US embassy cable - 05PARIS8088

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT AND EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: PTER, FR, PGOV 
SUBJECT: SARKOZY'S SECURITY ADVISOR DISCUSSES RECENT 
UNREST, TERRORISM 
 
REF: 11/18/2005 PARIS POINTS 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) Summary: Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy's security 
advisor, a 20-year plus veteran of the French National 
Police, said the recent unrest had taken the security 
establishment by surprise, but that the massive yet moderate 
response of the police prevented a major crisis of public 
order.  Although he said the unrest had no direct link to 
Islamic fundamentalism or terrorism, the security advisor, 
Jean-Marc Berlioz, said that the GOF separately had stepped 
up its surveillance and intelligence gathering presence in 
mosques, prayer halls, halal butchers, North African tea 
cafes, and prisons.  End summary. 
 
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RECENT UNREST 
------------- 
 
2. (C) Inspector General of the National Police Jean-Marc 
Berlioz told Poloff November 28 that many factors contributed 
to the recent social unrest in Paris' suburbs and across 
France, but that in general, integration and socio-economic 
problems were the root causes.  These issues were familiar to 
the GOF, said Berlioz, although this specific unrest did come 
as a surprise.  He confirmed that orders had been given to 
the more than 11,000 police dealing with the unrest not to 
use lethal force, even if they were under attack.  Berlioz 
praised the restraint of the police.  Cognizant of the need 
to show moderation and firmness, police officials frequently 
rotated and rested the forces on the street.  Still, Berlioz 
said "we were lucky" in that one shot by a policeman could 
have provoked an aggravation of the unrest.  Despite the fact 
that more than 250 police were wounded, some very seriously, 
the police exclusively used nonlethal force, said Berlioz. 
In doing this, he said the police gave politicians room to 
maneuver and respond. 
 
3. (C) Police officials were also aware, said Berlioz, of the 
need to demonstrate absolute control of the situation, not 
only in order to dampen the violence but also to prevent the 
emergence of vigilante groups.  A massive police presence was 
the primary way to demonstrate this control, said Berlioz. 
When asked why a major city like Marseilles was spared the 
unrest, Berlioz replied saying that it was by far the best 
integrated of French cities.  It was a port city, open to the 
world, and despite persistent poverty, opportunity existed 
there that did not in other cities. 
 
-------------------- 
GOF COUNTERTERRORISM 
-------------------- 
 
4. (C) The GOF's draft counterterrorism law was approved by 
the National Assembly last week, with approval by the Senate 
expected by the end of the year.  Berlioz said political 
fighting about the law was almost nonexistent.  All sides 
recognized that it was essential to reform certain aspects of 
France's fight against terrorism.  Primary reforms, said 
Berlioz, include adding police capabilities to track 
internet, cell phone and flight information.  In addition, in 
the aftermath of the June bombings in London, GOF officials 
realized that France needed to vastly upgrade its video 
surveillance of public areas.  This necessitated changing 
French privacy legislation.  Berlioz would not rule out 
additional legislation in coming months if the need arose. 
 
5. (C) France has focused on improving its ability to target 
and trace potential terrorists, said Berlioz, and the draft 
legislation would help.  In addition, French domestic 
intelligence - primarily the DST and RG (both under the 
control of the Ministry of Interior) - had stepped up its 
surveillance of mosques, prayer halls, halal butchers (who 
are seen as particularly linked to extremism), and North 
African tea/waterpipe cafes.  Another primary focus for the 
GOF is the French prison system, which has served as a place 
to recruit petty criminals into terrorist networks.  Berlioz 
said recent networks, including one linked to Iraq and 
another led by GSPC sympathizer Safe Bourrada, had begun in 
prison.  Public measures to deal with this issue include 
recruiting moderate imams to minister to the prison 
population.  Other, covert, measures include greater human 
and technical surveillance of the prison population, said 
Berlioz. 
 
6. (C) Despite these new measures, the GOF remains 
pessimistic regarding a possible terrorist attack, said 
Berlioz.  As an example, he cited the use of suicide bombers 
in the London bombings.  Security measures are essentially 
based on a potential attacker's fear of dying, said Berlioz. 
Take away that fear, and the person becomes nearly impossible 
to stop.  For this reason, it was essential that France 
better develop its targeting and tracing capability.  The 
idea of when, not if, a terrorist attack would occur has also 
spurred the GOF to work on increasing public awareness of 
terrorist threats, said Berlioz.  Traditionally, French 
intelligence chiefs were never in the public eye.  Interior 
Minister Sarkozy changed this, said Berlioz, and told them 
they needed to appear publicly and to give interviews, so 
that the French public would grow accustomed to their 
presence and the work of their agencies in dealing with the 
terrorist threat.  The GOF was impressed by the British 
public's sangfroid during the July bombings, said Berlioz, 
and it wanted to ensure that the French public was equally 
prepared.  (Note: As a demonstration of Sarkozy's decision, 
in recent days Pascal Mailhos, the head of the RG, and Pierre 
de Bousquet, the head of the DST, have given extensive press 
interviews on the threat of terrorism.  They have cited, 
among other issues, the role of Iraq in global jihadism, the 
threat of Islamist recruitment in French prisons, and the 
threat posed by the GSPC terrorist group.  End note) 
 
7. (C) Berlioz added that Iraq has taken the place of 
Afghanistan and Chechnya as a focal point for global 
jihadism.  One difference, said Berlioz, was that jihadists 
engaged in combat in Iraq generally do not return to their 
home countries.  Those who went to Afghanistan were less 
likely to engage in combat, preferring to attend training 
camps before returning home.  There was therefore a greater 
potential for Afghanistan veterans to form sleeper cells in 
their native countries, said Berlioz.  (Note: Another 
difference noted by French C/T professionals is that the time 
between conversion to extremist thought and action has become 
extremely short, making it more difficult for police and 
intelligence services to uncover new cells formed to send 
jihadists to Iraq and/or to plan attacks on French soil. 
(reftel) End note.) 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton