US embassy cable - 05ABUJA2326

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NIGERIA: VICE PRESIDENT ATIKU UPDATE ON DOMESTIC POLITICS

Identifier: 05ABUJA2326
Wikileaks: View 05ABUJA2326 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2005-11-29 11:00:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PGOV PREF PREL NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

291100Z Nov 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002326 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE  ASS TO POLAD 
LONDON PASS TO JACMOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK 
 
E.O. DECL: 11/26/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREF, PREL, NI 
SUBJECT:  NIGERIA:  VICE PRESIDENT ATIKU  UPDATE ON 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JOHN CAMPBELL for reasons 1.5 b) 
and d). 
 
Refs:  a) Abuja 1957, b) Abuja 1902 and previous 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Vice President Atiku says that he has 
taken the necessary steps to register, legally, a new 
political party through which he can contest the 2007 
elections should he fail to win the Peoples Democratic 
Party (PDP) nomination.  For the time being, however, he is 
using the Movement for Defense of Democracy (MDD) to 
maintain a dialogue with President Obasanjo and to try to 
retain some influence within the PDP.  If that dialogue 
fails from his perspective, then he will roll the MDD into 
his new political party, which will be joined, he said, by 
elements from other, already existing parties.  He remains 
confidant that he will be elected next President of 
Nigeria.  He said that the President lacks sufficient 
political support in the National Assembly and among the 
governors to amend the constitution in a way that would 
allow Obasanjo to extend his time in office past 2007. 
And, he continued, Obasanjo has little support amongst the 
military, meaning that he has no military card to play. 
End summary. 
 
2. (S) Atiku asked to see me on Thanksgiving Day 
(November 24), immediately upon my return from Washington 
and just before he traveled to Lagos to meet, he said, with 
Yoruba political personalities disaffected from Obasanjo. 
He said that he had registered legally a new political 
party, but, for the time being, he has continued to use the 
MDD as a vehicle for dialogue with the President and the 
PDP.  If this dialogue fails, he said, he will move the MDD 
into his new party, which will include significant support 
from former adherents of the ANPP.  He said that he was 
rallying the North and the Southwest against efforts in the 
Senate to provide some means for Obasanjo to remain in 
office. 
 
3. (S) Atiku remains confident that Obasanjo  efforts to 
extend his term in office will fail because he has 
insufficient support in the National Assembly and among the 
governors.  The President has also lost the support of the 
military, he continued, so there is no military card for 
him to play.  Ensuring that the rule of law is upheld, and 
the constitution is followed, he continued, is the 
responsibility of Nigerians.  But, Nigeria  democracy 
needs international sympathy and support. 
 
4. (S) I replied that U.S. policy remains based on 
adherence to the rule of law, the need for Nigeria  2007 
elections to be free and fair, to be more credible than its 
predecessors, and that a civilian government should be 
succeeded by a civilian government - the period of military 
regimes is over.  Atiku commented that Obasanjo has little 
interest in ensuring free and fair elections because he 
knows that he could not win one.  That, he said, is the 
reason why legislation to strengthen the Independent 
Electoral Commission has bogged down.  He said that his 
supporters in Washington are working with friendly members 
of Congress for hearings on the Obasanjo third-term issue. 
 
5.  (S) At the close of the conversation, Atiku turned to 
the current government  macro-economic achievements, 
which, he said, lays the groundwork for the future ending 
of poverty.  The challenge, he continued is to apply the 
new macro-economic policies to the  eal conomy to 
generate jobs and promote rural investment.  When I 
commented on Nigeria  positive, international role, Atiku 
acknowledged it, but said it was far more than Obasanjo 
achievement: 
Nigeria  active role in West Africa 
reflected its long-term, strategic interests. 
 
6. (S) Comment:  Atiku believes that Obasanjo is doing 
all that he can to manipulate the political system to 
remain in power, and thereby block the Vice President's 
aspirations to be president.  Only at one point in our 
conversation did he briefly allude to  vil counselors t 
the Villa as pushing Obasanjo forward; Atiku believes that 
it is Obasanjo  own ambition that is driving him.  He also 
believes that Obasanjo will fail because of the lack of 
domestic support, and that he himself will win the 
presidency in 2007 because of grass-roots support and 
superior political organization.  Atiku is also wrapping 
himself in the undeniable achievements of the current 
government  acro-economic reform and diplomatic activism 
 hile at the same time attacking Obasanjo. Still, the 
break between the two is not total:  when we met, President 
Obasanjo had left for Malta for a Commonwealth meeting, 
leaving Atiku in charge.  Atiku commented in passing that 
former dictator Ibrahim Babangida, with probably the 
deepest pockets of any political figure in the country, 
will not subject himself to the rough and tumble of 
electoral politics.  On the other hand, Babangida told me 
that he is interested in establishing a new political party 
to contest in 2007, and, if his new party fails to win 
office, to function as a  oyal opposition. Atiku also 
hinted at a possible personal rapprochement with former 
head of state (also an ex-military dictator) Buhari. 
Certainly if one were to throw his support to the other, 
the result would be a strong political alignment.  Clearly 
the political  rchitecture f Nigeria in the run-up to 
2007 is still evolving. 
FUREY 

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