US embassy cable - 05NAIROBI4902

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004902 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015 
TAGS: KE, KDEM, PGOV, PREL, KCOR, Referendum, Kibaki 
SUBJECT: A DEFINING MOMENT FOR KIBAKI,S PRESIDENCY 
 
Classified By: AMB. WILLIAM M. BELLAMY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C)  Summary.  President Kibaki met with me and three 
other chiefs of mission on November 25.  The COMs praised the 
government,s handling of the Constitutional Referendum and 
Kibaki,s stoic leadership following the massive &no8 vote. 
 We urged that Kibaki seize this chance to remove corrupt and 
non-performing ministers, bring in fresh talent and put his 
economic and political reform program back on track.  Kibaki 
reacted warmly to the demarche but was vague with regard to 
the future.  If he makes the wrong move now by retaining the 
corruption kingpins in his cabinet alongside advisers who 
have badly served him politically, he may have a hard time 
governing at all.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C)  Chiefs of Mission from the US, UK, Sweden and Canada 
called on President Kibaki at State House on November 25 to 
discuss the Referendum defeat, Kibaki,s dissolution of his 
cabinet and his future plans.  After praising the fairness of 
the Referendum voting, and Kibaki,s calm leadership in the 
wake of his defeat, the like-minded group of diplomats urged 
Kibaki to regard the referendum setback as an opportunity to 
rid his cabinet of corrupt and non-performing ministers and 
as a chance to re-launch his political and economic reform 
agenda.  The message from the Kenyan voters, we pointed out, 
was not that they wanted snap elections (as the "Orange" 
opposition movement is demanding) or a new President. 
Rather, the message seems to be that they want a cleaner, 
harder working, less divided government.  Only the President 
can deliver on that demand.  We urged Kibaki to be as 
inclusive as possible in forming a new cabinet. 
 
3. (C)  Kibaki agreed with our characterization of the 
voters, message.  He said his priority was to form a 
government that &would get down to work.8  Too many months 
had already been lost squabbling over political issues, 
including a new constitution.  Kibaki added that he wanted 
his new cabinet to be broadly based, but was not sure that 
Orange Democratic Movement opponents would be cooperative. 
If &Orange8 ministers were included in the cabinet, the 
risk is that they would prove as divisive and disruptive as 
before, Kibaki said. 
 
4. (C)  Throughout the cordial 40-minute conversation, Kibaki 
avoided any hint of specific personalities to be included in 
the new government.  He was confident, however, that &we 
won,t have any shortage of talent to draw upon.8  Beyond 
promising a &hard working8 government in which ministers 
concentrated on their portfolios rather than on partisan 
politics, he offered little in terms of future policy 
directions. 
 
5. (C)  Comment.  Other like-minded diplomats could have been 
included in the demarche, but the group was kept small to 
lend a degree of intimacy to the discussion.  Kibaki was 
accompanied only by policy adviser Stanley Murage and 
personal assistant Hyslop Ipu. 
 
6. (S/NF)  In part, this demarche was motivated by sensitive 
reporting available to the US and UK (which was not shared 
with the other diplomats) that several prominent Kikuyu 
politicians had told Kibaki that his referendum defeat was 
due to the joint efforts of the UK and US governments and 
Kenya,s national intelligence service (NSIS).  (Note:  At 
least one newspaper report has quoted former Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs Minister Murungi blaming NSIS for 
"failing to provide political intelligence8 and calling for 
the dismissal of NSIS director Boinett.) 
 
7. (C)  If Kibaki believes this talk, he displayed no sign of 
it during our discussion.  His overall performance, however, 
was not completely reassuring.  Despite his generalized 
assurances about bringing new faces into the cabinet, he 
repeatedly passed up opportunities to indicate that he would 
dismiss ministers identified as corrupt (e.g. Transport 
Minister Murungaru) or incompetent (e.g. Foreign Minister 
Mwakwere) or as purveyors of the kind of bad, sectarian 
political advice that led to the referendum debacle in the 
first place (e.g. Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister 
Murungi). 
 
8. (C)  The choice facing Kibaki is stark.  He can clean 
house, and thus send a signal to voters that he,s heard them 
loud and clear.  This would restore a good measure of 
Kibaki,s tarnished popularity and would position him to 
resume progress along the political and economic reform 
track.  (He will need some help from the &Orange8 camp to 
do this.  If he reaches out and is rebuffed by "Orange" 
politicians, he will still win points with the public for 
being Presidential.)  Alternatively, Kibaki could rebuff the 
electorate by retaining the group of mostly Kikuyu insiders 
who have served him and the country so badly in recent 
months.  Circling the wagons would keep rivals like Raila 
Odinga out of power (for now) but would almost certainly lead 
to increased official corruption and even less transparency 
and efficiency in government than before.  Under this 
scenario, few Kenyans outside the Kikuyu heartland would 
regard the Kibaki government as truly representative or 
responsive to their interests. 
 
9. (C)  While the choice seems obvious, it may not be so 
apparent to Kibaki.  Given opportunities in the past three 
years, he has often selected the security of tribe and 
kinship over the uncertainties of outreach and coalition 
building.  If he does so again, he may find it hard to govern 
at all.  End Comment. 
BELLAMY