US embassy cable - 05MADRID4095

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 004095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SP 
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED AND WHA PDAS SHAPIRO MEETINGS IN 
MADRID 
 
Classified By: DCM Bob Manzanares, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried, 
accompanied by WHA PDAS Charles Shapiro, visited Madrid 
November 15-16 for meetings with Spanish officials to discuss 
cooperation to advance Broader Middle East reform, the 
upcoming NATO summits, and areas for possible collaboration 
in Latin America.  Fried and Shapiro met with Spanish 
National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Bernardino Leon, MFA Director General for Foreign 
Policy Rafael Dezcallar, and ranking members of the 
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defense commissions.  A/S 
Fried thanked Spanish officials for Foreign Minister Miguel 
Angel Moratinos' participation in the Forum for the Future, 
emphasizing the importance of demonstrating a shared U.S.-EU 
commitment to democratic reforms in the Broader Middle East. 
Casajuana and Dezcallar indicated that Egypt is attempting to 
insert restrictive language regarding NGOs in the statement 
being prepared for the November 27-28 Barcelona Process 
Summit, much as it did at the Forum for the Future. 
Separately, Dezcallar requested USG public acknowledgement 
that the Spanish government had requested clarification of 
the alleged CIA rendition flights that landed at Spanish 
airfields.  A/S Fried raised Spanish public support for the 
lifting of the EU China arms embargo, saying the USG had 
hoped to lower the profile of this contentious issue. 
 
2. (C) On NATO, A/S Fried discussed the USG's rationale for 
the two-summit strategy, particularly the need to improve 
NATO's capability to meet current and future mission 
requirements and the USG's desire to use NATO as the primary 
forum for transatlantic security dialogue.  Spanish 
counterparts agreed on the need to bring NATO's capabilities 
up to date, but also asserted that the EU should be the main 
European interlocutor in transatlantic discussions since more 
and more European foreign policy is being determined in 
Brussels.  Casajuana and Dezcallar said Spain was generally 
pleased with plans for coordinating ISAF and Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan, but Dezcallar cautioned that the Zapatero 
government's mandate was limited.  On Latin America, A/S 
Fried and PDAS Shapiro expressed concern regarding 
Venezuela's destabilizing influence in the region and said 
the Spanish arms sale to Chavez sent the wrong political 
message and contributed to Venezuela's weapons build-up.  NSA 
Casajuana said the political decision to sell to Chavez had 
been made six months ago and that now it was "up to the 
companies" to complete the deal.  However, Deputy FM Leon 
(protect) insisted that President Zapatero had not yet made a 
final decision on the aircraft component of the sale (the 
Spanish government subsequently announced its support for 
both the aircraft and ship components of the sale).  On Cuba, 
Spanish officials said Madrid remains convinced of the need 
to maintain normal relations with the Castro regime in order 
to be in a position to influence his successors and requested 
the USG urge the Czech Republic and Poland to tone down their 
criticism of Spain in EU councils.  They agreed with A/S 
Fried and PDAS Shapiro on the need to work together to 
resolve crises in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and elsewhere in Latin 
America.  End Summary. 
 
//MIDDLE EAST REFORM// 
 
3. (C) A/S Fried thanked Spanish interlocutors for Spain's 
financial contribution to the Foundation for the Future and 
for FM Moratinos' participation in the Forum for the Future 
meeting in Bahrain.  Fried said Moratinos' presence 
symbolized U.S.-EU unity in promoting democratic reforms in 
the Middle East.  He discussed the outcomes of the meeting, 
acknowledging USG disappointment with Egypt's position on 
NGOs, but also the USG's determination to continue working in 
a persistent, but non-confrontational manner to advance 
democracy and freedom in the Broader Middle East.  A/S Fried 
said the U.S. and Europe should have ambitious objectives, 
but understand that progress towards those objectives may be 
incremental. 
 
4. (C) Casajuana said Spain was pleased to have been invited 
to Bahrain and noted that the EU was encountering similar 
problems with Egypt in the runup to the November 27-28 
commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona 
Process.  Casajuana expressed confidence that acceptable 
language would eventually emerge, but said Egypt was 
sufficiently concerned that Mubarak would not be attending 
the event.  Dezcallar indicated that Tunisia was raising 
objections on NGO language as well.  Dezcallar said Spain was 
pleased with USG support for the Alliance of Civilizations, 
which Spain believes will serve as a vehicle, through the UN, 
to encourage developing countries to become more involved in 
reforms. 
 
//NATO// 
 
5. (C) A/S Fried discussed the USG's view that the 2006 NATO 
Summit should focus on transformation and improving 
capabilities, holding off NATO enlargement until the 2008 
Summit since candidate countries will not be prepared by 
2006.  He said the new challenges facing the U.S. and Europe 
in the 21st century had transformed NATO into a global actor 
and into the security instrument of the transatlantic 
democratic community.  NATO members had to give the 
organization the tools to respond to its new and future 
missions.  A/S Fried underlined the point that the USG was 
not implying a need for massive increases in European defense 
budgets, but rather suggesting that NATO had to be ready to 
act when called upon, rather than waiting while the Secretary 
General went to each member to solicit funds and other 
resources.  He said Washington took seriously recommendations 
by European friends to consult more frequently with Europe, 
noting the increased use of the NAC as a forum for discussing 
issues of mutual interest.  The U.S. was not talking about 
coalitions of the willing or about using NATO as a toolbox, 
but instead wanted all NATO members to agree on how to 
improve the capabilities of the organization as a whole. 
 
6. (C) Casajuana said Spain was in full agreement on the need 
to improve NATO's capability to undertake new missions, 
exemplified by NATO operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
However, Casajuana said that Spain would have to place any 
increase in defense spending in the context of the European 
Security and Defense Policy for both practical and political 
reasons.  As a practical matter, Casajuana suggested it would 
be in the USG's interest to see the EU strengthen its defense 
capacity, which the EU could then "bring together with NATO." 
 Politically, said Casajuana, EU countries are increasingly 
transferring foreign policy decisions to Brussels, making the 
EU, rather than NATO, the proper forum for transatlantic 
dialogue on foreign policy issues.  In response, A/S Fried 
noted that then-Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had been among 
those calling for the increased use of NATO as a 
transatlantic link.  He said the USG was not pursuing a fixed 
policy, but would instead work within NATO or with the EU as 
the circumstances warranted.  A/S Fried emphasized, however, 
NATO remains the key vehicle for transatlantic security. 
 
7. (C) Casajuana and Dezcallar said Spain was satisfied with 
the Op Plan and the direction of planning for the fusion of 
ISAF and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, though Dezcallar 
cautioned that Spain's role in Afghanistan was constrained by 
its limited mandate to participate in the ISAF mission only. 
By contrast, Dezcallar expressed frustration with the results 
of NATO earthquake relief operation in Pakistan, both because 
Spain had borne most of the costs of the operation and 
because logistical complications had resulted in negative 
press coverage of the Spanish role.  Dezcallar said it was 
unfair that the NATO member that happened to hold the 
rotating command of the NATO Response Force should be 
expected to shoulder the financial burden of a given 
operation.  A/S Fried agreed and said such problems 
highlighted the need to use the 2006 Summit to deal with 
practical solutions to improve NATO capabilities (including 
more common funding). 
 
//CIA TRANSIT FLIGHTS// 
 
8. (C) Dezcallar drew attention to the issue of the alleged 
transit of CIA aircraft through Spanish airports as a 
priority for the Zapatero Government.  He requested that the 
USG acknowledge that the Spanish government had raised the 
issue of the flights with the Embassy in March 2005, as the 
impression that the Spanish government had ignored the 
flights was generating significant negative press.  With 
respect to the flights themselves, Dezcallar asked that the 
U.S. provide as much information as possible so that the GOS 
would have the full facts of the case. 
 
//EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO// 
 
9. (C) In his meeting with Deputy FM Leon, A/S Fried 
expressed the USG's desire to reduce the profile of the EU 
China arms embargo as a point of U.S.-EU friction.  Spain's 
public support for the lifting of the arms embargo during the 
visit of Hu Jintao did not help our effort to keep the issue 
off the front burner.  Leon said Spain had worked to keep 
that element of the visit low key, within the context of EU 
support for the Code of Conduct, and in the context of 
support for improved human rights practices by the Chinese 
government. 
 
//VENEZUELA// 
 
10. (C) A/S Fried and PDAS Shapiro reviewed USG concerns 
regarding Venezuela, recounting the negative role President 
Chavez had played during the Summit of the Americas and the 
worrisome authoritarian drift of the Chavez government. 
Shapiro reviewed the new U.S. policy halting the sale of 
lethal weapons to Venezuela and said the USG would look very 
closely at any requests to transfer of U.S.-origin components 
to Venezuela.  Fried and Shapiro expressed the USG's 
continued opposition to Spain's sale of aircraft and ships to 
the Chavez government, both because Chavez would use it to 
claim Spanish endorsement of his government and because it 
contributed to a massive and destabilizing Venezuelan arms 
buildup.  Shapiro asked the Spanish government to speak out 
in defense of Venezuelan civil society, the Church, and the 
private sector; urge Spanish foundations and political 
parties to work with and help fund counterparts in Venezuela; 
and actively defend the rights of the large Spanish community 
in Venezuela.  On Colombia, Shapiro urged increased Spanish 
support for the Colombian government and Spain's active 
assistance in the implementation of the Peace and Justice 
law. 
 
11. (C) NSA Casajuana asserted that Spain had never seen the 
sale to Venezuela as a weapons sale since the contracts were 
for transport aircraft and patrol boats.  He said the 
political decision to sell the items had been taken six 
months ago and that it was now up to the companies to 
complete the transaction.  Casajuana said Spain had resisted 
efforts by Chavez to add political overtones to the transfer, 
but intended to carry through with the sale itself.  A/S 
Fried said the USG viewed the transfer as a weapons sale and 
was certain Chavez would use it to claim Spanish political 
support. 
 
12. (C) In a separate meeting, Deputy FM Leon (protect) 
insisted that President Zapatero had not yet made a final 
decision on the aircraft component of the sale to Venezuela 
and urged continued USG engagement on the issue.  (NOTE: On 
November 25, Vice President Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega 
confirmed that DefMin Bono would travel to Caracas to 
finalize both the aircraft and naval vessel components of the 
sale.  END NOTE).  On political relations with Venezuela, 
Leon and Dezcallar said Spain does not view Chavez as a 
friend, but believes there is still a possibility that he may 
be influenced to play by democratic rules.  Leon said that 
both President Zapatero and former Spanish President Felipe 
Gonzalez had delivered tough messages to Chavez in private 
meetings with him, and cited the "Sumate" and Carlos Ayala 
cases as instances where Spain had publicly criticized 
harassment of civil society activists.  Leon and MFA Director 
General for Latin America Javier Sandomingo (who accompanied 
Dezcallar) expressed particular concern regarding Chavez' 
growing influence with smaller Latin American countries. 
 
//CUBA// 
 
13. (C) Shapiro urged Spanish officials to work with the USG 
to press for a democratic transition in Cuba rather than a 
succession and a continuation of the dictatorship.  He said 
Spain and the U.S. would likely have to coordinate closely 
and respond to fast-moving events when Fidel Castro finally 
passed from the scene.  Casajuana agreed on the need to work 
together on Cuba, but also said Spain favors a gradual 
transition rather than an abrupt, and possibly destabilizing 
shift.  Noting that Spain's own transition took place over a 
period of several years and included members of the Franco 
regime, Casajuana said that Spain would focus on the words 
and deeds of Castro's successors rather than on their 
"Fidelista" pasts.  Dezcallar asserted that in Cuba's 
post-Fidel era, "a Gorbachev is more likely than a Havel." 
 
14. (C) MFA Director General for Latin America Sandomingo 
requested USG assistance in "convincing the Czech Republic 
and Poland that Spain is not a lifeline for the Castro 
regime."  Sandomingo and Dezcallar said that Spain was being 
unfairly maligned for its initiative to suspend EU 
restrictive measures on Cuba.  They insisted that Spain's 
effort to re-establish normal relations with Havana had not 
been a "total failure" and suggested "truce" on this issue in 
view of the fact that no country's policy had succeeded in 
dealing with Castro.  A/S Fried and Shapiro pointed out that 
the Czechs and Poles saw Cuba through the prism of their 
recent pasts and had felt stifled within EU councils in 
attempting to promote their own views. 
 
//NICARAGUA, BOLIVIA// 
 
15. (C) Shapiro discussed the USG's concern that former 
Nicaraguan President Aleman may seek refuge in Spain for 
himself or others associated with his corrupt practices. 
This concern was compounded by Aleman's effort to destabilize 
the political situation in Nicaragua by allying himself with 
the Sandinistas.  Shapiro discussed recent USG actions to 
constrain Aleman that left a clear impression among 
Nicaraguan observers that the USG was serious about 
confronting Aleman's negative actions.  Sandomingo said that 
Spain's primary objective in Nicaragua was to break the 
Aleman-Sandinista alliance, but that Aleman needed to be 
dealt with through incentives rather than penalties.  He 
added that Aleman is still the power in the Liberal Party and 
must be dealt with as such.  He said Aleman wanted to remain 
in Nicaragua, not go abroad and that most Nicaraguans did not 
view Aleman as being more corrupt than other Nicaraguan 
political figures.  Though Sandomingo said Spain was not 
inclined to close its borders to Aleman, Dezcallar 
(Sandomingo's superior) left the issue open, saying the 
Spanish government would employ tough measures against Aleman 
if that proved necessary.  A/S Fried noted that Spain had 
agreed to support the G-8's 2003 and 2004 declarations and 
the 2005 declaration at the Fourth Global Forum Against 
Fighting Corruption, pledging to deny safehaven to corrupt 
government officials.  Dezcallar was unaware of these 
declarations and said he would look into them. 
 
16. (C) Sandomingo discussed the recent visit of Bolvian 
cocalero leader Evo Morales to Madrid, where he met with FM 
Moratinos, Sandomingo, and Dezcallar.  He described Morales 
as more reasonable in his private meetings than in his public 
events and said that Morales was difficult, but ultimately 
someone Spain could "work with" if necessary.  Sandomingo 
said Spain expects Morales to win the Presidency and was 
reluctant to isolate him.  Spanish interlocutors agreed with 
Shapiro's assessment that Bolivia's next leader, regardless 
of who it was, would face a chaotic political situation. 
Deputy FM Leon noted signs of a rift between Morales and 
Chavez, with Chavez withholding funding because Morales is 
reportedly showing too much independence.  Shapiro responded 
that the USG has seen no evidence of such a rift but would 
investigate. 
 
//CASSIRER ART RESTITUTION CASE// 
 
17. (U) In his meeting with Dezcallar, A/S Fried raised the 
issue of the Cassirer art restitution case, urging the MFA to 
use its influence to convince the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum 
to engage in discussions with the claimants.  Fried 
emphasized that the claimants preferred negotiations to a 
lengthy trial process.  Director General for European and 
North American Affairs Jose Pons, who was present at the 
meeting and was aware of this issue, said that FM Moratinos 
himself had been involved in the case.  (NOTE: Later in the 
day, Pons informed DCM that he had obtained an update on the 
case and said it would be difficult for the Spanish 
government to do much more since the painting was now the 
subject of a legal case in the U.S., which restricted the 
Spanish government's ability to intervene.  However, Pons 
said the GOS would still urge the museum director to pursue a 
negotiated resolution with the claimants.  END NOTE). 
 
//MEETING WITH PARLIAMENTARIANS// 
 
18. (SBU) DCM hosted a lunch for A/S Fried and PDAS Shapiro 
with six members of Parliament's Defense and Foreign Affairs 
commissions to discuss NATO, US-European cooperation on 
Middle East reform, and developments in Venezuela.  Fried 
thanked the Parliamentarians for Spain's support of BMENA and 
for FM Moratinos' participation in the Forum for the Future. 
Rafael Estrella, Socialist Party speaker in the Foreign 
Affairs Commission, and his Popular Party counterpart Gustavo 
Aristegui emphasized their broad agreement that NATO should 
be maintained as the principal transatlantic security 
organization.  They praised A/S Fried's comments on the 
importance of US-Europe consultation and communication. 
Jesus Cuadrado, Socialist Party speaker on the Defense 
Commission, discussed the Defense Commission's efforts to 
raise Spain's defense budget in the face of many competing 
domestic priorities. 
 
19. (SBU) Fried underscored NATO's growing importance as the 
security arm of the transatlantic democratic community in the 
world, a point well received by the Spanish Parliamentarians. 
 Fried reviewed the advantages both of common NATO assets, 
which would allow fast response, and of a cost-sharing 
mechanism that would reduce the financial burden on countries 
that commit troops to NATO operations.  On Venezuela, the 
discussion reflected the split between the Socialists and the 
Popular Party on to how to deal with Chavez, with Rafael 
Estrella defending the Spanish arms sale to Venezuela (and 
repeating Defense Minister Bono's claim that Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld had not opposed the Spanish sale to 
 
SIPDIS 
Caracas) and Aristegui calling it a terrible mistake.  All 
agreed with the Aristegui's characterization of Chavez as a 
menace to democracy in the region.  As the meeting was 
breaking up, Parliamentarian Luis Mardones of the "Canaries 
Coalition" told Shapiro he was concerned about the fate of 
Canary Islanders living in Venezuela, especially in Yaracuy 
state, where agricultural land was being seized by the 
Venezuelan government. 
 
//OUTREACH TO OPINION LEADERS// 
 
20. (U) A/S Fried and PDAS Shapiro met with representatives 
of several of Madrid's leading think tanks and academic 
institutions, including figures from Elcano Institute, the 
Socialist-affiliated FRIDE think tank, Madrid's Autonomous 
University, and the Center for Peace Studies (CIP).  Fried 
reviewed the USG's strong interest in Europe as a partner, 
not a counterweight to the U.S., emphasizing the 
transatlantic community's responsibility to work together to 
strengthen global security.  He discussed BMENA and expressed 
appreciation for Spain's role in promoting Middle East 
reform.  Fried highlighted the Secretary's success in 
brokering the Rafah crossing agreement, noting its importance 
for the Gaza withdrawal and further progress in the peace 
process.  Meeting participants asked A/S Fried about the 
state of overall U.S. views towards Europe, whether the USG 
was prepared to press for further concessions from Israel in 
the Mideast peace process, and the tension between realist 
doctrine and the freedom agenda in U.S. foreign policy.  A/S 
Fried noted that Secretary Rice had achieved a breakthrough 
by brokering the agreement on the Rafah crossing; stressed 
that progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace depended on 
building on the Gaza withdrawal, especially building 
functioning institutions in the future Palestinian state, not 
abstract pressure on Israel; and emphasized the USG's 
conviction that a key role of the transatlantic democratic 
community should be to press for democratic reforms beyond 
its borders, rather than attempt to insulate itself within a 
fixed sphere. 
 
21. (U) A/S Fried and PDAS Shapiro cleared this message. 
AGUIRRE