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| Identifier: | 05CAIRO8917 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05CAIRO8917 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Cairo |
| Created: | 2005-11-28 14:40:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV ETRD ECON EG Parliamentary elections |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 008917
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS AND SINGH
USTR FOR SAUMS
USDOC FOR 4520/ITA/MAC/SAMS, TALAAT AND JACOBS/WIEHAGEN
USDA FOR FAS/SHEIKH/BERNSTEIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ETRD, ECON, EG, Parliamentary elections
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTER URGES FTA ANNOUNCEMENT TO
BOLSTER REFORM
Classified by Ambassador Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Nazif convoked the
Ambassador on November 27 to make a strong plea for an FTA
announcement during this week's TIFA Council meeting in
Washington. Citing President Bush's promise to take
"positive steps" by the end of the year, Nazif stressed that
the GOE has demonstrated its readiness and commitment to
negotiate an FTA by undertaking difficult economic reforms,
and needs an FTA to bolster the reformers and the reform
process at a critical political juncture. The Ambassador
pressed Nazif hard on the disappointing conduct of the
elections by the GOE, emphasizing that the larger political
context does matter in the U.S. decision whether and when to
begin negotiations on an FTA. Nazif affirmed that despite
the election violence and electoral resurgence of the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB), President Mubarak remained committed to
both economic and democratic political reform as his
"legacy." The Prime Minister cautioned, however, that the
reform process is complex, and linking an FTA to specific
additional reform steps could prove counterproductive. Still
vulnerable, the reformers see the FTA announcement as a
powerful impetus to their economic reform agenda and a way to
strengthen their credibility and chances of being returned to
office, bolstered both in spirit and in numbers. End summary.
2. (C) The Prime Minister opened the meeting by recounting
President Bush's promise to him last spring for positive
steps on an FTA before the end of 2005. Nazif expressed his
hope that the TIFA Council meeting, being held in Washington
on November 30, will result in an FTA announcement. He said
that an FTA is needed to make the bilateral economic
relationship more proactive and to align the countries' trade
policies. The reformers have achieved much of their agenda,
but have much more to accomplish urgently, and are moving
forward on the remaining goals. This remarkable success so
far demonstrates the GOE's ability and commitment to reform,
he said.
3. (C) The Ambassador responded that the election thuggery
had damaged the confidence and trust of foreigners as well as
Egyptians in their Government. Had the GOE accepted
international election monitors, they might have deterred
miscreants from intimidating voters, and have given more
accurate public reporting on the big picture (Nazif had
claimed that current CNN reporting on democracy in Egypt was
harsh and unfair). Nazif replied that "even if we accept all
media reports as true," the ongoing parliamentary elections,
as flawed as may be, represent a significant advance for
democracy in Egypt -- "yet another result that we could not
have imagined a year ago." The process had allowed MB
candidates not only to run, but also to win what could prove
to be as many as 100 seats in the 454-seat parliament. That
fact alone, unwelcome as it was to the Government and most
Egyptians, shows that unprecedented political change is
happening. Though it should be a long term process of "10 or
15 years," Nazif argued that Mubarak is committed to pressing
reforms quickly, aiming to turn over a civilian, democratic
government to the people of Egypt within his remaining
tenure.
4. (C) Nazif cautioned that transforming a state from one
type of government to another is a long-term process,
illustrated by the fact that even the first reform steps had
not guaranteed wide voter participation (only 25% of voters
turned out in the last round, and those voters belonged to
narrowly defined groups). Suggesting that the reform process
would have to be fine-tuned along the way, he argued that
conditioning an FTA on specific political reform steps could
be very tricky and ultimately counterproductive. The Prime
Minister added that if the reformers ever judged that Mubarak
was not committed to pressing the "transformation," "then we
would all find something else to do."
5. (C) Minister Rachid stressed that the timing of the FTA
announcement was critical. He expected that the large number
of the MB in opposition in the new Parliament would
negatively impact on all the GOE's reform efforts. Delaying
an FTA announcement would likely reduce the support and
momentum for an FTA within government and could shake
investor confidence in the Egyptian economy. FTA
negotiations would force the MB to expose its true colors on
the FTA's gamut of tough policy issues involving job creation
and economic reform.
6. (C) The Prime Minister concurred with Rachid, noting that
the MB bloc in the next Parliament will likely pander to
anti-American sentiment by opposing closer relations with the
U.S., including the negotiation of an FTA. More broadly,
Nazif stated that the MB is seeking sufficient electoral
representation to field a presidential candidate in 2011.
With their rise, the only hope for quick political reform,
the Prime Minister asserted, was to use the strength of the
current presidential system to put a better system in place
over the next two to three years. It is important for
Washington to understand the danger facing the secular state
of Egypt, he said.
7. (C) The Ambassador replied that the USG frankly did not
accept the false choice that some in the NDP and even the GOE
seemed to be holding forth: either a slow-to-reform GOE, or
a slide toward a fanatical Islamic state. We continue to
believe that serious democratic reform, at a bolder and
faster pace, offers the best way for the political change for
which Egyptians are clearly impatient. Washington was
looking for GOE willingness to allow a liberal, democratic,
free-market opposition, and for statements to this effect
made at the highest levels. The Ambassador recommended that
Nazif (leaving for the European-Mediterranean summit in
Barcelona that day) or Mubarak himself should publicly and
soon re-affirm such a commitment to hasten democratic
political as well as economic reforms.
8. (C) Nazif responded that in his November 25 interview
with the Financial Times he had in fact expressed the
government's intention to allow "secular opposition parties
to show their face" in the next phase of political reform.
Meanwhile, the reforms that Mubarak had promised to complete
this term, such as better balance of parties and greater
representation of women in the parliament, are underway. The
silver lining of the large vote for MB candidates is that it
showed how much the population wants change. It also
demonstrates that change has begun, though not in the way
that either the USG or the GOE might have preferred.
Nonetheless, given Egypt's low socio-economic indicators ("we
are not eastern Europe"), Nazif doubted that change could
have occurred any differently or faster. In any case, he
argued that if political reform were required for an FTA,
then neither Jordan nor Bahrain should have been accorded the
opportunity to negotiate one with the U.S.
9. (C) Comment. As the current cabinet nears the end of its
term, the reformers are determined to lock in their
hard-fought gains and press for more if they survive. Having
delivered on their promise to implement real and difficult
reforms in just 16 months, they view an FTA announcement not
only as a tool to ensure reform beyond their tenure, but also
as an expression of U.S. confidence in the Mubarak/Nazif
government. The reformers are still a vulnerable minority
within the NDP, and their credibility inside and outside of
government and possible shelf-life beyond the current
government depends upon getting results. With President
Mubarak gearing up to appoint a new cabinet after the
parliamentary elections, the reformers are looking for an FTA
announcement as U.S. validation of their program, and hope
that it will result in Mubarak returning them to office,
bolstered both in spirit and in numbers. End comment.
RICCIARDONE
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