US embassy cable - 05LAGOS1803

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 001803 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/W 
STATE FOR INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, NI 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL INDECISION THREATENS SYSTEM 
OVERHEATING 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for Reason 1.4 (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In a late October conversation with the Consul 
General, Kwara State Governor Bukola Saraki described three 
approaches President Obasanjo could follow regarding the 2007 
elections:  amend the constitution to extend his current 
term, reconcile with the Vice President and support his 
candidacy for president, or identify an acceptable successor 
from the ranks of the current state governors.  The middle 
option is being progressively sandwiched and overshadowed by 
the other two.  Saraki's counsel to the President has been to 
take the third approach, with Governors Yar'Adua of Katsina 
and Makarfi of Kaduna as the possible leading candidates, in 
that order.  However, Saraki fears the President prefers to 
remain in office, and expects significant northern outcry as 
a result.  End summary. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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2.  (C) Kwara State Governor Bukola Saraki presented his 
views on President Obasanjo's position on the upcoming 2007 
election during an October 29th meeting with the Consul 
General.  Saraki, the smart son of Kwara State political 
godfather Olu Saraki, is in his first term and looks forward 
to winning a second term in 2007. 
 
3.  (C) Although sympathetic to Vice President Atiku, Saraki 
maintains an amiable relationship with the President. 
Obasanjo has chided the Governor in conversations for his 
pro-Atiku leanings but apparently does not regard Saraki as a 
die-hard Atiku supporter.  Thus, according to Saraki, his 
relationship with Obasanjo is not antagonistic, and Obasanjo 
considers Saraki a sufficiently creditable performer, which 
is a significantly better assessment than Obasanjo gives any 
of the staunchly pro-Atiku governors. 
 
4.  (C) Saraki described three approaches the President could 
take regarding the elections: continuing in office through 
the duration of an extended second term, reconciling with and 
supporting the Vice President as his successor, and 
identifying an acceptable compromise successor candidate from 
among the current governors. 
 
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OPTION 1:  EXTENDING THE CURRENT TERM 
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5.  (C) Saraki stated that the President's preference is to 
amend the constitution, establishing a single presidential 
term of six years, with the term extension effective 
immediately.  This would keep Obasanjo in office another two 
years.  (Comment:  This limitation of course depends on there 
not being yet another constitutional amendment.  End comment.) 
 
6.  (C) Saraki was skeptical about the President's ability to 
garner enough support for this maneuver.  Constitutional 
amendments require adoption by 24 states, and Saraki 
forecasted the President could not get that number of states 
in his corner.  For instance, Obasanjo would have a difficult 
time gaining the assent of the eight northern states 
controlled by All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) governors. 
Any ANPP governor that publicly endorsed Obasanjo's extension 
would be casting his own political career into a furnace, 
Saraki profferred.  Likewise, the AD-controlled Lagos State 
would oppose Obasanjo's bid, as would the party-less Governor 
Ngige of Anambra State.  (Ngige previously was evicted from 
the PDP.)  Edo, Delta, Imo, Abia, and Akwa Ibom are 
controlled by the pro-Atiku governors who would fight 
Obasanjo's extension with all assets at their disposal. 
Additionally, the PDP governor of Adamawa State is Atiku's 
political younger brother and this filial relationship would 
withstand any pressure that Obasanjo could martial on that 
governor.  Last, states like Benue, Ebonyi and Niger, the 
latter being the home of presidential hopeful and former 
military leader Ibrahim Babangida, were undecided, and could 
go against Obasanjo.  All in all, Saraki thought Obasanjo 
could only get half of the states on his side.  Despite the 
hurdles, Saraki continued, the President currently favors 
this course of action. 
 
7.  (C) Additionally, a constitutional amendment would take a 
super-majority of the National Assembly.  Given Obasanjo's 
testy relationship with that body, Saraki predicted Obasanjo 
would have a difficult time finding the requisite support 
notwithstanding the number of carrots and sticks he might 
brandish. 
 
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OPTION 2:  A NONSTARTER - RECONCILING WITH ATIKU 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
8.  (C) The second scenario Saraki outlined has the President 
and Vice President reconciling to a point where the President 
supports the Vice President in 2007.  This scenario was the 
most unlikely and exists only in theory, said Saraki.  To 
Saraki, President Obasanjo has described his relationship 
with Atiku as dead, and the schism has resisted all attempts 
to mend it, by party leaders and traditional rulers alike. 
Obasanjo simply does not want to be succeeded by Atiku, 
explained Saraki. 
 
9.  (C) Saraki described the President's strategy was to 
undermine Atiku by isolating the Vice President.  The 
President would accomplish this by frightening Atiku's 
supporters then wresting the party machinery from them and 
the Vice President.  According to Saraki, the President 
deliberately chose Atiku opponents to oversee the recent 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) registration exercise. 
Pro-Atiku governors were placed on their haunches when 
Obasanjo appointed opponents of these governors to shepherd 
membership registration in their respective states.  As a 
price for their affinity for Atiku, these governors lost 
control of who could join the PDP in their states. 
Obasanjo's strong-arming weakened several Vice Presidential 
supporters, recounted Saraki.  Governors Goje of Gombe State, 
Akume of Benue State, and Nyame of Taraba State all turned to 
the President swearing their loyalty.  Reportedly, Obasanjo 
accepted their entreaties and returned control to them of the 
registration process in their states.  Pro-Atiku southern 
governors have remained in the Vice President's camp.  Saraki 
expects some of them may yet return to the Presidential fold, 
but others will stick to Atiku to the bitter end.  Saraki 
believed that these hardliners would adhere to Atiku not 
necessarily out of principle but because they mistrusted 
Obasanjo even more than they were frightened by him.  No 
matter the overtures the President might make, governors such 
as Ibori in Delta and Igbinedion in Edo felt they could not 
reach amends with him. 
 
10.  (C) Eventually, the President's unyielding approach may 
cause some governors to leave the PDP, Saraki continued, 
however, current PDP leadership seemed more focused on making 
a soft bed for Obasanjo supporters but a hard place for 
Atiku's.  Loyalty matters more than numbers.  If some 
unfaithful choose to leave the PDP, so be it, Saraki 
summarized as Obasanjo's attitude. 
 
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OPTION 3:  IDENTIFYING AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE CANDIDATE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
11.  (C) If the political pressure were removed, the vast 
majority of PDP governors would oppose Obasanjo's 
continuation.  The governors are meeting constantly in large 
and small packs to reach consensus on a compromise candidate 
acceptable to the President, confided Saraki.  A unified 
front would give each maximum political cover from potential 
presidential ire.  It would also help show that a 
constitutional amendment was unlikely.  Their focus has been 
on identifying an acceptable northern governor, thus 
fulfilling the deal reached in 2003 for the President to come 
from the North.  To make this course more amenable to 
President Obasanjo, Saraki continued, the governors would 
have to emphasize that this tack would assure the President 
the distinction of being the first elected Nigerian civilian 
chief executive to hand over to another elected civilian. 
Thus, Obasanjo's place in history would be guaranteed by 
conducting a fair election and by his accomplishments in the 
arena of economic reform. 
 
12.  (C) Some northern governors under consideration were 
Adamu of Nasarawa, Muazu of Bauchi, Makarfi of Kaduna, and 
Yar'Adua of Katsina, with Makarfi and Yar'Adua the most 
attractive candidates in Saraki's estimation.  Saraki liked 
Muazu but questioned whether he had sufficient scope to 
handle the presidency, and Adamu was viewed as a poor 
administrator and too much in the President's pocket. 
 
13.  (C) Saraki said Ahmed Makarfi of Kaduna was an able 
political strategist who has been doing a good job 
pre-positioning himself as a dark horse.  Makarfi is 
intelligent and a good governor, Saraki maintained.  However, 
Umaru Yar'Adua, governor of Katsina State, was the truly 
intriguing prospect, according to Saraki.  Yar'Adua is quiet, 
has received good reviews for his performance in office, and 
he would likely continue Obasanjo's economic reform programs, 
but with a more humane approach. 
 
14.  (C) Most significantly, Yar'Adua is the younger brother 
of late General Shehu Yar'Adua, founder of the Peoples Front 
of Nigeria (PFN), which later became the Peoples Democratic 
Movement (PDM).  When General Yar'Adua died, PFN leadership 
fell to Atiku Abubakar, the current Vice President.  If Umaru 
Yar'Adua were nominated as a presidential candidate, many of 
Atiku's supporters would become double-minded and Atiku's 
claim that he was championing the Yar'Adua legacy would lose 
credence.  Atiku could lose a significant chunk of his 
rank-and-file support.  The resultant diminution of Atiku's 
political base by the ascendancy of Yar'Adua would be a 
consideration Obasanjo would find highly attractive because 
it would also make it difficult for Atiku to leave the PDP to 
join forces with another group.  Umaru Yar'Adua also enjoys a 
decent relationship with Obasanjo. 
 
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SARAKI'S ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT 
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15.  (C) Governor Saraki has said he would continue 
conferring with his fellow PDP governors to rally around 
Makarfi or Yar'Adua as worthy successors to Obasanjo, with 
Yar'Adua as the top choice.  Yar'Adua is on no one's 
blacklist, he has shown himself to be a capable public 
servant while serving as Katsina governor, and he would 
satisfy the call for a President from the north.  To complete 
the ticket, a southern Vice Presidential candidate would be 
in order.  Saraki listed Duke of Cross River, Egwu of Ebonyi, 
and Attah of Akwa Ibom as capable choices.  Saraki's sense, 
however, is that the President's favorite from the south is 
Peter Odili of Rivers State, whose selection would set a poor 
example given Odili's "self-enrichment" while in office. 
 
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COMMENT 
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16.  (C) The President's continued silence about his position 
in 2007 is causing increased political turbulence.  A first 
term governor, Saraki has no national ambitions for now and 
just wants to get to his second term with his state and the 
nation in one piece.  Saraki is in the position to play as 
honest a broker as one can find among the crop of Nigerian 
elected officials.  His assessment of Obasanjo jibes with 
most others we have gotten.  Saraki's identification of 
Yar'Adua as a possible candidate is creative and it also 
further indicates to what extent the Obasanjo-Atiku rift 
influences all else, including the discovery of a possible 
way out of this face-off.  At bottom, the real question is 
whether Obasanjo stays past 2007.  Most who know the 
President indicate he does not appear to be a man looking to 
pack his suitcase.  Should he decide to try to hold on, his 
decision will meet with considerable opposition within the 
party and in the region where Saraki hopes the next president 
will come - the North.  End comment. 
BROWNE