US embassy cable - 05HARARE1608

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001608 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI "SUSPENDED", PREPARING FOR PARTY 
CONGRESS 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1603 (B) HARARE 1578 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Eric T. Schultz under Section 1 
.4 b/d 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) Following the &non-event8 Senate elections on 
November 26 (septel), opposition MDC President Morgan 
Tsvangirai received a letter from party Vice President Gibson 
 
SIPDIS 
Sibanda, a leader of the pro-election faction, purporting to 
suspend Tsvangirai from the party.  At a meeting with the 
Charge in the party's Harvest House headquarters November 28, 
Tsvangirai said following his call for a boycott, the low 
 
SIPDIS 
turnout had vindicated his leadership.  That said, the letter 
indicated that his opponents in the party were determined to 
fight on even if it meant the party,s destruction. 
 
2.  (C) Tsvangirai nonetheless expressed confidence that he 
would successfully deflect the suspension effort and would 
have his leadership reconfirmed at the Party Congress 
scheduled in February.  Tsvangirai said mass action against 
the regime would have to wait until after the Congress had 
resolved the intra-party disputes.  A Tsvangirai aide 
separately alleged Tsvangirai,s MDC opponents had struck a 
deal with the ruling party's Mujuru clique after Tsvangirai 
spurned Mujuru's overtures, an allegation given weight by MDC 
MP David Coltart,s claim that faction leader Welshman Ncube 
had received favors from the GOZ, including a stolen farm. 
End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
"Suspended" but In Charge 
------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Firmly in charge at party headquarters, Tsvangirai 
confirmed receipt of the Sibanda letter.  Tsvangirai said the 
suspension was invalid arguing that only a National Congress 
could remove elected party officers from office.  Moreover, 
they could be sanctioned, but only by the National Council, 
which had not addressed the issue.  The Disciplinary 
Committee, which Sibanda chaired, could only recommend 
suspension following a hearing, and no such due process had 
been afforded.  Tsvangirai said he had called for a meeting 
of the National Council on December 3, which he said would 
put the issue to rest. 
 
4.  (C) Tsvangirai said, however, that he feared the letter 
was a sign that his opponents within the party were not 
interested in reconciliation but instead, having lost badly 
in the debate over the Senate elections, were intent on 
&burning down the house.8  He nonetheless expressed hope 
that with the election behind them, some of the pro-election 
leaders would rejoin the fold and reunify.  As for the Senate 
candidates elected under the MDC name, Tsvangirai reiterated 
that the party had tagged them as "independent" and therefore 
no longer members of the party.  However, he saw no reason to 
contest their election or to force them to resign their seats 
to remain in the MDC.  Their status within the party was 
"open to further discussion." 
 
---------------------------------- 
Focus on Internal Party Activities 
---------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Tsvangirai emphasized that as a result of the 
continuing divisions within the party it would be very 
absorbed with its internal issues until the Party Congress in 
February.  This was unfortunate.  He would have liked to 
build on the momentum from the successful boycott by 
confronting the regime.  The party would continue to be 
supportive of actions - mostly at the local level - by 
partners in civil society.  However, MDC sponsored mass 
action would have to wait until the distraction of the Ncube 
faction could be put to rest, which could only be at the 
Party Congress, when all of the leadership, himself included, 
would be subject to an election. 
 
6.  (C) Tsvangirai anticipated that many of his opponents in 
the leadership would not be reelected and for that reason 
might try to hold a rival Congress, possibly with a view to 
pursuing legal action to claim the MDC mantle.  Tsvangirai 
added that provincial congresses would start the weekend of 
December 10 and would elect local leadership as well as 
consider reforms to the party,s structures and constitution. 
 Tsvangirai expressed confidence that all of the provincial 
congresses would support him, with the possible exception of 
Matabeleland South. 
 
7.  (C) Responding to the Charge's expression of concern 
about growing reports of intra-party violence, Tsvangirai 
said he "didn't know where such reports were coming from." 
Then he recounted several incidents of violence against his 
supporters and asked why nobody seemed to want to discuss 
those.  In any event, he had earlier expelled certain youths 
over their violent actions and acknowledged the importance of 
not giving the ruling party fodder with which to discredit 
the MDC for violent tactics.  He said he was confident that 
the provincial congresses would not turn violent. 
 
--------------------- 
Engaging with ZANU-PF 
--------------------- 
 
8. (C) Responding to the Charge's inquiries about any 
discussions he may have had with elements of the ruling 
party, Tsvangirai said he had engaged with ruling party 
elements with a view to exploiting fissures.  He said he met 
with unspecified individuals "from time to time" and found 
the parliament a particularly useful venue in which the MDC 
could reach out to the "many doubters" on the other side.  He 
observed that "suppression" at the top of ZANU-PF remained 
strong, but that fissures became more evident farther down, 
especially in the hopelessness over the country's economic 
situation, and that he would remain open to such discussions. 
 
 
9.  (C) In a separate meeting with poloff on November 26, 
Tsvangirai adviser Eddie Cross provided background on some of 
 
SIPDIS 
some of these meetings.  According to Cross, Tsvangirai had 
met in September with ZANU-PF kingpin Solomon Mujuru at 
Mujuru's instigation.  Mujuru had heavy-handedly invited 
Tsvangirai to cooperate with him &post-Mugabe8 and be 
 
SIPDIS 
"taken care of" or else.  After Tsvangirai had refused, a 
more conciliatory Mujuru had gotten the two together two 
weeks later and asked what it would take to win Tsvangirai,s 
cooperation.  Tsvangirai had responded that it would take a 
negotiated constitution, a transitional government, and free 
and fair, internationally monitored national elections. 
 
10.  (C) Cross said Mujuru never responded to Tsvangirai's 
proposal but instead, supported by South African President 
Thabo Mbeki, approached Welshman Ncube with the same initial 
deal, to which Ncube had agreed.  Ncube's desperate attempts 
to oust Tsvangirai over the past two months represented his 
part of the bargain with Mujuru.  Adding substance to this 
charge, MDC MP David Coltart confided to poloff in another 
meeting on November 26 that Ncube had recently taken 
possession of a farm seized as part of the GOZ,s fast-track 
land reform.  Coltart said the owner of the farm in question 
was a client of his.  He added that Ncube had also purchased 
Z$1 billion (US$10,000) in cattle, and had received his 
Mercedes - a parliamentary perk - ahead of others who had 
still not received a car from the last parliament. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (C) The suspension effort appears to represent the 
uncoordinated will of the increasingly isolated leadership of 
the Ncube faction.  Indeed, Coltart - the party's Secretary 
for Legal Affairs and a member of the Disciplinary Committee 
- confirmed to poloff the Disciplinary Committee's 
limitations and said he was unaware of any suspension actions 
underway.  Ncube faction member Moses Mzila-Ndlovu told 
poloff the same day that plans were afoot to commence 
suspension proceedings the following week but seemed unaware 
that a letter had gone forward.  Tsvangirai is likely to 
easily beat back this effort at the December 3 meeting. 
 
12.  (C) However, much more dangerous to the party than the 
ill-advised suspension effort is the opposing faction's 
apparent willingness to draw Tsvangirai and the party as a 
whole into protracted procedural battles that will distract 
the party from its imperative to reconnect with the public 
and do battle with the regime.  The Ncube faction,s actions 
would certainly seem to lend credence to the allegations that 
they have sold the party out (Embassy efforts to communicate 
with Ncube and key allies over the past two weeks have been 
fruitless, and Ncube failed to appear at a scheduled meeting 
with poloff in Bulawayo on election day).  However, perhaps 
the greatest risk to the MDC at this juncture is the threat 
that the intra-party wrangling may spill over into the courts 
where the GOZ would be able to manipulate outcomes that would 
further hamstring the opposition. 
SCHULTZ