US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA3518

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 003518 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CCA; WH/CAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: CU, ETRD, ETTC, PREL 
SUBJECT: CANADA: SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT 
 
REF: A. (A) SECSTATE 207359 
     B. (B) OTTAWA 1676 
 
Classified By: EconMinCouns Brian Mohler, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
 1.  (C)Summary:  While Canada has a long history of economic 
engagement with Cuba, it has supported U.S. efforts to 
address Cuban human rights issues in international fora and 
has practiced a consistent, if cautious, policy of 
maintaining ties with dissidents and pressing Cuba on human 
rights issues. Post recommends that Title III of the Libertad 
Act continue to be suspended for Canada, on grounds of 
national interest.  End Summary. 
 
CANADA-CUBA ECONOMIC TIES 
------------------------- 
2.  (SBU) In 2004, Canada's exports to Cuba were 327 million 
Canadian dollars (252 million USD), somewhat less than U.S. 
exports. Canadian imports from Cuba in 2004 were 453 million 
USD.  The 600,000 Canadian tourists to Cuba each year, 
attracted mainly by low cost, account for roughly a third of 
Cuba's total tourist trade.  In 2004, Cuba ranked fifth in 
popularity as a tourist destination for Canadians, after the 
United States, Britain, Mexico and France.  Canadian 
companies are active in the Cuban tourism industry through 
hotel supply-contracts.  Two Canadian-based tourism-related 
companies have recently been listed as Specially Designated 
Nationals under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. 
Because of the tightly intertwined nature of U.S. and 
Canadian financial services markets, much back-office 
processing for Canadian banks takes place in the U.S., 
raising potential for payments to Cuban companies operating 
in Canada to be blocked. 
 
3. (U) Canada is also currently the largest foreign investor 
in Cuba; the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council lists over 
eighty Canadian companies which do business or have done 
business with Canada (listing available at 
www.cubatrade.org.).  Canadian officials consistently 
complain about the extraterritorial reach of the Libertad Act. 
 
CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE UN 
----------------------------------- 
4. (SBU)  This year, Canada cosponsored --for the 14th 
consecutive time-- the U.S.-led resolution on Cuba in the UN 
General Assembly.  It also issued a statement in the UN Human 
Rights Committee listing Cuba among Canada's top 25 priority 
human rights countries.  While the list is not in rank order 
and space constraints limit detail on each country, it does 
specifically address Cuba,s human rights record. 
 
5. (C) Though it does not support U.S. positions in every UN 
vote, Canada is generally helpful and cooperative with regard 
to Cuban-sponsored UN human rights resolutions.  Canada 
demonstrates significant cooperation in working quietly and 
behind the scenes, frequently complementing USG efforts. 
Recently, during the UNGA's Third Committee, Canada called 
the vote on one of the three resolutions that the U.S. 
opposed and, indeed, voted with the U.S. on the 
Cuban-sponsored resolution "Promotion of Peace as a Vital 
Requirement for Full Enjoyment of Human Rights by All." 
 
6. (C)  In general, the Government of Canada evaluates each 
resolution based on its merits and Canada's perceived ability 
to influence or moderate the language and outcome.  Canadian 
counterparts stressed that they were influential in 
moderating the language in some of the more controversial 
paragraphs in the recent "Right to Food" resolution that 
passed in the Third Committee by a vote of 171 to 1 (the U.S. 
was the lone objector).  Canada shares the U.S. objective of 
creating a strong Human Rights Council(HRC) in the UN system 
that would address human rights issues more effectively than 
the current Human Rights Commission.  While flexible about 
the Council's membership, Canada is receptive to the U.S. 
idea of HRC candidates providing letters in support of their 
candidacies. 
 
A POLICY OF POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Canadian officials believe that Canada's policy of 
economic and political engagement with Cuba allows them to 
raise human rights and democracy issues more effectively with 
Cuban officials.  Canada -- like the U.S. -- is mindful of 
future opportunities to influence the post-Castro Cuban 
transition to a democratic system and focuses on maintaining 
access to the full range of people in the political process. 
 
8. (C) Both the USG and GoC give high priority to outreach to 
Cuban dissidents, although the Canadians prefer to meet 
privately with Cuban Government officials to protest 
crackdowns on dissidents, rather than making public 
statements. Out of concern for the safety of dissidents, 
Canadian diplomats do not publicize meetings with them.  They 
do not ask for permission to meet with dissidents, although 
they assume Cuban intelligence services know of most of these 
meetings.  At the May civil society assembly held at a 
private location in Cuba, a Canadian Embassy representative 
attended as an observer to prevent interference from Cuban 
officials, despite Cuban government requests that they stay 
away. 
 
9. (SBU) The policy of engagement also allows Canada to raise 
human rights in other venues.  During Cuban Foreign Minister 
Filipe Perez Roque,s visit to Ottawa in October, Foreign 
Affairs Minister Pettigrew raised human rights abuses in 
Cuba.  Press reports highlighted that Canada pressed Cuba on 
its human rights record, and expressed particular concern 
about three dissidents on hunger strike.  The three 
dissidents in question ended their hunger strikes soon after 
the Foreign Minister,s visit to Canada. Although there is no 
proof that the two are directly linked, the Canadians believe 
that their pressure encouraged the Cuban government to 
address their concerns. 
 
10 (U) Canada also has a small bilateral aid program (3-5 
million USD a year)which includes some support for Oxfam work 
with NGOs, technical assistance for economic agencies, and 
periodic shipments of medicines and other essential needs 
items.  (See www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb for details.) 
 
9. (SBU) Local Cuba watchers have generally endorsed the 
GOC,s approach.  Ana Faya, Director of the Cuba project at 
the Canadian Foundation for Latin America, (FOCAL) an 
independent think tank that receives GOC funding, 
corroborated much of what Foreign Affairs Canada officials 
told us about Canada,s dealings with Cuba and Cuban 
dissidents.  Faya, who recently moved to Canada from Cuba 
where she observed the Canadian Embassy in action, said that 
Canadian diplomats maintain consistent, quiet contact with 
dissidents.  &They know the organizations and their 
people,8 she said.  With the support of the GOC, FOCAL 
publishes a newsletter and runs a series of Cuba programs 
designed to draw attention to human rights issues in Cuba and 
to encourage democratization.  The group is currently working 
on a 2-year research initiative on governance and social 
justice in Cuba (in conjunction with the Florida 
International University Cuban Research Institute). 
 
RECOMMENDATION: CONTINUE TO SUSPEND TITLE III IMPLEMENTATION 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
10.  (C)Embassy Ottawa recommends that implementation of 
Section III of the Libertad Act continue to be suspended for 
Canada on grounds of national interest and further 
cooperation on transition to democracy in Cuba.  In addition 
to the overall value of our close cooperation with Canada, a 
NATO ally, in key regions of the world (e.g. military support 
in Afghanistan) and in Latin American democratic institutions 
and processes such as the OAS and Summit of the Americas, 
Canada has given us effective support on Cuban human rights 
issues in the UN Third Committee and in our efforts to forge 
a more effective human rights structure in the UN.  Canada 
practices a cautious but consistent policy in Cuba of 
maintaining communications with key dissidents. 
 
11. (C)Canada has longstanding economic ties to Cuba; a 
decision to apply title III would not change the level of 
Canadian economic engagement.  However, it would generate a 
new bilateral irritant at a time when we are looking for 
Canadian cooperation in other regions and areas ranging from 
earthquake relief to continuing military support in 
Afghanistan, where the Canadian Forces just took its first 
casualty during its current deployment.  We believe that U.S. 
entry restrictions on key Canadian corporate officials under 
Title IV of the Libertad Act create a sufficient disincentive 
to Canadian investment in potentially expropriated properties 
and effectively underscore our opposition to such 
investments.  (Comment: given the geography of Canada and the 
degree of bilateral economic, social and cultural 
integration, an entry bar to the U.S. can be a major 
logistical and social headache for a Canadian. End comment) 
 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS