US embassy cable - 05ADDISABABA3997

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003997 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR A/S FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ET, SOMALIA, ELEC 
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DAS YAMAMOTO TALKS DEMOCRACY, SOMALIA 
WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Visiting DAS Don Yamamoto told Deputy 
Foreign Minister Tekeda the GOE had to move faster to 
strengthen key democratic institutions and to release 
imprisoned CUD opposition leaders.  He and Amb. Huddleston 
highlighted increasing concern about Ethiopian human rights 
and democracy at senior levels of the USG and among the U.S. 
public. Yamamoto pressed for consular access to the detained 
leaders, but received a cool response from Tekeda. The Deputy 
Minister said the GOE objected to micromanagement of 
relations with Ethiopia's opposition. He lamented that the 
opposition was successfully tarnishing the GOE's image as 
part of its long-standing, subversive agenda. Tekeda asked 
for USG understanding as the GOE sought to balance the need 
to ensure the rule of law and maintain civil order while 
respecting democratic rights. He said the GOE had no problem 
"in principle" with the democratic reforms the USG was 
suggesting; the only differences were over speed and the 
specifics of implementation. On Somalia, Tekeda agreed with 
the USG plans to increase support for the TFG process, while 
pressing TFG President Yusuf to build ties with other actors. 
 Yusuf shared Ethiopia's unwavering commitment to fighting 
extremism, he added. Tekeda said the GOE believed 
Somaliland's people should decide whether they wanted 
independence.  He recommended that the USG tell leaders from 
both Somaliland and the TFG that the U.S. expected them to 
work out their differences through dialogue.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) AF DAS Yamamoto and Charge met over breakfast with 
Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu 
Nov. 28. Director for North American Affairs Grum Abay and 
Deputy Alayew Mamo joined Tekeda, while AF/RSA rep Col Kenny 
and PolEcon Counselor Kevin Sullivan also attended for the 
USG. 
 
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Yamamoto, Charge Press for Democratic Reforms 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) DAS Yamamoto told Tekeda that both Secretary Rice and 
President bush wanted to know what was being done to address 
the political crisis in Ethiopia. Both had taken notice of 
Diaspora protests and the reports of the detention of CUD 
leaders and wanted answers. Yamamoto asked the Deputy FonMin 
how the country could move forward on democracy and human 
rights. Tekeda replied that a small group of opposition 
hard-liners were holding both opposition moderates and 
society at large hostage.  The return of CUD President Hailu 
Shawel to Ethiopia had been the real blow to the democratic 
process; the GOE should not be blamed for this. Tekeda asked 
for USG understanding as the GOE sought to balance the need 
to ensure the rule of law and maintain civil order while 
respecting democratic rights. According to Tekeda, the way 
forward was for CUD MPs to come to Parliament, hopefully 
along with those leaders not implicated in "crimes." He added 
that the GOE objected to too much micromanaging by the 
international community of the GOE's relations with the 
opposition.  Ethiopians must learn to talk to and trust each 
other, rather than running to outsiders for help. Tekeda 
lamented that the CUD had been successful in its efforts to 
tarnish the GOE's international image, which he said formed a 
key element of the opposition's long-standing strategy to 
undermine the EPRDF government. 
 
4. (C) Yamamoto said that imprisoned CUD leaders would be the 
biggest challenge for the GOE.  Creative solutions would be 
needed; amnesties linked to medical conditions were one 
possibility. Col Kenny suggested revising widely criticized 
changes to the rules of Parliament would be another 
initiative the GOE could take to defuse the situation. Charge 
Huddleston agreed, and argued that if the EPRDF had been more 
willing to build trust with CUD moderates and the general 
public, the objections of CUD hard-liners like Hailu Shawel 
could have been overcome. Trust remained a problem, she 
added. Everyone was waiting for the GOE to follow through on 
its commitments. Prime Minister Meles had expressed his 
agreement with reforming Parliamentary rules, opening the 
media and building capacity at the NEB, but nothing had 
happened. Tekeda responded that the GOE agreed "in principle" 
with democratic reforms; the only issue was how and when to 
implement them. 
 
5. (C) The Charge and DAS Yamamoto pressed Tekeda for access 
to detained CUD leaders; Yamamoto mentioned that he had 
brought medication from the U.S. for Hailu Shawel. The Charge 
noted that a series of major letter-writing campaigns had 
begun at some of the U.S. most prestigious universities on 
behalf of the imprisoned members of the opposition. Granting 
DAS Yamamoto access would allow him to address these concerns 
more effectively. Yamamoto pointed out that many of the 
detainees had AmCit family members to whom the USG would have 
to discuss their cases. While granting the USG access would 
go beyond Ethiopia's Geneva Convention obligations, it had 
been done before in other countries. Tekeda answered that he 
hoped the USG would not insist on this point. Allowing 
international community access to the detainees would 
"maintain their illusion" that outsiders cold resolve their 
legal problems. The GOE should be the primary interlocutor 
for the opposition, not third country representatives. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Somalia: GOE Favors More USG Support for TFG 
-- With String Attached 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) DAS Yamamoto briefed Tekeda on U.S. plans for greater 
engagement on Somalia. The USG was looking for ways to show 
increased support for the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) while at the same time mitigating President Yusuf's 
tendency to go it alone, rather than reaching out to 
potential rivals like the Speaker of the Parliament. The 
Department had taken an initial step forward by having 
Washington based officials meet Yusuf in New York on the 
margins of the UNGA. A next step would be for a USG rep visit 
to the TFG in Jowhar. Yamamoto underscored that the U.S. 
continued to believe that the introduction of foreign troops 
from neighboring countries would be counterproductive. At the 
same time, the USG was looking for fresh ideas on how to 
promote stability in Somalia. Yamamoto and Kenny also 
mentioned stepped up USG efforts to combat Somalia-based 
pirates in the Indian Ocean. 
 
7. (C) Tekeda agreed that it was important to keep pushing 
Yusuf to build relations with other actors in Somalia. He 
noted that while many observers believed Yusuf was "in our 
pocket," Yusuf had walked out on a meeting with GOE reps. 
What kept the GOE close to Yusuf was their common commitment 
to fighting Islamic extremism. Yusuf's determination on that 
point was absolute, and no amount of money could buy him off. 
The GOE was working more closely with other regional states 
to support the TFG, even Egypt, which no longer posed an 
obstacle to the process. The Deputy Prime Minister said 
sending a USG representative to Jowhar would send a positive 
signal -- the principal contribution the USG could make -- 
and did not appear to have a downside.  Tekeda remarked that 
most Somali leaders had a weakness, including links to 
drug-trafficking or other illicit activities, in marked 
contrast to their more responsible counterparts in Hargese. 
 
8. (C) Asked what message Tekeda could carry Jowhar later the 
same day, Yamamoto requested that the GOE ask Yusuf to act as 
a national leader, rather than a warlord. He should engage 
with the Speaker of Parliament and other leaders in Somalia. 
If he is successful, the USG will engage with him at a higher 
level. 
 
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Somaliland: GOE Agrees Gradual Engagement, 
Supports Self-Determination 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) Tekeda told DAS Yamamoto that the GOE sought to 
maintain honest and transparent relations with both the TFG 
and Somaliland authorities in Hargese. Ethiopia had no 
position on the substance of Somaliland's desire for 
independence from Somalia; the GOE believed that the people 
of Somaliland should determine their relationship with 
Somalia.  Tekeda added that Somaliland's quest for 
independence was not a policy driven exclusively by an elite, 
but rather enjoyed strong grassroots support. He called an 
AU-organized referendum "one option" for gauging dealing with 
the issue of independence. The Deputy Minister acknowledged 
Ethiopians' strong sentimental affinity for the Issacs clan 
in Somaliland, which had developed strong ties with Ethiopia 
over the decades. Still, explicit GOE support for 
independence of Somaliland or early diplomatic recognition of 
authorities in Hargese would be damaging. The GOE would 
instead seek to maintain "balance" between the TFG and 
Somaliland.  Tekeda claimed that Somaliland and Puntland 
would have gone to war several times in recent years had it 
not been for GOE intervention. In managing the issue of 
Somaliland, the Deputy Minister suggested that Egypt would 
not be helpful, but would not be as big an obstacle as in the 
past, while Kenya was "neither here nor there." 
 
10 (C) Yamamoto indicated that the USG would also be seeking 
balance in its relations with the TFG and Somaliland 
authorities. The U.S. would begin with low-level contacts 
with Hargese. Tekeda recommended that as a first step, the 
USG communicate to both Hargese and Jowhar its expectation 
that the two sides would start talking in order to resolve 
their disagreements through dialogue. 
 
HUDDLESTON