US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1657

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 001657 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR DAS MARK PEKALA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EZ 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS PEKALA'S VISIT TO PRAGUE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William Cabaniss for reasons 1.4 b+d 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Czechs this month marked the 16th 
anniversary of the Velvet Revolution.  As you will see during 
your visit this week, the country has embraced a 
pro-transatlantic foreign policy, with the Czech government 
and NGOs playing a significant role in efforts to promote 
democratic transformation in Cuba, Belarus, Iraq and 
elsewhere.  Czech military reform and integration into NATO 
is well advanced; the Czechs are still struggling to define 
their niche within the EU.  Bilateral relations are healthy, 
with the question of visa waiver the only contentious issue. 
The Czech economy is performing very well, with 5% growth and 
strong investment inflows, despite incomplete structural 
reforms and persistent corruption.  Foreign and economic 
policy will both be shaped by decisions made by PM Paroubek, 
whose attention is squarely on elections next June; Paroubek 
has already redrawn the political landscape by his decision 
to openly cooperate with the Communist party.  We suggest 
your message during your meetings in Prague focus on three 
points: 
(a) we applaud Czech efforts to foster democratic 
transformations in Cuba, Iraq, Belarus the Balkans and 
elsewhere; we want to coordinate and support these efforts. 
(b) we appreciate Czech support for U.S.-led efforts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and our continued cooperation in the field 
of non-proliferation 
(c) we are concerned that a more active Communist role in 
foreign policy (e.g., visits by North Korean and Iranian 
delegations) shows a puzzling lack of Czech resolve and will 
introduce irritants into our bilateral cooperation and reduce 
the active and positive role the CR is playing 
internationally. 
 
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The "bulldozer" remakes the landscape 
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2. (C) Since he took over as prime minister in April, Jiri 
Paroubek has repeatedly demonstrated that he deserves his 
nickname, the bulldozer.  He has single-handedly turned 
around the fortunes of his Social Democratic Party (CSSD), 
bringing them nearly even with the opposition Civic Democrats 
(ODS).  By dropping the long-standing taboo against openly 
working with the Communist Party (KSCM) at the national 
level, Paroubek has dramatically increased his power and 
bargaining room:  he no longer needs to rely on the one-vote 
majority his formal three-party coalition government enjoys, 
but instead can fall back on the eleven-vote majority that 
CSSD and KSCM together can provide; he can push through 
legislation (like the new union-friendly Labor Code) that his 
center-right coalition partners oppose but his party's core 
voters want; and he can essentially ignore the threat that 
the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) will bring down his 
government (as it successfully brought down former PM Gross). 
 
 
3. (C) Opinion polls show that Paroubek's nuanced approach to 
the third largest party in Parliament -- he will seek the 
votes of the KSCM, as he would from any party, but he refuses 
to "formally" cooperate with them (i.e., form an actual 
coalition) until they reform (primarily by renouncing the 
crimes of the past and accepting the primacy of transatlantic 
relations in Czech foreign policy) -- has not cost him any 
support.  Of note:  even a committed anti-communist like 
former President Havel has made clear that he is not opposed 
to what Paroubek is doing.  While the November 17 celebration 
of the 16th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution brought 
passionate debate about the Communist party and its legacy, 
Paroubek clearly feels vindicated in his approach.  Last week 
brought the first sign that Paroubek may have found the limit 
in how far he can push, when he quickly backed down from a 
suggestion that the time had come to rescind the Lustration 
Law that prevents former secret police officials from filling 
public sector positions. 
 
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What the Communists mean for us 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Paroubek is described as having a pragmatic, rather 
than principled, approach to governance.  He, and many other 
senior officials, have assured us repeatedly that whatever 
political deals Paroubek may cut with KSCM in order to pass 
bills on social and economic policy, the CSSD will deal only 
with its coalition partners or ODS on foreign and security 
policy.  However, we have already seen examples of where 
Paroubek's cooperation with KSCM had a foreign policy impact. 
 Specifically, last month a DPRK parliamentary delegation 
visited the CR at the invitation of KSCM Chairman Filip; the 
delegation visited the Temelin nuclear power plant despite 
strong objections from the USG and Czech MFA.  This week 
Filip is bringing a group of Iranian parliamentarians to 
Prague and has tentatively secured a meeting for them with 
the First Deputy Foreign Minister (a CSSD appointee).  During 
a lunch meeting on November 17, Ambassador told Paroubek that 
the USG is concerned about the increasing influence of KSCM 
on foreign policy, as well as their role in promoting 
economic policy measures that will hurt the investment 
climate.  We need to continue to reinforce this message, so 
that the pragmatic prime minister realizes there is a cost to 
his political approach. 
 
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A small transatlantic friend 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (C) With the notable exception of the KSCM and a few of 
the most left-leaning members of CSSD, there is broad 
agreement across the Czech political spectrum about the 
importance of transatlantic relations.  Likewise, with the 
notable exception of President Klaus and some (but by no 
means all) ODS members, Czechs broadly support the EU.  Like 
other Central European states, the CR does not believe the 
two are incompatible; Czechs appreciate transatlantic ties as 
a way to balance their relations with Brussels, as well as 
for the values that they respect in U.S. foreign policy.  As 
a small country, the Czechs are well aware of the need to 
prioritize their foreign and security policies, and they have 
identified goals that broadly support USG objectives.  They 
have embraced military reform and specialization within NATO, 
distinguishing themselves for their NBC and special forces 
capabilities (the latter will be redeployed in Afghanistan 
next year).  While participating in ESDP (Czechs and Slovaks 
recently announced they will form their own battlegroup), 
they have made NATO their clear priority.  They have 
maintained a small but steady presence in Iraq, with nearly 
100 military police training Iraq forces near Basra 
(extension of the deployment for next year is expected to 
pass easily in December, given the support of the opposition 
ODS).  They give priority focus to the Balkans, where the 
Czechs have troops in both Bosnia and Kosovo (in the latter 
leading the multinational brigade in the central region). 
Government assistance is designed to strengthen civil society 
in the Balkans, Iraq, Cuba and other countries in transition. 
 Unfortunately, their goal of engaging internationally is not 
always matched by success in influencing CFSP decisions in 
Brussels.  We can help by encouraging the Czechs to play 
better and smarter in Brussels. 
 
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Czechs know something about transformational diplomacy 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
6. (C) One legacy of the forty year struggle against 
Communist dictatorship, and then of the long tenure of Vaclav 
Havel as president, is that support for democracy and freedom 
is a core principle of Czech foreign policy.  Foreign 
Minister Svoboda is an ardent supporter, as is his former 
deputy Petr Kolar, who assumes his duties as Czech Ambassador 
to the U.S. this week.  The two established a "Transformation 
Cooperation Unit" within the MFA, that funds programs to 
support civil society and democratic opposition in Cuba, 
Belarus, Iraq, and the Balkans, with secondary focus on 
Moldova and Burma.  The MFA cooperates closely in this effort 
with Czech NGOs, notably People in Need, the largest Czech 
NGO, whose former director, Tomas Pojar, recently replaced 
Kolar as Deputy Minister for Bilateral Relations.  Beyond 
their direct assistance, the Czechs try to use their 
diplomacy to influence EU and UN decisions to support reform, 
most famously their efforts to maintain an EU common position 
that supports Cuban peaceful opposition by inviting 
dissidents to national day celebrations.  Former President 
Havel supports the government effort, through his own work on 
Cuba, and through inspirational messages he sends, for 
example to support protesters during last year's Orange 
Revolution.  We are coordinating with the Czechs through 
USAID (jointly supporting radio broadcasts to Belarus, for 
example) and in other ways, but can always do more.  With the 
possibility that Czech foreign policy could becoming more 
"pragmatic," USG encouragement and support for Czech efforts 
can help bolster the position of Svoboda and others. 
 
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Just how pragmatic will it get? 
------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Paroubek wants Czech foreign policy to promote 
business interests; there is already an emphasis on 
rehabilitating economic ties with Russia and other countries 
to the east.  But China is Paroubek's current focus.  After 
leading a large trade delegation to China in the fall, 
Paroubek invited Premier Wen Jiabao to visit Prague in early 
December.  The MFA reports tremendous pressure to finalize a 
new economic agreement in advance of the visit, despite 
concerns that some of the Chinese demands would run afoul of 
EU rules.  Many Czechs (not least MFA staff) were surprised 
that Paroubek's visit to Beijing included no significant 
mention of continued human rights abuses, and this is not 
expected to be a prominent topic next month in Prague. 
 
8. (C) Perhaps a stronger test of just how pragmatic Czech 
foreign policy will become is the EU arms embargo on China. 
According to the MFA, it was only the Czechs and the Danes 
that prevented the arms embargo from being lifted earlier 
this year; Czech policy has long urged that the embargo 
cannot be lifted absent three steps:  some human rights 
improvement, a secure toolbox, and an effective EU dialogue 
with strategic partners, including the U.S.  MFA staff have 
told us that the Czech position would eventually have to 
yield to a concerted EU push on this, although with the issue 
largely dormant for the bulk of Paroubek's time in office the 
policy itself has not been tested.  Another test is continued 
Czech coordination on broader non-proliferation goals, 
notably the VERA-E passive surveillance system.  Two years 
ago the Czechs pulled the plug on a planned VERA-E sale to 
China, at USG request, and they have since cooperated with us 
to prevent sales to countries of concern.  We need to show 
our appreciation, and to work closely with the Czechs, to 
prevent the commercial pull of these sales from outweighing 
the non-proliferation concerns. 
 
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Visas and visits 
---------------- 
 
9. (C) Committed Czech transatlanticists -- lamenting the 
inevitable increasing influence of the EU, the general 
popular disinterest in international affairs and lack of 
first-hand knowledge about the U.S., and the threat posed by 
pragmatic policymakers -- are not shy about telling U.S. 
officials that tangible signs of U.S. appreciation for Czech 
efforts would facilitate their task of keeping Czech foreign 
policy consistent.  They believe that changing U.S. visa 
policy for Czechs is far and away the one area that would 
make a positive impact:  ideally adding the CR to the visa 
waiver program, or at least reducing fees or otherwise making 
noticeable "improvements" in the application process. 
Happily, officials like FM Svoboda and new Ambassador Kolar 
realize that, regardless of the state of Czech preparedness 
for visa waiver, Congressional action on this is not in the 
cards at this point; they agree that the most important thing 
is for the two governments to make progress on the Visa 
Roadmap, through the Bilateral Consular Working Group (which 
will next meet on December 7).  However, most Czechs -- 
including some MFA staff -- are not as reasonable.  After 
visas, Kolar and others believe that bilateral visits can 
best strengthen the position of FM Svoboda and other 
supporters of current foreign policy.  The MFA would like 
Svoboda to call on Secretary Rice early next year, when he 
visits the U.S. to formally open a new Czech Consulate in 
Chicago.  You can expect to hear about both of these issues 
during your visit. 
CABANISS