US embassy cable - 05KATHMANDU2635

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002635 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, NP 
SUBJECT:  UML LEADER CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT 
UNDERSTANDING WITH MAOISTS 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 2556 
 
     B. KATHMANDU 2605 
 
Classified By: CDA Elisabeth I. Millard, Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C)  CPN-UML leader Madhav Kumar Nepal told the Charge 
November 28 that the political parties would shun violence, 
even if the Maoists broke the cease-fire, due to expire 
December 3.  He speculated that the insurgents might pose 
conditions for extending the cease-fire.  He emphasized his 
continued suspicion of the Maoists and said that he had 
requested the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) to monitor the Maoists' commitments.  The UML 
leader believed that the Parties still had room to negotiate 
with the King, but distrusted the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). 
He hoped that the King would respond positively to the 
Maoist-Parties understanding and act to return power to the 
political parties, who would continue their successful 
protest program for democracy.  End Summary. 
 
Maoists Might Extend Cease-Fire 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In a November 28 meeting, the Charge cautioned MK 
Nepal of the possible consequences if the political parties 
were associated with a group using violent means to attempt 
to overthrow the government.  MK Nepal asserted that the 
Maoists might extend the cease-fire, speculating that the 
Maoists might stipulate to the King some conditions, such as 
withdrawing his call for the municipal elections scheduled 
for February 8.  If the King met the conditions, the Maoists 
would be prepared to prolong the cease-fire indefinitely; 
however, if the King reacted negatively, the Maoists would 
break their cease-fire.  MK Nepal claimed that the Parties 
had tried to convince the Maoists to extend the cease-fire, 
but he acknowledged the Maoist cadre were "restless" because 
of the losses they had suffered during the cease-fire.  He 
indicated that the Parties had not agreed on how to react if 
the Maoists did not extend their cease-fire. 
 
But UML Remains Suspicious Of Maoists 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) MK Nepal admitted that he was of two minds about the 
Maoists.  Part of him wanted to take the Maoists into his 
confidence and trust them, but he also feared that the 
Maoists intended to use the political parties.  He wanted to 
have the opportunity to observe their actions.  Recalling the 
Maoist refusal to negotiate with the political parties when 
former PM Deuba's government had extended an offer to do so, 
MK Nepal also worried that the Maoists might have a secret 
understanding with the King.  However, he concluded that the 
political parties had achieved a great deal by persuading the 
Maoists to agree to the 12 point understanding (ref A). 
Saying that they had turned a new page, he argued that the 
Parties should gauge their actions and call them to account 
if they violated their commitments. 
 
And Asks OHCHR's Assistance 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (C)  The UML head relayed that he had just met with UN 
OHCHR head Ian Martin to request OHCHR involvement to monitor 
Maoist commitments to multiparty democracy, rule of law, and 
human rights.  MK Nepal said that the Maoists had not agreed 
to abide by or recognize Nepali law.  The definition of rule 
of law was debatable, but the Maoists and Parties might be 
able to agree on and establish certain norms.  He suggested 
that the seven-party alliance could arrange among themselves 
to gather information on Maoist behavior, which they could 
transmit to OHCHR.  Martin had said he would consider Nepal's 
request. 
 
5. (C) MK Nepal admitted that the Parties could not assure 
the displaced people that they could return to their homes. 
Explaining that some of the IDPS were believed to have been 
 
 
involved in retaliatory action against the Maoists, he said 
that there was so much bitterness on both sides that a human 
rights organization would need to monitor the return and 
bring both sides together.  MK Nepal noted his surprise at 
seeing the large number of abductions had continued and that 
the Maoists needed to be criticized on this score.  He 
acknowledged that the seven-party alliance had not yet 
concentrated on these issues. 
 
Parties Still Have Room To Negotiate With The King 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6. (C) MK Nepal stated that the seven-party alliance would 
meet after hearing the King's response to the Parties-Maoist 
understanding -- a response that was expected after the 
King's scheduled December 2 return to Nepal.  The Charge 
stressed that it was important that the King reach out to the 
political parties, and if he did so, that the Parties 
respond.  The UML leader set forth the steps he believed 
necessary for the King to take.  First, he should postpone 
municipal elections; second, retreat from the moves taken 
February 1 and since; and third, indicate a "willingness to 
hand over complete power to the political parties."  The King 
should dissolve the current government, appoint a prime 
minister and either reinstate parliament or form an all-party 
government.  He explained that the 1990 Constitution would 
need to be changed to curtail the King's power.  He 
emphasized that the King could reach a private understanding 
with the political parties before constituent assembly 
elections to ensure the retention of a ceremonial monarchy, 
if the King undertook not to usurp power in the future. 
 
But Distrust the RNA 
-------------------- 
 
7. (C) MK Nepal insisted that the Parties would not accept 
keeping the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) under the King's 
control.  He charged the RNA with interfering with Party 
activities and expressed his belief that free and fair 
elections would be impossible if the RNA were free to move 
around.  Nepal emphasized that the army should be "a 
national, not royal, army."  UML Central Committee member 
Jhalanath Khanal, who had recently been in Pyuthan District 
in mid-western Nepal and sat in on the meeting, alleged that 
while lower-ranking officers had allowed the UML's activities 
to occur without any disturbances, senior officers had 
instructed the RNA to conduct checks and other activities 
that interfered with the Party's work. 
 
UML Demonstrations a Success 
---------------------------- 
 
8. (C) MK Nepal claimed that his Party's recent 
demonstrations (in Butwal, Pokhara, and Jhanakpur) had been a 
success, despite the government's attempts to create 
obstacles (ref B).  The government had funded the publishing 
and distribution of pamphlets denouncing the mass meetings, 
cancelled bus permits to prevent travel to the meeting sites; 
threatened some bus owners if they carried demonstrators; 
enforced strict limits on the number of passengers busses 
could carry (disallowing standing passengers on anybody 
riding on the roof); and set up temporary security 
checkpoints along the roads leading to the meeting sites.  MK 
Nepal asserted that the Party could have doubled its 
estimated attendance to 200,000 had the government not acted. 
 He added that all seven-parties were cooperating and 
participating in the UML-organized meetings. 
 
9. (C) He stated that the UML would watch to see whether the 
government disturbed a UML demonstration scheduled for 
December 2 in Kathmandu.  He commented that the Party would 
not be able to prevent the people from reacting violently if 
the security forces provoked them, adding that the UML 
suspected the security services might do so.  The UML head 
said that his Party had clearly told the Maoists that they 
should not do anything that would lead to violence.  He 
indicated that if violence occurred, it would be at the 
instigation of the government.  After the current round of 
party-organized meetings the alliance planned to hold an 
 
all-party demonstration in Jhanakpur, where they hoped to 
draw 400,000 participants. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C)  Despite MK Nepal's deep suspicion of the Maoists and 
his realization that they could destroy the political 
parties, his current plan seems to be to continue trusting 
them while waiting to see how the King responds.  He was not 
able to detail a plan of how the parties would react if the 
King rejected the understanding or if the Maoists broke the 
cease-fire, beyond calling on the international community to 
pressure both the Maoists and the King.  The possibilities of 
a trainwreck December 2-3 in light of the current lack of a 
plan by the Parties seems to be growing. 
MILLARD