US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4774

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREF, EAID, ECON, EIND, MOPS, IZ 
SUBJECT: TOWNS NEAR SYRIAN BORDER RETURNING TO NORMALCY 
AFTER COMBAT OPERATIONS 
 
Classified By: Robert S. Ford, Political Counselor 
for reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary. This is a SET Ramadi Cable.  Site visits to 
two, separate portions of the Western Euphrates River 
valley revealed -- post-combat operations -- a generally 
positive climate for the December 15 elections.  There are 
no immediate humanitarian crises and military planners hope 
to expand the number of polling sites near the Syrian 
border.  Iraqi civilians populated the market place in 
hard-hit Husaybah, and interest in civic affairs appears on 
the rise in both Husaybah and Barwana to the east.  The 
region requires ITG attention to rebuild their essential 
services infrastructure, eroded both by years of neglect 
under Saddam and the recent military operations.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (S) PolOff accompanied 2MarDiv Commanding General to 
view Haditha Dam operations and discuss political 
developments in the Haditha-Hit corridor November 22.  On 
November 24, PolOff joined the Assistant Division Commander 
and drove from al-Qaim to the Syrian border, observing the 
resurgence of commerce and normalcy after operations in 
Husayba, Karabilah and New Ubaidi.  Insurgent activity has 
starkly dropped over the last two weeks in Anbar, most 
likely in part the result of the concerted effort to 
disrupt terrorist support networks along the vital 
Euphrates valley.  Like squeezing a tube of toothpaste, 
insurgent cells may have relocated over the Syrian border; 
to the village of Anah, a center point between al-Qaim and 
Haditha; and perhaps northwest on the route to Mosul. 
Nonetheless, the present drop in attacks provides an 
opportunity to kick-start reconstruction in the region and 
administer elections in different locations than were 
possible in the October referendum. 
 
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Elections Planning; Reemergence of Local Government 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
3. (C) Pending a decision by the IECI on whether it has the 
capacity to administer the election on its own (the so- 
called "Falluja model"), Marine planners are reviewing 
potential polling site location for security.  Centers are 
slated for Haditha, Hit, Baghdadi and Barwana.  Nearby 
Haqlaniyah is deemed too unstable to allow its own site. 
As on October 15, there will be buses to transport voters 
to nearby Haditha to vote.  According to official IECI 
tallies of the October referendum, only 744 voted in 
Haditha, 899 in the larger Hit (where 17 of the 22 polling 
centers registered zero votes) and 1,014 cast their ballots 
in Barwana's three polling centers.  The battalion 
commander noted that in Barwana, a tiny hamlet on the north 
side of the river, a 'festive' atmosphere prevailed on 
October 15.  The leading sheikh and city council member 
from the former insurgent stronghold also recently applied 
to the Anbar governor for guidance in selecting a new 
mayor.  On November 18, the Hit City Council formally 
registered their protest of the detention of three of their 
members and are boycotting further meetings.  After 
operation 'Rivergate', CF forces have retained a presence 
in downtown Haditha, Haqlaniyah and Barwanah, and civil 
affairs teams are active in all three. 
 
4. (C) Toward the Syrian border, CF commanders will 
recommend to the IECI additional sites in Husaybah, Sadah, 
Karabilah and New Ubaydi.  In the October referendum, 1,153 
area voters cast ballots in Sadah, near al-Qaim.  (Note: 
In their official tally, the IECI listed eight polling 
centers in al-Qaim, but voting actually took place in the 
village of Sadah due to security considerations.  End 
Note.)  Husaybah's mayor has allegedly stepped forward, as 
well as the police chief.  The latter claims he has 50 
officers under his command.  PolOff will confirm with the 
Provincial government whether these are indeed legitimate 
leaders.  New Ubaydi is a tight 'company' town consisting 
of rows of identical prefab concrete housing.  The local 
commander believes many of the city's current inhabitants 
are squatters.  Old Ubaydi, which may not receive a polling 
site, is located in the opposite bend of the river. 
 
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Internally Displaced People: Quashing the Rumors 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
5. (C) CA teams reported there had been two camps of IDPs 
during and shortly after operations.  One area, said to 
have housed an estimated 2,000 persons fleeing the 
operations in Husaybah, was located adjacent to the large, 
state-owned (and currently defunct) Super Phosphate plant. 
Those who had not returned home may have taken residence in 
former plant employees housing (conex looking structures). 
Another former camp was just outside New Ubaydi.  It too 
was abandoned, and only plastic water bottles littered the 
yard where 2,000-4,000 IDPs moved in and out, waiting for 
the end of the combat phase.  It was apparent driving 
through Karabilah, the scene of some of the harshest 
fighting, that many had not returned (or chose to stay 
indoors).  It was the only area where the civilians did not 
wave or smile at the passing convoy. 
 
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Repairing Infrastructure Damage 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (S) CF are focusing on restoring electrical power to 
Husaybah in the near term.  The hospital suffered damage in 
an exchange between insurgents (firing from the grounds of 
the hospital), but is open for outpatient services.  NGOs 
and Ministry of Health are evidently in contact with the 
facility.  Civilians complain of the lack of potable water, 
which is a common complaint in the province, especially in 
the capital, Ramadi.  Perhaps a remnant of its former 
privileged status, New Ubaydi retains power and water 
services, and a near-term goal is to restore the telephone 
lines.  The school, one of the better looking buildings in 
Anbar, is intact, yet reportedly has not had a teaching 
staff for two years.  There is money in this corner of the 
province: motorboats ply the river, and many of the houses 
in Husaybah (destroyed and otherwise) are enormous, grand 
residences.  Smuggling, present for centuries, appears to 
have benefited the Husaybawis far more than the 
Karabilawis, judging from the quality and square footage of 
their homes.  Amazingly, there seemed no shortage of fuel. 
There were minimal lines at several gas stations and even 
kerosene is said to be in sufficient supply. 
 
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Atmospherics 
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7. (C) It has been a while since an FSO has been able to 
survey western portions of the Iraqi Euphrates.  Hulking 
state-owned factories appear to have dominated the economy 
of this stretch.  Both the cement factory we flew over 
(south of al-Asad) and the second we viewed in al-Qaim were 
belching smoke and producing.  The Super Phosphate plant 
lay dormant, surrounded by mounds of earth, some stained 
yellow, perhaps a legacy of chemicals aside from the yellow 
cake allegedly produced in the plant's heyday.  New Ubaydi, 
too, has a large, abandoned factory at its entrance, but 
most of the housing was for workers at the Phosphate plant. 
The road leading into the town is pockmarked by deep gouges 
from detonated IEDs, and people were scarce.  The Civil 
Military Operation Center was buzzing, however.  Iraqi 
soldiers and Americans alike noisily refurbished the former 
sports hall they occupied.  A whitewashed (but legible) 
painting of Saddam read, "If there isn't democracy in 
sport, there's no democracy".  Back on the Syrian border, 
the Husaybah markets were bustling.  Bright red radishes 
the size of a fist and assorted other vegetables and fruits 
lined the souk.  Most astounding was the reaction of the 
people.  Nearly all children waved, even from far across a 
field.  Many 'military aged men' responded to the 
Commander's greeting; drivers of cars stopped to allow our 
convoy to pass shrugged and gave a wave, dismissing the 
inconvenience. 
 
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Comment 
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8. (C) Progress is uneven, and the mood varied dramatically 
between Karabilah and Husaybah.  In the short-term, CF and 
USAID-funded NGOs can ameliorate the challenges in the wake 
of combat operations.  In the medium term, the towns and 
villages need to select officials and work with Directors 
General to seek funding through the Provincial 
Reconstruction and Development Councils.  Supposedly, the 
ITG announced a 37 million USD fund (like Falluja's special 
funds) for Husaybah and its neighbors, and an additional 20 
million USD for the Haditha-Hit corridor.  It is not clear 
about how the fund will be dispersed or which entities 
retain oversight.  Our experience with the ITG on such 
reconstruction funding has been mixed at best.  Surprising 
amid the collapsing homes of Husaybah's worst hit 
neighborhood, there is a buoyancy among the men, women and 
children on the street, almost akin to post- al-Fajr 
Fallujah.  Perhaps sustained attention like Fallujah has 
enjoyed could produce a similarly politically active 
citizenry on their way to demanding and finding ways to 
restore essential services. 
KHALILZAD