US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI9008

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 009008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINS, EFIN, KCRM, KTFN, PBTS, PK, IN, TS, Counter-Terrorism, GOI 
SUBJECT: MEA SHARES INDIAN INTEL BLAMING LET FOR DIWALI 
BOMBINGS 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 8782 
     B. NEW DELHI 8680 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (S) Summary: Following up on MEA Additional Secretary 
Meera Shankar's November 14 assurance that the Indian 
government would share with us information regarding the 
October 29 Diwali bombings (Ref B), MEA Joint Secretary 
(Americas) S Jaishankar on November 29 confirmed to Charge 
and Poloff that Kashmiri businessman and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 
(LeT) member Tariq Ahmed Dar, who has been in police custody 
since November 11, organized the attacks.  Dar's identity 
emerged through an assessment of telephone data, he added. 
Jaishankar then summarized, but did not pass, a paper marked 
"Secret," which he said was based on "information from Dar," 
presumably derived from Dar's interrogation by police.  The 
information Jaishankar conveyed to us includes background on 
Dar himself; limited identifier data on the terrorists who 
carried out the attacks; and some data on Dar's 
terrorism-related financial transactions.  Jaishankar did not 
mention any direct role by ISI or the Pakistani government. 
News of Dar's arrest and his alleged connection to the Diwali 
bombings have been reported in the Indian media, but the 
press has been debating his role in the attack and in LeT. 
This is the first information we have received from the GOI 
confirming Dar's and the LeT's role.  End Summary. 
 
Dar's Affiliations 
------------------ 
 
2.  (S) From the information Jaishankar provided, Dar is a 
former Hizbul Mujahedeen (HM) member who joined 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in July 2005.  His point of contact was Abu 
Huzaifa, who Jaishankar characterized as an LeT division 
commander in Srinagar.  Dar also communicated with LeT cells 
on both sides of the LoC, and -- as Indian media had reported 
-- he also issued press statements on LeT's behalf to the 
media in Srinagar. 
 
The Perpetrators 
---------------- 
 
3.  (S) According to Dar, three "Pakistanis" and one 
"Kashmiri" carried out the Diwali bombings.  (NOTE: 
Jaishankar added that, in the Indian context, "Pakistanis" 
indicated non-Kashmiri Pakistanis, whereas "Kashmiri" could 
have meant a person from either Indian or Pakistani Kashmir 
-- he did not further specify.  END NOTE.)  All four 
terrorists departed Delhi soon after the attacks, but Dar did 
not know where they went.  Also, per Jaishankar, "implicit in 
Dar's statement" was that the November 21 arrests in Srinagar 
of Mohammad Rafiq Shah and Mohammad Hussain Fazli were 
"related" to the bombings.  (NOTE: Jaishankar did not clarify 
this statement.  END NOTE.) 
 
The Money 
--------- 
 
4.  (S) Dar also provided to the police some information on 
international money transfers.  He had received a total of 
five million rupees (approximately $110,000) from both HM and 
LeT combined since 2002.  Specific transactions included two 
transfers in late October for a total of 900,000 rupees 
(approximately $20,000) from an individual named Akbar Khan 
via UAE Exchange House in Dubai, and a series of transfers in 
July-October totaling 1,400,000 rupees (approximately 
$31,000) from al-Masha Trading, also in Dubai.  Also, Dar 
within the 2002-05 period deposited 2,800,000 rupees 
(approximately $62,000), which he identified as money from 
HM, into a separate account.  Jaishankar clarified that these 
transactions involved bank accounts, and not hawala 
transactions.  (NOTE: Jaishankar's statement suggests that 
some of the information may have been derived from 
investigating Dar's bank accounts, and not from Dar himself. 
END NOTE.) 
 
Comment: The Start of a Beautiful Relationship? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5.  (S) The real story here is the start of a productive flow 
of intelligence that goes beyond MEA handing us press 
clippings.  The data Jaishankar provided is, admittedly, of 
limited value on its own, but it is undoubtedly meant to be a 
show of good faith, particularly in the wake of MEA's renewed 
requests for USG information on the IC-814 hijacking (Ref A). 
 If we are able to reciprocate in some useful fashion (not 
necessarily on IC-814), it could be the start of a more 
productive exchange of terrorism-related information. 
BLAKE