US embassy cable - 05PARIS8150

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

DEMARCHE ON PRESIDENT'S IRAQ SPEECH: FRENCH RESPONSE

Identifier: 05PARIS8150
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS8150 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-12-01 09:47:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL EAID PGOV IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

010947Z Dec 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 008150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PGOV, IZ 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON PRESIDENT'S IRAQ SPEECH: FRENCH 
RESPONSE 
 
REF: STATE 216314 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Poloff discussed the President's major policy speech 
on Iraq and the just-released U.S. strategy paper on Iraq 
with MFA DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf affairs 
Antoine Sivan and MFA Iraq desk officer David Cvach November 
30.  Sivan welcomed our briefing, and said he would 
incorporate the President's speech and U.S. strategy paper on 
Iraq into briefing materials for Presidential Diplomatic 
Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne's visit to Washington 
later this week. (Note: We also provided a copy of the 
executive summary from the U.S. strategy paper and a copy of 
the President's November 30 speech to Presidential Middle 
East Advisor Dominique Boche November 30.) 
 
2. (C)  After briefly reviewing the executive summary of the 
U.S. strategy paper, Sivan underlined three elements of GoF 
Iraq policy, concluding that he did not see major divergences 
between the U.S. and GoF approaches.  First, he concurred 
that Iraq's stability would not be achieved overnight; the 
international community therefore needed to work 
cooperatively to help build a base for national political 
unity in Iraq, without which Iraq's reconstruction was not 
possible.  Second, Iraq must find its own political model, 
without one being imposed from outside, which must entail a 
new political equilibrium, inclusive of all Iraqis.  Thirdly, 
Sivan stressed that the GoF did not want to create problems 
for the U.S., but it would continue to insist on Iraqi 
sovereignty and territorial unity.  Further on this point, 
Sivan asked to what extent the newly articulated U.S. 
strategy presaged a reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq, 
cautioning that France was being careful not to be seen 
calling for a U.S. withdrawal or timetable -- he cited PM 
Villepin's November 29 CNN interview as an example of the 
GoF's effort to remain constructive.  Poloff stressed that 
the U.S. strategy would remain conditions-based and not 
linked to an artificial calendar; at the same time, the MNF-1 
posture in Iraq would remain flexible and responsive to 
changing conditions. 
 
3. (C) Comment: Despite Sivan's suggestion that the GoF and 
U.S. have convergent approaches on Iraq, he gave no 
indication of French willingness to offer additional 
assistance to achieve our shared goal of a democratic, stable 
Iraq.  When pressed on new assistance, Sivan remained evasive 
and described existing French programs, such as student 
exchanges in France, in which some 500 Iraqis have 
participated since 2003, and French participation in the EU 
JUSTLEX rule of law training program, which has welcomed 40 
Iraqi police officers so far.  Sivan's readout on the 
November 28-29 FM Zebari visit to Paris, which offers 
additional details on the long-stalled French offer to train 
Iraqi police, is reported septel. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04