US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4788

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004788 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, KDEM, IZ, Security, Sunni Arab 
SUBJECT:  ANBAR SECURITY CONFERENCE DRAWS  STRONG SUNNI 
PARTICIPATION; LOCAL LEADERS PUSH  FOR ISF LEAD 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 4733 
 
Classified By: ROBERT S. FORD, POLITICAL COUNSELOR 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary and Comment.  During an 
unprecedented gathering on November 29th, 
leaders from Ramadi and elsewhere in Anbar 
province agreed to build Iraqi capacity to take 
over security in Anbar's cities.  Nearly all of 
the assembled leaders encouraged Anbaris to 
join the ISF, but there were divided opinions 
on the optimal degree of "local content" in the 
Iraqi Army and Police.  Several senior ISF 
commanders spoke frankly of the need to field 
an integrated (cross-sectarian) army and the 
necessity of support from the civilian 
population.  An ex-Saddam era Army officer 
presented a detailed plan for future CF 
presence in populated areas that involved 
immediate reductions in CF security operations 
in the cities and eventual transfer of foreign 
troops to staging sites outside the cities. 
Local Sunni Endowment leader Sheikh Dhaher 
thrust the responsibility for security upon the 
Anbaris themselves.  He disavowed Islam's 
relation to terrorism and emphasized that the 
terrorist's end-game is destruction. 
 
2. (C) Summary and Comment (cont.) The group 
agreed to a follow up meeting on December 1, 
the same day the Independent Electoral 
Commission Iraq (IECI) will meet in Ramadi as 
part of its planned outreach.  Following the 
meeting, Anbaris looking for immediate tangible 
proof of American "sincere intentions" in the 
form of easing of checkpoints or relaxing 
vehicle restrictions will most likely be 
disappointed.  We need to emphasize greater 
Sunni involvement in the impending elections, 
while sustaining efforts to improve security 
conditions in the province gradually. 
Continued engagement will help clarify 
achievable goals as we reach out to Sunni Arab 
leaders.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
3. (C) Two-hundred Anbari technocrats, ex- 
military officers, tribal sheikhs, provincial 
officials and citizens braved terrorist threats 
to attend a conference on November 29 in 
Ramadi.  Senior Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 
commanders and CF commanders sat side by side 
with imams and senior provincial officials 
during a four and half hour session on 
establishing sufficient security to permit the 
withdrawal of the CF from Anbar's cities. 
 
4. (C) Governor Ma'moon Sami Rasheed (al 
Alwani) was primarily responsible for 
organizing the event, but the overwhelming 
turn-out was due at least in part to the 
support of the province's three most senior 
imams (reftel).  Interim Provincial Police 
Chief Abdul Kareem again failed to appear in 
the capital.  Fortunately, there were no terror 
attacks; three indirect fire attacks (mortars) 
struck harmlessly near the provincial council 
building and a possible VBIED attack was 
successfully averted. 
 
Building the ISF With the 'Sons of Anbar' 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Conferees heatedly debated whether Anbar 
natives should form the majority of recruits 
for the Iraqi Army units (and, less often 
mentioned, for the Iraqi Police) in the 
province.  General Hekmet of the 7th Division, 
IA, himself a native of the western town of 
Ubaydi, observed that indigenous troops were 
savvier about the criminal elements in Anbar. 
Sheikh Anwar Kharbit stated, "Ramadi is not an 
island," and emphasized that raising ISF units 
from solely Sunni (or Ramadi'i) sources was not 
the solution.  A lower ranking tribal sheikh, 
Nasir Abdul Kareem, preached, "Sunni and Shia 
need to put hand in hand to achieve peace and 
prosperity in Anbar." 
 
6. (C) Ex-military officer Sabah Menfi al-Rawi 
dredged up the Minister of Defense's 
controversial quote "Anbar is a safehaven for 
terrorists," which others later interpreted as 
"Anbar is a terrorist province."  Rawi 
postulated this statement proves the Ministries 
of Interior and Defense are involved in a 
conspiracy to marginalize the Sunni.  His plea 
to reinstate the local former regime military 
officers (of which there are many, he asserted) 
held the audience's rapt attention. 
 
Debate on Solutions 
------------------- 
 
7. (C) Rawi offered a committee of sheikhs 
headed by the governor to recruit and vet 
potential cadre for a "native defense force and 
police."  Rawi suggested that "friction" 
resulting from the proximity of Coalition 
Forces and the local populace caused the "armed 
population" to engage the CF in combat, instead 
of fighting their real enemy, the insurgents. 
The forceful ex-officer proposed a series of 
restrictions on the CF, to include prohibitions 
on manning checkpoints, conducting raids and 
foot patrols, accessing the main highways, and 
leaving the bases unconditionally.  Removing 
the CF to "staging places" outside Anbar's 
cities would lessen the psychological impact of 
Coalition troops on the populace.  Brigadier 
General Hekmet noted that the 7th Division was 
still attempting to recruit an additional 2,000 
soldiers from Anbar, which Rawi dismissed as 
"too little, too late."  In the fiery exchange 
that followed, Rawi claimed Hekmet had been 
selected and later rejected for command of a 
unit that was recently deployed to Diyala. 
Hekmet taunted Rawi (who had admitted 
consulting with the last two Ministers of 
Defense), that "no one in Basra or Diyala went 
whining to the Minister, 'we must have a 
completely indigenous army.'"  Pleading for the 
support of sheikhs and imams, Hekmet announced, 
"we are all Iraqi and we're all under 
occupation". 
 
Security and Economics 
---------------------- 
 
8. (C) Brigade Commander Colonel Haider of the 
1st Division, IA (already stationed in Ramadi) 
spoke of the unemployed and halted projects. 
He expressed doubt an Anbar army could 
guarantee security, because security depends on 
more than the army; it depends on the civilian 
population, too.  He asked the audience, "now 
that we have heard your views, what are we 
going to do?"  The Assistant Division 
Commander, General Williams, reiterated that 
money and economic development only come with 
security and offered Falluja as a prime 
example. 
 
9. (C) Sheikh Dhaher of the Anbar Sunni 
Endownment admonished, "Anbaris must assume 
responsibility."  He suggested that even the 
Muslim Ulema Council agrees terrorism has 
nothing to do with Islam.  He asked the 
audience, "What do terrorist attacks reap?" 
Answering his own query, he stated 
"destruction".  (Comment:  Overall our 
interlocutors do not complain about a 
disruptive impact of CF operations on economic 
activity.  Far more common are emotional 
charges of improper treatment or displays of 
disrespect by troops.  In the Anbari mindset 
(as in much of the Middle East), raiding or 
"Cordons and Knock" missions -- both of which 
involve intrusion into the home sanctuary -- 
are a form of disrespect.  End Comment.) 
 
10. (C) Participants (Head Table): 
 
Iraqi Security Forces: 
---------------------- 
7th Iraqi Army Division (due in Anbar in 
January) General Hekmet 
Special Police Commando ('Wolf Brigade') 
Commanding Officer (due in Ramadi in December) 
Abdul Salam 
1st Iraqi Army (7th Brigade) Colonel Haider 
 
Provincial Government: 
---------------------- 
Governor Ma'moon Sami Rasheed (al Alwani) 
Provincial Council Chairman Khudair Abdel Jabar 
Provincial Council Deputy Chairman (and Anbar 
IIP Secretary General) Dr. Abdelsalam al Ani 
 
Imams: 
------ 
Sheik Yassin Muflin al Hambadi of Hit 
Sheikh Dhaher Mohammed Awad Obaydi 
Sheikh Thamir Ibrahim Dharer al Assafi 
 
Coalition Forces: 
----------------- 
Assistant Division Commander General Williams 
2BCT Commander Colonel Gronski 
6th Civil Affairs Group Governate Support Team 
Col Burdine 
3-7 Brigade Commander LtCol Turner 
229 Brigade Commander LtCol Roggeman 
PP3 (Police Advisor) Major Rice 
2MarDiv FAO Capt Aziz 
SET Officer Lane D. Bahl 
KHALILZAD