US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4800

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004800 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2015 
TAGS: MOPS, PHUM, PINS, PGOV, KJUS, IZ, Detainees 
SUBJECT: UPDATED STATUS OF IRAQ DETAINEE ABUSE 
INVESTIGATIONS 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 4745 
     B. BAGHDAD 4716 
     C. BAGHDAD 4672 
 
Classified By: Classified by Evan Reade, Acting Counselor for 
Political-Military Affairs for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (S/NF) Three committees investigating human rights 
abuses committed against 168 detainees at the Iraqi 
Ministry Interior (MOI) Bunker facility and others at 
similar facilities nationwide are making uneven 
progress. The mandate of some committees has been 
overwhelmed by the political agenda of Shi'a 
politicians close to the PM's office and MOI; others 
may yet prove productive. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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2.  (SBU) In the wake of the November 13 discovery of 
168 detainees - many bearing marks of physical abuse - 
in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions at an 
unofficial MOI detention facility in the Jadriyah 
district of Baghdad (the "Bunker"), the Prime Minister 
appointed two committees to address allegations of 
detainee abuse by Iraqi authorities: 
 
(i) a Bunker Investigation Committee led by Deputy 
Prime Minister Rowsh Shaways and comprised of assorted 
Iraqi officials and private citizens, tasked with 
reporting on Bunker detainees' allegations of abuse; 
 
(ii) a National Investigation Committee led by PM 
military assistant Major General Talib al Kinani and 
comprised of representatives from the Ministries of 
Heath, Justice, and Human Rights, tasked with 
inspecting Iraqi detention facilities nationwide. 
 
In addition, a third committee comprised of 
investigating judges has been established by Judge 
Medhat al Mahmood, Chief of the Iraqi Higher Juridical 
Council, to assess the legality of Bunker detainees' 
imprisonment, recommend their future disposition, 
investigate allegations of abuse and murder, and 
consider charges against Iraqi officials involved. 
 
 
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NOVEMBER 27: INTERVIEWS AT ABU GHRAIB 
------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) On November 27, members of the Bunker 
Investigation Committee visited Abu Ghraib to conduct 
interviews with detainees removed on November 13 from 
the Jadriyah Bunker (currently housed in a separate 
detention compound usually reserved for Coalition 
security internees awaiting release). Embassy Rule of 
Law (ROL) Coordinator, MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence, and PolMilOff were present. 
 
4.  (S/NF) Upon arrival at Abu Ghraib, the committee 
leader - Rashid Majid Salih Khattab al Nasiri, a 
medical doctor and prominent Da'wa Party member - 
selected a small group of detainees from the crowd, 
seemingly at random, and ordered that they be brought 
to the tent reserved for interviews and seated in rows 
of plastic chairs before the committee. 
 
5.  (S/NF) Committee members watched as Dr. al Nasiri 
asked selected detainees to unzip their jumpsuits to 
the waist, then inspected their feet (most were 
wearing sandals). Dr. al-Nasiri expressed impatience 
with detainees who interrupted the brief examination 
to report threatening behavior or other complaints 
against MOI officials, exclaiming "I am here to see 
scars, not to talk about bad words!" 
 
6.  (S/NF) Some committee members - who represented 
the Ministry of Transitional National Assembly (TNA) 
Affairs and Baghdad City Council, as well as the 
Ministry of Human Rights (MoHR) - showed a keener 
interest in the cause of detainees' imprisonment than 
in their physical treatment, repeatedly asking one 
detainee "why have your put your thumbprint confessing 
to a crime if you are innocent?". 
 
7.  (S/NF) After interviewing three groups of 
detainees, a total of 18 from the 166 present, the 
committee declared its work done, and packed up. MoHR 
Prison Inspector Saad Sultan, present at his own 
behest, expressed frustration with the committee 
members' performance, saying the they had "no 
information and no knowledge" of human rights 
investigations. 
 
8.  (S/NF) Mr. Sultan was also pessimistic about the 
value of the Judicial Committee's review of the 
legality of the MOI Bunker detainees' imprisonment, 
noting that judges present at the Bunker had failed to 
report physical abuse and lack of access to counsel. 
"Iraqi judges are involved in illegal detentions," he 
said, "and these judges you bring don't have the power 
to say other judges are wrong". 
 
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NOVEMBER 28: CONSULTING WITH DPM SHAWAYS 
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9.  (S/NF) The following day, MNF-I Commander Task 
Force 134, Embassy ROL Coordinator, Political 
Counselor, and PolMilOff visited DPM Shaways at his 
home. ROL Coordinator told the DPM that, speaking 
bluntly, the interviews performed by the Bunker 
Investigation Committee at Abu Ghraib had been cursory 
at best. (Note: the DPM previously expressed concern 
about the committee's capability; see Reftel A.) 
 
10.  (S/NF) DPM Shaways agreed that the committee's 
efforts were inadequate: "I have told the PM we need 
much more time," he said, "that we need to repeat 
this, that we need to ask individuals about these 
matters singly, that we need a list of questions". He 
also noted that he had asked the MOI to prevent 
officials accused of abuse at the Bunker from 
departing Iraq. 
 
11. (S/NF) The DPM was more positive about the role of 
the Judicial Committee, saying he had high respect for 
Judge Medhat, and agreed with the judges that all 
Bunker evacuees should be moved in short order to an 
Iraqi facility. He pledged to ask the judges "to 
accelerate the investigation into cases of detainees 
without charges and to release those against whom 
there is no evidence". 
 
12.  (S/NF) The DPM advocated more substantial MoHR 
involvement in the investigation, and was interested 
by the idea of requesting assistance from an 
international organization such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. But he seemed shy of 
advocating these proposals himself, suggesting instead 
that Post and MNF-I raise these issues with the PM. 
 
13.  (S/NF) In closing, the DPM noted the importance 
of continued USG engagement with the ITG on the Bunker 
issue, and the broader issue of detainee abuse. "There 
are some," he said, "like Safa al Safi (Reftel A), who 
object to that. But we will ensure that these meetings 
are open. I personally think it is necessary." 
 
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NOVEMBER 29: MG AL KINANI ON NATIONWIDE INSPECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
14.  (C) Major General Talib al Kinani opened the 
first joint USG-ITG meeting on the PM's six-point-plan 
proposal for nationwide inspections of all Iraqi 
detention facilities with an explanation of his 
committee's mandate, and a pledge to start inspections 
as quickly as possible - "in'shallah, as soon as one 
week". 
 
15.  (C) MG al Kinani confirmed that he planned on 
surprise inspections, saying "the PM has charged us to 
convey the reality of what has happened in these 
facilities".  His intent, he continued, was to start 
with MOI facilities - " there is a lot of corruption" 
- and to move next to Ministry of Defense holding 
cells. The Ministry of Justice, whose prisons were 
already inspected regularly, was a lower priority. 
 
16.  (S/NF) While MG al Kinani thanked Post and MNF-I 
profusely for their repeated offers of support, he 
avoided specific commitments to joint efforts in 
planning or execution, aside from assuring us that he 
would "share our reports with you, of course" and 
saying that "when we need help, we will ask it from 
you, in a second". 
17.  (S/NF) When offered the advice of MNF-I technical 
experts in detention conditions and inspections, al 
Kinani nodded enthusiastically, saying "we will learn 
and benefit from you guys, as a friend." He also 
requested access to Coalition intelligence about the 
location of additional detention facilities. It was 
clear, however, that he saw the USG role as limited. 
 
18.  (S/NF) Asked about methods of inspection, al 
Kinani said he envisioned small ITG teams posing as 
human rights organizations, which would present 
themselves unannounced at detention facilities "with 
different IDs, in different cars - sometimes even 
taxis" in order to avoid "a big event with media 
attention, security, where the Americans are going 
into this prison". 
 
19.  (S/NF) Al Kinani was frank about the likelihood 
that additional Bunkers lay undiscovered, saying 
"there are places all over, prisons we're looking at - 
and the holding areas can be worse than the prisons. 
We know that MOI and MOD are doing that right now. And 
we have to find these places. Even if they hate us, 
that's fine with us." 
 
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NOVEMBER 29: THE INITIAL REPORT IS (NOT) PRESENTED 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
20.  (C) Later that afternoon, CDR TF 134, ROL 
Coordinator, COS for Intelligence and PolMilOff 
attended a meeting of the Bunker Investigation 
Committee, at which the committee was to present its 
findings from the Abu Ghraib interviews and its 
initial report on abuse allegations. In the absence of 
DPM Shaways, whose mother passed away in the Kurdish 
region that morning, the meeting was chaired by 
Minister of State for TNA Affairs Safa al Safi. 
 
21.  (S/NF) Dr. al Safi opened by requesting that USG 
officials sit on one side of the table (USG and Iraqi 
officials had taken mixed seats, informally). He then 
warned Iraqi committee members in Arabic not to talk 
about copies of the initial report (which most members 
had in front of them on the conference table) "in 
front of everybody". 
 
22.  (S/NF) Dr. al Safi then launched into accusations 
directed at USG officials. The Bunker had held 171 
detainees, he said, but MNF-I had only 168 at Abu 
Ghraib. The Bunker Director had told him, he said, 
that "the Americans took everyone, in one big group, 
not in an orderly way. That's why we want to know, 
where are these three? Where? They could be anywhere". 
 
23.  (S/NF) "When Coalition Forces came in," said Dr. 
al Safi, "we removed our hands. The Coalition Forces 
took our power. So we ask: were the detainees removed 
with or without authorization? Were Iraqi officials 
present? Were files removed, and were they signed for? 
This poses a problem for us; there is no coordination. 
We know files were destroyed." 
 
24.  (S/NF) Dr. al Safi brushed aside USG comments 
that 168 detainees had been jointly counted by USG and 
ITG officials, and that all files had been sealed and 
entered into the custody of Iraqi judges. "We're not 
saying that tortures took place," he countered, "but 
for now, we just have one word against another. We 
need for you to give us details and evidence, if you 
want us to talk to people about these crimes". 
 
25.  (S/NF) Acting Minister of Human Rights Narmin 
Othman, seated to Dr. al Safi's right, objected to 
comments by committee members echoing Dr. al Safi's 
accusations. "You are defending those officials at the 
Bunker," she said loudly, turning to face all Iraqi 
committee members, "and I will never do that." 
 
26.  (S/NF) We pledged to give Dr. al Safi additional 
copies of the substantial documentation already 
provided to the ITG on abuses - including murder - at 
the Bunker. Dr. al-Safi questioned the quality of the 
reporting he had seen so far. "These reports cite "a 
witness," he said. "What is a witness? In court, you 
cannot convict without 100% evidence. It's not enough 
to say somebody has heard, that somebody knows." 
 
27.  (S/NF) Dr. al Safi closed the session by voicing 
unfounded complaints that the USG had released 
provocative photographs of abuse to Iraqi TV stations. 
"In the media, they're showing a picture of a man who 
is supposed to be a torture victim - and he is wearing 
a gun on his hip," he said. "The media will ruin this 
investigation." 
 
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COMMENT 
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28.  (S/NF) To date, the USG has provided the ITG with 
lists of detainees whose legal status is unresolved, 
lists of reported deaths in custody, lists of 
officials working at the Bunker, and a comprehensive 
intelligence picture of the facility's establishment, 
history, and the role played by MOI leadership. The 
ITG has taken no action to use this information as a 
basis for substantive investigation. 
 
29.  (S/NF) The incompetence of the Bunker 
Investigation Committee and the intransigence of its 
Acting Chairman clearly need to be addressed; we will 
raise this issue with DPM Shaways as soon as he 
returns south, and will take up the replacement or 
reconstitution of the committee with the PM if this 
proves necessary following DPM-level consultation. 
 
30.  (S/NF) Meanwhile, a commitment order has been 
issued mandating the transfer of all Bunker evacuees 
to the MOJ Rusafa Prison in Baghdad, which is 
monitored by U.S. DOJ personnel. We will press Iraqi 
investigating judges to set clear timelines for 
determining the legality of these detentions and 
releasing detainees not subject to criminal charge. 
 
31.  (S/NF) We intend to meet with MG al Kinani in the 
coming days to clarify his plans for nationwide 
inspections, and discuss alternate modi operandi. His 
initial mock-NGO espionage inspection proposal is 
creative, but is unlikely to produce useful 
assessments (and would outrage the humanitarian NGO 
community). 
 
32.  (S/NF) It is premature to conclude (although we 
suspect) that MG Kanini - a Shi'a officer and close 
associate of National Security Advisor Abd al Karim al 
Anzi - is incapable of mounting a credible national 
inspection regime. Post and MNF-I will engage him with 
detailed proposals on alternate methods of proceeding, 
and will report on further developments septel. 
KHALILZAD