US embassy cable - 05PARIS8062

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR CA/VO/BIP-NEGAH ANGHA, INR/IC-JOSIE PAPENDICK, 
NCTC/TIG-DAVID WIGMORE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: PTER, CVIS, CASC, PGOV, PREL, PINR, FR, EUN 
SUBJECT: FRANCE: HSPD-6 TERRORIST LOOKOUT SHARING PROSPECTS 
 
REF: A) STATE 126313 B)173539 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION KARL HOFMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) 
 (c) and (d) 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Agencies at post involved in our productive 
and extensive counterterrorism dialogue with the French have 
considered HSPD-6 requirements to explore obtaining terrorist 
watchlist information.  We consider it highly unlikely the 
GOF would consent to unilateral sharing of its watchlist data 
with us; any successful U.S. approach would have to be 
reciprocal.  Our primary dialogue with the French on 
watchlist issues has been over the No-Fly list, and France,s 
cooperation on No-Fly issues--vital to our interests--comes 
with many strings attached.  Any broader watchlist sharing 
effort would need to protect that vital cooperation. 
Finally, post is interested in Washington agencies, response 
to the draft proposal by the TSC Director to offer the French 
a sample watchlist exchange of 200 names for purposes of 
comparison.  Such a proposal would, we think, be 
well-received by the GOF and could provide useful insight 
into issues that the GOF might raise in a broader watchlist 
exchange exercise.  END SUMMARY 
 
2. (S/NF) Agencies and offices active in terrorist lookout 
issues at post, (including Legatt, RMAS, Econ, Pol, Consular, 
TSA, and ICE), have consulted on HSPD-6 per reftels.  We 
 
SIPDIS 
believe that the GOF would be open to sharing watchlist 
information, subject to passage of anti-terrorist legislation 
currently under consideration (expected by late-December) and 
resolution of ongoing data privacy law concerns.  The French 
services are very circumspect about the details of how their 
data is organized, but we can assume they have databases of 
known or suspected terrorists that they could share with us. 
It is extremely unlikely that they would agree to do so on 
other than a reciprocal basis.  Defining reciprocity will be 
particularly challenging, since they already receive our 
No-Fly list, and question both the list,s size and the 
quality of information on which many entries are based. 
 
3. (S/NF) Our primary contacts on watchlist issues have 
emerged from the convoluted arrangements developed at GOF 
insistence to implement the No-Fly Emergency Amendment. TSA 
provides the No-Fly list to the French Border Police (PAF) 
and to Air France, and notifies both GOF authorities and the 
airline when APIS data detects name-matches.  When necessary, 
detailed intelligence on watchlist matches is passed by 
either Legatt or RMAS to the Direction de la Surveillance du 
Territoire (DST), an Interior Ministry office equivalent to 
the FBI.  Emboffs also maintain a continuing dialogue on 
watchlist screening with the Secreteriat Generale de la 
Defense Nationale (SGDN), the Prime Minister,s interagency 
coordinating body for defense and counter-terrorism. 
 
4. (S/NF) We expect the DST is likely to be interested in 
sharing watchlist information, with an eye toward spotting 
French citizens or residents who might be of concern.  A 
similar arrangement has already been established with the UK, 
with what we understand to be positive results so far. 
(Note:  Post would appreciate details on how this arrangement 
has worked.)  However, any proposal will also have to protect 
existing cooperation with the French on No-Fly 
implementation, and to take GOF skepticism about the size and 
inclusiveness of both the No-Fly and Selectee lists into 
account. 
 
5. (C) The GOF would probably be reluctant to share names of 
French citizens or residents with us without clearly defined 
and mutually agreed upon criteria for inclusion or exclusion 
from our watchlists, and may argue that sharing data raises 
legal or privacy protection issues.  We are also concerned 
that the GOF could use expanded information sharing as 
leverage for requesting underlying intelligence about names 
included on our lists, especially those of French citizens 
and residents.  Any additional information they receive could 
be used to highlight the issue of why names are included or 
excluded from the No-Fly and Selectee lists.  We should also 
expect that they will at some point propose joint-vetting of 
names or development of a common watchlist. 
 
6. (SBU) Following the visit of TSC Director Donna Bucella in 
October, Legatt received a draft TSC proposal for sharing 200 
names at random on a trial basis with the DST, to be used 
exclusively for comparison and evaluation rather than 
operational purposes.  Post believes this could be a 
worthwhile limited next step that has the potential to 
demonstrate how watchlist sharing could help both sides plug 
gaps in their knowledge, and is likely to be well-received by 
the French.  It could provide a much-needed opportunity to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of our watchlist scrub and the 
seriousness of the information underlying entries on our 
list.  It could also provide useful insight into how the GOF 
might handle any larger watchlist sharing arrangement. 
 
7. (SBU) Post understands that TSC is actively polling 
Washington agencies on the above proposal.  We would be 
interested in hearing reactions, as well as any suggestions 
agencies have on how such a proposal can be crafted so as to 
avoid our being drawn into unproductive discussions with the 
GOF on No-Fly issues. 
 
8. (SBU) Post regrets delay in responding to reftels. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton