US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS4203

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: ESDP: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FORCE REQUIREMENT 
CATALOGUE 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 4202 B. BRUSSELS 3747 
 
Classified By: USEU Political Military officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) A major European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
deliverable for the current UK Presidency was the 
Requirements Catalogue 2005 that was approved by the European 
Council on November 21.  The catalogue lists military 
capabilities needed to execute the European Security Strategy 
and the Headline Goal 2010.  The NATO Consultation, Command, 
and Control Agency (NC3A) has assisted the EU with computer 
modeling to derive the force requirements, which will be sent 
to EU nations by year's end, and they will use the catalogue 
as a guide for pledging capabilities and assets against the 
requirements.   Member State Feedback on the requirements 
catalogue will be used to create a follow-on "force 
catalogue" in 2006 listing all forces, assets and 
capabilities pledged to the EU, and a "progress catalogue" in 
2007 identifying shortfalls between requirements and pledges. 
 This more detailed force planning may result in an increased 
requirement for airlift, and a realization that the EU may 
not be able to launch concurrent operations simultaneously 
due to lift shortfalls. EU planning may instead require a 
"break" between two high intensity operations due to 
sustainment issues. End Summary 
 
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EU's Headline Goal 2010 
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2. (U) In June 2004 the EU Council endorsed the Headline Goal 
(HG) 2010, and posted ambitious new targets for European 
Security and Defense.  The HG 2010 reflects the aims of the 
European Security Strategy (ESS), builds upon the previous 
Headline Goal (2003), and lists several milestones for the EU 
to attain in its attempt to "share in the responsibility for 
global security."  HG 2010 also outlines a roadmap for 
generating the military capabilities required to execute the 
ESS.  A key deliverable for that process is the Requirements 
Catalogue 2005. 
 
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Requirements Catalogue: Place Your Bids 
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3. (C) The just approved Requirements Catalogue incorporates 
results of an initial catalogue which was the product of 
technical work performed during the iterative process between 
the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) completed in May 2005.  The final 
Requirements Catalogue is a detailed list of total 
requirements. It includes an overall EU force number as well 
as a lengthy list of capabilities, assets, and forces 
required to execute the ESS and to lend substance to ESDP. 
The final catalogue, a UK Presidency deliverable, is 
scheduled for release by the end of 2005.  Once that 
catalogue is released, the EU will launch a bidding process 
where nations will pledge capabilities against the listed 
requirements.  A Headline Goal Questionnaire, adapted from 
and compatible with NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire (as 
part of the "Berlin-Plus" arrangements), will be sent to 
nations asking them to list the forces and capabilities they 
possess.  Nations' pledges will be used to create a "Force 
Catalogue" in 2006, which will detail national forces 
available for EU-led crisis management operations.  The force 
catalogue will be followed up with a "Progress Catalogue" in 
2007 identifying shortfalls between requirements and pledges. 
 
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Key Elements of the Requirements Catalogue 
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4. (U) The primary elements of the catalogue are; strategic 
planning hypotheses, five illustrative scenarios and a list 
of the capabilities required to meet the HG 2010 goals.  The 
EU has developed five ESDP mission scenarios based on the ESS 
including; separation of parties by force (SOPF), 
stabilization, reconstruction and military advice to third 
countries (SR), conflict prevention (CP), evacuation 
operations (EO) and assistance to humanitarian operations 
(HA).  EU planners also developed a set of variables that may 
have an impact on the EU's ability to launch and sustain 
operations including; distance from Brussels to the theater 
of operations, reaction time required for member states' 
forces, mission duration, force rotation and the EU's 
capacity to sustain several operations simultaneously. 
 
 
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Not (Un)Like NATO's Force Planning Process 
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5. (U) The EU's attempt to develop a Force Requirement 
Catalogue is not unlike the early stages of NATO's 
well-established Force Planning Process (FPP).  In the early 
stages of NATO's FPP, NATO's Consultation, Command, and 
Control Agency (NC3A) conducts a similar type of 
computer-assisted operational analysis, drawing on Military 
Tasks (MT) and representative Planning Scenarios (PS) which 
act as capability drivers.  The end result of the NC3A work 
is the derivation of the Alliance's Minimum Military 
Requirement (MRR) based on the Level of Ambition (LoA) as 
stated in the Ministerial Guidance (MG).  Thus, NATO's MRR is 
roughly equivalent to the EU's Requirements Catalogue.  The 
two institutions sharply diverge, however, in what happens 
next.  As outlined above, in the EU's current process, the 
derivation of the Force Catalogue followed by a strictly 
voluntary "bidding process" is the end-state.  In NATO's FPP, 
the development of the MMR is merely the initial step in a 
ten-year process that seeks to challenge Allies to fulfill 
the MRR by producing the capabilities identified in it.  A 
cursory comparison between the EU's process and the more 
detailed, interactive NATO FPP suggests that the EU's passive 
and voluntary system based upon bidding against a 
Requirements Catalogue may not be successful in "driving" 
Member States to produce the necessary capabilities. The 
European Defense Agency (EDA) is trying to introduce greater 
competition into the European Defense Equipment market and 
rationalize the demand side in hopes of inducing the industry 
to produce the needed capabilities. (See reftels for more 
details.) 
 
 
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NC3A To The Rescue 
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6. (C) The initial limited version of the requirements 
catalogue was produced during the Luxembourg Presidency.  The 
EU tasked the European Defense Agency to contract the NATO 
Consultation, Command, and Control Agency (NC3A) to produce a 
computer-assisted analysis to "verify" and expand upon the 
previous findings.  (NC3A also provided such support for the 
initial Headline Goal requirements work in 2000.)  NC3A's 
detailed work has provided the EU a more precise, detailed 
rendering of requirements for the final Catalogue. 
 
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Planning Assumptions 
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7. (C) The EU Military Staff created a set of strategic 
planning assumptions to assist in uncovering the total 
capability and force requirement.  Planning assumptions 
include an operational ESDP range from 4,000-15,000 
kilometers from Brussels. Fifteen thousand km may seem like a 
stretch for the airlift-poor EU, but in reality the EU would 
embark on these missions only for "Evacuation Operations" and 
"Assistance to Humanitarian Operations" scenarios on a 
limited scale.  To put these significant operational ranges 
into context, the distance from Brussels to South Africa is 
9,200KM and to Perth, Australia, it is 14,200KM.  Clearly 
airlift will be the long pole in the tent for either 
scenario, since the rapid response requirements negate use of 
sealift. 
 
8. (C) For the higher intensity scenarios such as separation 
of parties by force, the EU's Achilles heel appears to be 
"reaction time," which may require at least 60 days before 
the EU can have troops on the ground operating at an "initial 
capacity".  The EU level of ambition also seeks to carry out 
"two concurrent operations", but in practice, "concurrent" 
will likely mean separating the start of each operation by at 
least two months to allow time for the strategic lift to 
reset. 
 
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Impact on EU Strategy and Capability Requirements 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
9. (C) One of the unintended consequences of this more 
detailed, computer assisted modeling by NC3A compared to the 
EU's previous assumptions, mostly based on the previous 
Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue 2002, is that preliminary 
figures for this year's catalogue will represent increases in 
total force requirements.  Especially striking is the jump in 
the requirement for airlift, and the resulting increase in 
the EU airlift shortfall.  This change is also due to the 
significant increase in the EU's level of ambition and 
corresponding airlift requirements for "Evacuation 
Operations." 
 
10. (C) The EU is also looking at decreasing the time 
required for a decision to launch rapid response operations, 
which would enable military authorities to shift loads to 
sealift assets, and ease the reliance on airframes.  Because 
of sustainment difficulties, it is also likely the approved 
catalogue will include a warning that the EU will require one 
year between each "separation of parties by force" operation 
and six months between "conflict prevention" missions. 
 
McKinley 
.