US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4790

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004790 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PNAT, PHUM, IZ, Elections, Parliament 
SUBJECT: FORMER EXILE SAYS REAL TEST TO COME WITH POST- 
ELECTION PM SELECTION 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. 
Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  Former Iraqi exile Saad Saleh Jabr 
predicted that the Sunni victors in the upcoming 
elections would ally with Iyad Allawi, providing the 
Kurds with a king-making position of supporting either 
Allawi or Adel Abdel Mahdi.  He complained about 
Iranian "control" of key Iraqi factions and geography, 
and assessed the USG as incapable of thwarting either 
Iranian or Syrian interference in Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Poloffs met November 30 with Saad Saleh Jabr 
(whose father was a Shia prime minister under King 
Feisal II).  Jabr, who was an active politician in 
exile during the Saddam years, shared his analysis of 
the upcoming Iraqi elections.  He predicted that the 
four major parties -- Shia (Unified Coalition), Kurds 
(Kurdish Alliance), Sunni (Tawafuq Front), and Allawi 
(Iraqi National List) -- will each win between 40 to 
65 seats.  Under this scenario, the resulting rough 
balance among the four groups will affect the choice 
of a prime minister.  Jabr expects the Sunni winners 
to ally with Allawi.  The question will then be what 
the Kurds decide to do.  Jabr believes that with a 
little nudge from the USG, the Kurds will back 
Allawi.  If not, they will back SCIRI's Adel Abdel 
Mahdi.  Jabr is certain Jafari will not remain 
Prime Minister.  He predicted that support among the 
Shia for the Unified Coalition would drop 
significantly from January (where they gained a 
majority of votes).  "The Shia masses may be 
illiterate but they are not dumb-dumbs," he said, 
observing that the Shia government under Prime 
Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari had failed to deliver 
services or otherwise improve the daily lives of most 
Iraqis.  Jabr said Ayatollah al-Sistani would maintain 
his decision not to endorse any list, but worried that 
unsophisticated Shia would be misled into believing 
that Sistani supported the Unified Coalition, noting 
his picture has already been identified with the 
list.  He confirmed the widely held expectation that 
the Sunni community would come out to vote in large 
numbers, and dismissed concerns about possible 
terrorist violence. 
 
3. (C)  Jabr strongly urged the USG to become involved 
in the formation of the new government.  Poloffs 
stressed that the U.S. is committed to the right of 
the Iraqi people to choose their government and urged 
that Jabr watch the President's speech to be given 
later in the day.  Jabr criticized the rationale for 
what he viewed as a "hands-off approach".  "How can 
you say you're not involved with thousands of troops 
on the ground."  He added, "Iran is involved, why not 
you?"  He also emphasized the four-year time frame of 
the new government, which he argued underscores the 
need to get it right.  Jabr said a primary concern of 
voters about the new cabinet will be whether the 
ministers are clean (i.e., not corrupt).  He predicted 
Allawi would win support from the following camps: 
those who fear Iranian influence, those who are 
secular or distrust religiously aligned political 
parties, and those Shia disenchanted with Jafari's 
government.  In a familiar lament, Jabr recounted that 
his father was a Shia and his mother a Sunni, implying 
voters like him who regretted the increase in 
sectarianism in Iraqi politics would support Allawi. 
Acknowledging the injustices done to the Shia by 
Saddam, he nonetheless argued this history did not 
excuse attempts by Shia leaders to exclude the Sunni 
community from Iraqi politics. 
 
4. (C)  Jabr expressed regret about complete Iranian 
"control" of Iraqi politicians and groups such as 
Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Abdel Mahdi, and Badr Corps, and 
of southern Iraq, especially Basra.  "Iranian presence 
couldn't be any stronger," he asserted.  When asked to 
provide specific examples of Iranian control, he said 
"that is the stupidest question."  He said the 
Iranians are "laughing at the Americans," and asserted 
the USG had no means of thwarting Iranian influence. 
He also shared his view that the USG could not affect 
Syrian behavior, either.  "What can you do," he asked, 
"talk louder?"  He noted that Iran pays many of these 
political leaders as well as "the top 15 clerics" 
inside Iraq. 
KHALILZAD