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| Identifier: | 05SANTIAGO2423 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05SANTIAGO2423 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Santiago |
| Created: | 2005-11-28 15:53:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ASEC EAGR EAID PREL SENV TBIO AVIAN FLU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTIAGO 002423 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DSERCC, DS/IP/WHA, DS/OSAC, CA/ACS/OCS, WHA/BSC, WHA/EX E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC, EAGR, EAID, PREL, SENV, TBIO, AVIAN FLU SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA - SANTIAGO, UPDATE ON SEC FOR USMC BALL REF: A)STATE 209622 B)02135 1. SUMMARY: The DCM convened a meeting of the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) at Embassy Santiago on 11/22/05 to discuss the Avian Influenza Trip wires for Chile. The EAC also reviewed final security preparations for the 230th USMC BAll. The meeting was chaired by the DCM with AMB, RAO, E/POL, RSO, DAO, MILGRP, DEA, LEGATT, APHIS, PAO, FCS, CONS, MGT, and MSG present. END SUMMARY. 2. The EAC discussed security for the 230th USMC Ball that will be held on November 26, 2005 at the Marriott Hotel in Santiago, Chile. RSO has coordinated security with local police who will use metal detectors, k-9 units, explosive detection machines and police special reaction teams. The EAC is confident that sufficient security will be present to secure the site. RSO will also request additional support from local police for Embassy residences the night of the ball. The EAC has no information on any potential threats at this time. 3. The following baseline Tripwires were approved by the Santiago EAC and in substance by RMO Brooks Taylor. The following proposed tripwires address the possibility of human cases of avian influenza in Chile and/or evidence of the virus demonstrating more efficient human-to-human transmission elsewhere in the world. These tripwires are based on the following assumptions, should sustained human-to-human transmission become a reality. To avoid repetition, only new measures taken under each Tripwire are listed - all previous measures under previous Tripwires will be maintained. ASSUMPTIONS: A. The disease would spread rapidly, both within a particular country and internationally. B. Once the World Health Organization has declared a human pandemic - but probably even before then - airlines will cancel flights as countries try to control the spread of the disease. Some countries may bar individuals coming from infected countries. C. The Embassy must keep in mind "double standard" concerns, and will coordinate consular, medical, evacuation, etc. with appropriate Department offices. D. The Embassy must keep in mind that many of its children attend international schools, which must be kept in the information loop as well. E. The Embassy should carefully consider all the ramifications of authorized departure and/or ordered departure, as in fact it may be safer to actually remain in Chile. F. The Embassy should remain in constant contact with Clinica Las Condes and Clinica Alemana, as well as with the Ministry of Health. G. The Embassy will procure sufficient supplies of Tamiflu, N100 Nano-masks, N95 masks, and additional hand cleansers, as well as the items recommended in the RMO,s list. 4. Tripwire 1: Any case of avian influenza among humans in Chile. Action: Management Section/Health Unit will send an information notice to all Mission personnel and the Consular Section will send a warden message to all American citizens detailing the episode, and suggest preventive measures. The notice will also be posted on the Embassy website. Embassy will notify RMO Lima and State Med. 5. Tripwire 2: Confirmed human-to-human transmission occurs in one or more neighboring countries - singly or in clusters - but not in Chile. This is particularly significant if there are multiple, geographically diverse clusters, or if a cluster occurs in a major transit hub. Action: a. Consider immediate authorized departure of U.S. family members and non-emergency personnel in consultation with State, if the U.S. itself is relatively avian flu-free and if the airlines are flying. Have evacuation plans for both the healthy and sick. Explore evacuation by military airlift. b. Institute screening practices for all visitors to U.S. Government facilities, limit their numbers, and refuse entry to those visibly ill or who are coughing. c. Order mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any flu-like symptoms or has a family member with flu-like symptoms. The Health Unit will issue detailed flu symptom descriptions (also to appear in "Santiago Scene") and monitor Embassy employees. d. Issue a warden announcement to American citizens. e. Require use of masks and hand cleansers, AND consider use of the prophylactic Tamiflu ( oseltamivir) by U.S. and Chilean staff in positions that require contact with the public. 6. Tripwire 3: Significant numbers of human cases of avian flu (H5N1, H7N7 or others), presumably transmitted from birds or other animals, appear in Chile, but without evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission. Action: a. All official and unofficial travel to affected areas, bird markets and similar facilities will be prohibited. Outside visitors to the Embassy will continue to be limited. Tamiflu will be given as a prophylactic to those U.S. and Chilean staff who have regular contact with the general public as part of their work. b. Management Section will send a warning announcement to Mission personnel. The Consular Section will send a warden message to private American citizens and to tourist hotels and cruise ships that are frequented by traveling Americans. Embassy will post the warning announcement on the Embassy website. c. Health Unit will provide detailed briefing to Embassy community, and if appropriate, to the international schools. Check with Las Condes and Alemana to ensure that they are still able to handle large numbers of avian flu patients. d. Consider authorized departure measures or even ordered departure measures - in conjunction with the State Department - if the airlines are still flying and if there are any recognized safehaven countries who are accepting outsiders. Communicate pertinent information and options to the Embassy community at town hall meetings or via e-mail, as the timeline will be short. e. Issue Travel Warning to Americans considering travel to Chile, in conjunction with the Bureau of Consular Affairs. f. Encourage all employees to stock up on food and other necessities in the event there is an announcement of an imminent pandemic. 7. Tripwire 4: Sustained human-to-human transmission in Chile, but not in Santiago. This is particularly significant if there are multiple, geographically diverse clusters. Action: a. Reduction to emergency consular services only for American citizens. No visa services (except on a severely restricted case-by-case basis), as it would be expected that commercial airlines have cancelled flights. b. Implement authorized departure. Consider ordered departure in conjunction with State Med, at the discretion of the Chief of Mission. If commercial airlines not flying, consider use of military airlift. Ideal would be to have enough people leave post so that those left behind equal the amount of Tamiflu on hand. c. Consider implementing selective administrative leave for those Americans who remain at post and FSN employees. Consider other options for minimizing workplace exposure, like tele-commuting. d. Continue mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any flu-like symptoms or has a family member with flu-like symptoms. e. Consider home quarantine and limiting venues of human-to-human contact. f. Mandatory screening of visitors, who shall be limited to those whose business absolutely must be conducted in person; mandatory use of protective gear, especially N95 masks for Embassy screeners. g. Health Unit to initiate appropriate use of prophylactic Tamiflu (oseltamivir) for minimal U.S. and Chilean staff remaining on the job. h. Update warden message, Travel Warning, and Consular Information Sheet. 8. Tripwire 5: Sustained human-to-human transmission, as evidenced by clusters of cases in Santiago. Action: a. Implement ordered departure, if airlines are still servicing Santiago, and if there are any avian flu-free countries to fly to. Consider use of military airlift, if the U.S. or any avian flu-free countries are allowing incoming flights from affected areas. b. Implement administrative leave for all FSNs. Consider other options for minimizing workplace exposure, like tele-commuting. c. Initiate appropriate prophylactic use of Tamiflu for all American employees and family members remaining at post. d. Issue warden update and inform American community that the Embassy will only offer emergency AmCit services by phone. YAMAUCHI
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