR ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

Identifier: 05ANKARA7068
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA7068 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-12-01 16:02:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ASEC PTER PGOV KTFN TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FBI FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS ATTN:  REBECCA 
MOLONEY AND JOYCE MCCLELLAND 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  11/30/2015 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, PGOV, KTFN, TU 
SUBJECT:  UPDATED SCENESETTER FOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION (FBI) DIRECTOR ROBERT S. MUELLER, III 
 
Classified By:  CDA Nancy McEldowney, reason 1(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (U) Embassy Ankara looks forward to welcoming you to 
Turkey.  This will be the first high-level FBI visit to 
Turkey since Director Freeh came in 1998, prior to the 
opening of the Legat office in Ankara in October 1999. 
Turkish government and press interest in your visit will be 
very high.  Your visit provides an opportunity to further 
strengthen our excellent working relationship with the 
Turkish National Police and the Turkish National 
Intelligence Organization and to advance our cooperation 
with the Government of Turkey in their anti-terror and 
anti-crime efforts.  As you are likely to encounter in 
other countries you will visit on this trip, there is 
intense interest in the Turkish press in CIA-leased 
airplanes transiting the region and allegations of detainee 
abuse, and you are likely to be asked about these issues. 
 
 
2.  (C) As you are aware, the single largest terrorist 
threat to Turkey is Kurdish separatist insurgency Kongra- 
Gel (KGK), which is also referred to by the name of its 
predecessor organization, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). 
The perception that the coalition forces in Northern Iraq 
have not done enough to suppress Kurdish separatist 
activities remains a major irritant between our two 
countries.  In addition to action against the PKK in Iraq, 
we are working with Turkey to convince European countries 
to crack down on PKK criminal activities, terrorist 
financing, networks, and propaganda outlets. 
 
BILATERAL RELATIONS 
------------------- 
 
3.  (C) You will arrive in Ankara at a time when bilateral 
relations have been steadily improving from a low point 
early this year, brought on mainly by events in Iraq.  The 
turning point came with Prime Minister (PM) Erdogan's June 
visit to Washington, when the President urged him to take 
ownership of the relationship.  Since then, both sides have 
been publicly defending the importance of good bilateral 
relations.  Both sides have also sought to expand and 
intensify our official dialogue.  Your visit is part of 
that, something you may wish to point out publicly and 
privately.  We continue to work closely with Turkey on a 
number of issues including Afghanistan, Turkey's EU 
candidacy, Cyprus and Turkey's IMF program. 
 
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERICS 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (C) PM Erdogan remains Turkey's most popular politician 
and his pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) is 
firmly in control of parliament.  Secularists, including 
the bureaucracy and the military, worry about what they 
view as AKP efforts to advance an Islamic agenda on issues 
like restrictions on headscarves in universities or on 
graduates of religious schools, but the AKP government has 
had little success on these issues.  Turkey has been rocked 
by allegations that the Interior Ministry's paramilitary 
Jandarma were involved in a November bombing in the heavily 
Kurdish southeastern province of Hakkari; several 
investigations are underway. 
 
ECONOMIC SITUATION 
------------------ 
 
5.  (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the 
financial crisis of 2000-2001 under an IMF-sponsored 
economic reform program.  Through fiscal austerity and the 
independent Central Bank's right monetary policy, Turkey's 
economy has stabilized after years of booms and busts with 
strong growth, an improving debt situation, and increased 
foreign investment.  The Government of Turkey occasionally 
backslides on economic reform, but is broadly moving ahead 
under IMF and EU pressure.  The October 3, 2005 start of EU 
accession talks, though a long-term process, has added to 
business confidence.  Although Turkey's economic situation 
has improved substantially in the past three years, the 
country remains vulnerable to unforeseen events that could 
send investors fleeing the country's thin financial markets. 
 
JUDICIAL 
-------- 
 
6.  (U) The criminal justice system in Turkey is 
administered by the Ministries of Justice and Interior. 
The Justice Ministry consists of the public prosecutors 
offices, the courts, and the prisons.  The Interior 
Ministry consists of the Turkish National Police (TNP) and 
the Jandarma.  Crimes are investigated by the TNP or 
Jandarma (based upon their respective jurisdictions); 
prosecuted by the Public Prosecutor; and tried before a 
court consisting of from one to three judges depending on 
the type and severity of the criminal offense.  The TNP 
handles law enforcement responsibilities for urban areas in 
Turkey, and the Jandarma handles law enforcement matters in 
the rural countryside.  The courts apply the law based upon 
a "code" system (adapted from Italian criminal law), as 
opposed to the "common law" system.  Case preparation and 
evidentiary standards are not yet up to U.S. or western 
European standards. 
 
7.  (U) An Extradition Treaty and a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty is in effect with the United States Government. 
 
PKK 
--- 
 
8.  (C) Iraq has been the major sore point in U.S.-Turkish 
relations for the past three years, and a particular source 
of Turkish ire is the continuing presence of the separatist 
PKK in northern Iraq.  The PKK called off its unilateral 
"cease-fire" with Turkey in the summer of 2004, which had 
been in place since 1999.  Since then, both PKK attacks 
(primarily using IEDs) and increased Turkish military 
activity in the southeast have resulted in dozens of deaths. 
The Government of Turkey blames us for allowing the PKK to 
maintain terrorist training camps in northern Iraq, from 
which PKK leaders have command and control over operations 
in Turkey.  Coalition forces are not in a position to take 
resources from the fight against the insurgency in order to 
fight the PKK. 
 
9.  (C) In an effort to take action where we can - and to 
improve our relationship with Turkey - there is an ongoing 
interagency effort to approach European countries where the 
PKK currently conducts criminal activities to support its 
terrorist goals (including extortion and narcotics 
trafficking).  The PKK also runs media outlets in Europe 
and its European network provides logistical support to its 
operatives in Turkey and Iraq.  The USG estimates that 
illegal PKK "mafia"-like activities in Europe raise $300 
million per year.  The U.S. effort on PKK in Europe is 
multi-pronged, including diplomatic pressure on European 
governments not to allow PKK to use their territory, 
pressure on PKK media outlets, and an offer to work more 
closely in support of Turkish efforts to secure European 
law enforcement and judicial system action against PKK. 
This support was offered by APNSA Stephen Hadley when he 
visited Ankara in September and by other senior officials. 
Complementary to these efforts, Treasury, State and DOJ are 
pressing Turkey to strengthen its relatively weak anti- 
terrorism finance regime.  Additionally, we are providing 
enhanced intelligence support to the Turks as they carry 
out counterterrorism operations in Turkey. 
 
KEY ISSUES TO RAISE DURING YOUR VISIT 
------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (U) The TNP is the main liaison contact with the Legal 
Attache office.  We would request that you thank the TNP 
for its continued cooperation and support.  You may wish to 
express condolences for the loss of TNP officers in Iraq in 
2005 and for the many deaths over the past two decades as a 
result of PKK and other terrorism, noting that we are aware 
of the sacrifices the TNP makes daily and we appreciate the 
advice and guidance they provide to us. 
 
11.  (C) Turkish authorities are to be congratulated on the 
recent arrest of Lu'ay Saqa, who supported the Al-Qaeda 
role in the 2003 Istanbul bombings.  We will seek to assist 
the Turkish authorities in confronting the terrorist 
activities that are undertaken by the PKK and various 
Marxist organizations from safe havens in Europe and 
northern Iraq and that continues to threaten Turkish 
citizens.  We seek to assure the Turkish authorities that 
we will follow any lead they provide us regarding anyone in 
the U.S. who may be connected to or providing support for 
terrorists.  We also want the Turks to know that if they 
have information about PKK affiliates operating in Europe, 
we will work, consistent with U.S. law, with law 
enforcement liaison in Europe to bring them to justice. 
 
12.  (U) The Embassy is especially proud of the recent 
successful cooperation between the FBI and the TNP that 
resulted in the arrests in Turkey and Morocco of those 
responsible for releasing the destructive ZOTOB virus, 
which plagued CNN, ABC News, the U.S. Congress, and 
numerous corporations throughout the world. 
 
MCELDOWNEY 

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