US embassy cable - 05ADDISABABA3954

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ETHIOPIA: DIVIDED CUD STRUGGLES TO RECOVER FROM CRACKDOWN

Identifier: 05ADDISABABA3954
Wikileaks: View 05ADDISABABA3954 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Addis Ababa
Created: 2005-11-28 12:56:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM PREL ET ELEC UNREST
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003954 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ET, ELEC, UNREST 
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DIVIDED CUD STRUGGLES TO RECOVER FROM 
CRACKDOWN 
 
 
Classified By: PolEcon Counselor Kevin Sullivan for reason 
1.4 (b,d) 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The GOE's comprehensive crackdown on the CUD 
has left remaining leaders of Ethiopia's largest opposition 
party fearful, divided and so far paralyzed.  At least 25 of 
60 supreme council members are in jail; many others are under 
surveillance and afraid to engage in political activity.  The 
focus of at least part of the party has now shifted to the 
Diaspora, which is pushing donor governments in their 
capitals to help free jailed leaders.  PM Meles has insisted 
that imprisoned CUD leaders will be tried for treason, and 
told the Charge that an Ethiopian court would soon ban the 
party.  The National Electoral Board (NEB) has rejected the 
CUD's attempts to re-register itself as a legal party.  Meles 
has left the door open to dialogue with CUD leaders still at 
large, but has so far taken no concrete steps toward this 
end.   Some CUD moderates would like to meet to discuss a way 
forward, but have faced threats from security services. 
Lidetu Ayalew, who was suspended from the CUD just prior to 
the crackdown, hopes to take at least a portion of his 
UEDP-Medhin party into Parliament eventually, but is 
 
SIPDIS 
struggling with powerful popular opposition to compromise 
with the GOE.  Unless international pressure and/or continued 
domestic unrest force PM Meles negotiate with detained CUD 
leaders -- which appears quite unlikely in the near term -- a 
renewed political dialogue with the UEDF and a quiet 
migration of CUD MPs into Parliament are probably the best 
chance keep democracy moving forward in Ethiopia.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
CUD Decapitated and Paralyzed at Home 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) The GOE's comprehensive crackdown on Ethiopia's 
largest opposition organization, the Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD), has left the party largely leaderless and 
paralyzed within Ethiopia.  At least 25 of 60 members of the 
CUD's Supreme Council, the party's policy-making body, were 
rounded up after the outbreak of large-scale protests 
throughout the country during the first week of November.  PM 
Meles indicated to the Charge that the GOE had arrested only 
those members of the CUD leadership who had actively 
supported street violence designed to overthrow the 
government.  A number of other alleged party supporters, 
including newspaper publishers and NGO leaders, were also 
arrested.  Meles has since stated emphatically in public and 
in private that arrested CUD leaders would be tried for 
treason in connection with their alleged role in fomenting 
and organizing violent demonstrations. 
 
3. (C) Most remaining members of the CUD Supreme Council have 
remained at home or kept a low-profile since the arrests. 
Several claimed in conversations that they received telephone 
warnings, presumably from GOE intelligence officers, that 
they should remain at home or refrain from any political 
activity.  Admassu Gebeyehu, whom the CUD designated in 
September to become deputy mayor of Addis Ababa, told PolEcon 
Counselor in mid-November that he had had no contact with 
other party leaders since the arrest.  The focus of at least 
part of the party has now shifted to the Diaspora, where 
thousands of supporters are pushing donor governments in 
their capitals to help free jailed leaders.  At the same 
time, Admassu asked post for help in bringing CUD leaders 
still at liberty in Ethiopia together to discuss the way 
forward. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Charge's CUD Lunch Turns Out to be No Picnic 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) The Charge invited all CUD Supreme Council members 
still at liberty to lunch at her residence on Nov. 18, along 
with opposition leaders from the UEDF and OFDM who had chosen 
to enter Parliament.  Her purpose in hosting the event was to 
provide a space for shaken CUD leaders to regroup and begin 
to consider whether and how they could rejoin the political 
process.  The Charge notified the Minister of Justice and the 
State Minister of Foreign Affairs about the meeting and its 
purpose in advance, but nevertheless found an alarming news 
article in a ruling party newspaper on the morning of the 
event that suggested the U.S. Embassy was seeking to 
reorganize the criminal CUD.  She also received a phone call 
from PM Meles the same morning in which Meles cautioned 
against "coddling" CUD leaders.  The Charge should not 
suggest that the international community would solve the 
party's problems or protect them, the PM said.  He added he 
expected at least 50 CUD MPs would eventually choose to join 
Parliament "if left alone."  The Charge also heard separately 
from MFA State Minister Tekeda that meeting with CUD leaders 
one at a time was fine, but that meeting with them in groups 
offered hard-liners the opportunity to grandstand and impose 
their view.  The Charge reiterated her purpose for the 
gathering and asked that the GOE not prevent CUD members from 
attending. 
 
5. (C) Only seven CUD leaders chose to attend the lunch in 
the end; some reported that they were too concerned about 
their security, while others indicated that they felt it was 
inappropriate to meet or make decisions while party leaders 
were imprisoned.  Still others objected to the Charge's 
inviting Lidetu Ayalew, the charismatic leader of the 
UEDP-Medhin party whom the CUD had officially suspended after 
 
SIPDIS 
he failed to cooperate with the process of re-registering the 
CUD coalition as a unified party.  Those who did attend the 
lunch included representatives from UEDP-Medhin and the 
Ethiopian Democratic League (EDL).  No representatives 
attended from Berhanu Nega's Rainbow Party or CUD President 
Hailu Shawel's precursor All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP). 
Hailu Shawel's son, Shawel Hailu, expressed suspicions 
concerning Charge's lunch at a gathering the Charge hosted 
for families of detained leaders.  Shawel told one post 
contact that the lunched was designed to split the CUD. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Negotiate with Jailed CUD Leadership? 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Those closest to the imprisoned leadership of the CUD, 
as well as more neutral local observers, appear to be betting 
that international pressure will force PM Meles to negotiate 
a deal with the jailed leaders.  Isaac Kifle, a long-standing 
embassy contact who now serves as a political representative 
for Hailu Shawel, approached PolEcon Counselor Nov. 18 to ask 
for Embassy support in arranging such a negotiation.  Isaac 
invoked the precedent of Nelson Mandela's negotiated release 
from jail and ultimate assumption of political power.  Isaac 
subsequently reported receiving a warning from GOE security 
personnel note to leave his home.  At a subsequent gathering 
of independent newspaper editors and political experts, all 
expressed the view that any effort to make peace between the 
CUD and the GOE would have to involve release of all or most 
of the imprisoned leadership.  One well-informed observer, 
Abdul Mohammed of the InterAfrica Group, suggested an 
ambitious bargain in which all CUD leaders would be freed in 
return for a commitment for all CUD MPs to take their seats 
in Parliament and regional councils, including Addis Ababa. 
He then acknowledged that release of Hailu Shawel would be 
nearly impossible for the GOE, and suggested that sending 
Shawel and associate Dr. Mesfin Woldemariam to the U.S. 
(permanently) for medical treatment would be the most 
practical solution for all sides. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
GOE Takes Steps to Outlaw and Demonize CUD 
------------------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) PM Meles indicated to the Charge and AU Chairman 
Konare in mid-November that he hoped to engage in a dialogue 
with those CUD leaders still at liberty -- but never with 
jailed hard-liners.  At the same time, however, the EPRDF 
government appears to be moving to terminate the CUD itself. 
PM Meles indicated to the Charge on Nov. 25 that an Ethiopian 
court would soon ban the party as a result of its criminal 
acts in fomenting violent demonstrations both in November as 
well as earlier in June.  Ethiopian state media have been 
engaged for two weeks in a massive campaign to blame the CUD 
as an organization -- rather than individual leaders -- for 
the violence and destruction of property in early November, 
probably to prepare public opinion for the banning of the 
party.  On November 20, the National Electoral Board rejected 
the application filed by CUD component parties to register 
the coalition as a unified party.  The NEB found that the 
application was "incomplete" because one of the parties 
participating in the merger, the UEDP-Medhin, did not present 
appropriate documentation.  PM Meles told the Charge 
separately in their Nov. 18 phone call that an Ethiopian 
court might ban the party.  In another ominous development, 
stories began appearing in state media on November 23 
suggesting that the NEB would soon move to hold bi-elections 
to fill those parliamentary and regional council seats not 
taken by CUD candidates.  Such elections would definitively 
close the door to reintegrating CUD leaders into the 
political system. 
 
------------------------------ 
CUD Moderates Try to Resurface 
------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Some CUD leaders remain optimistic about the party's 
continued survival and integrity, however.  Dr. Alemayu 
Aredo, a senior member of the Ethiopian Democratic League 
(EDL), a junior partner within the CUD, told post privately 
on Nov. 24 that NEB officials had indicated they would 
reconsider the board's decision to reject the CUD merger if 
it received a clearer endorsement of the application from 
UEDP-Medhin, or if the latter party were dropped from the 
 
SIPDIS 
application.  Alemayu also said that many leaders among those 
still at liberty had concluded after recent violence that 
Parliamentary participation was the only way forward for the 
party and for Ethiopian democracy.  The large number of 
unnecessary deaths had had on impact on many party leaders, 
he said.  Alemayu acknowledged that some party hard-liners, 
including members of the Diaspora, would oppose any effort to 
chart a new course while party leaders remained detained, but 
he claimed that he and many other leaders were prepared to 
proceed anyway.  He asked post's assistance in securing a GOE 
commitment not to arrest CUD leaders if they met to consider 
next steps.  The Charge made a pitch for such guarantees to 
Deputy Foreign Minister Tekeda Nov. 25 and received a 
positive initial reaction, and a promise to pursue assurances 
with EPRDF leaders. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Outcast Lidetu Seeking Alternate Path 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) UEDP-Medhin leader Lidetu Ayalew has played a key role 
in the CUD's tumultuous recent history.  Lidetu has 
increasingly taken issue with the more confrontational course 
Hailu Shawel has charted for the coalition.  After CUD 
leaders decided against entering Parliament and the 
government of Addis Ababa in October, Lidetu decided to 
withhold his party's support for the CUD's formal merger 
application.  Lidetu predicted privately in mid-October that 
the NEB was likely to refuse the CUD's merger application, 
and that the kind of confrontation that Hailu sought would 
eventually lead to the banning of the party.  His refusal to 
hitch his party's star whole-heartedly to Hailu's earned him 
public repudiation in opposition-leaning media as well as 
formal suspension from the CUD.  Some of Lidetu's colleagues 
in UEDP-Medhin remained loyal to him, while others joined 
Hailu Shawel's camp within the CUD. 
 
10. (C) Events have proven him correct, but Lidetu has 
continued to maintain a low political profile since the early 
November arrests.  He has recently begun to do media 
interviews again advocating a "political solution" to current 
tensions.  He told the Charge in mid-November that he hoped 
to convince the public and other CUD leaders gradually that 
entering the Parliamentary system was the best way to build a 
durable, successful opposition movement.  Lidetu believed 
that getting a significant number of CUD MPs into Parliament 
was possible, but that GOE release of most CUD leaders and 
other political detainees was essential in order to reduce 
the deep and widespread popular anger at the EPRDF.  He said 
the threat of potential bi-elections to fill their seats 
might be just the face-saving excuse many CUD leaders would 
need to enter Parliament.  He also suggested negotiations 
with imprisoned leaders themselves.  While this step would be 
extremely difficult for PM Meles, Lidetu argued that the 
EPRDF needed opposition parties in order to govern the 
country.  The alternative would be eventual guerrilla 
activity in both rural and urban areas and the loss of 15 
years of painful democratic progress.  Lidetu added, however, 
that the CUD might be forced to break down into its component 
parties again, at least for a time, in order to survive and 
move forward in the coming months. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
------ 
Comment: With Negotiation Unlikely, CUD May Need to Find 
Another Way 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
------ 
 
11. (C) Most knowledgeable observers in Ethiopia agree that 
political compromise between the EPRDF and CUD supporters is 
essential both to the establishment of successful multi-party 
democracy as well as to the avoidance of armed civil conflict 
in the medium term.  At the same time, the CUD as an entity 
so far appears unable to engage in a dialogue except through 
its imprisoned senior leadership -- with whom PM Meles 
refused to negotiate.  The EPRDF may be planning to do away 
with the CUD altogether through jailing its leaders, denying 
it legal status and intimidating those left at liberty.  PM 
Meles has indicated previously that Ethiopia's current 
opposition was fundamentally undemocratic and might have to 
be destroyed in order for a more genuine and enlightened 
opposition to emerge.  His government may well be acting now 
upon that premise.  An alternate theory, however, would hold 
that PM Meles has sought to surgically remove hard-line 
elements of the CUD -- including some newspaper editors -- in 
order to allow more moderate elements to enter the 
Parliamentary political process.  The GOE's actions over the 
next few weeks should reveal which explanation of recent 
events is more accurate. 
12. (C) Unless international pressure and/or continued 
domestic unrest force PM Meles negotiate with detained CUD 
leaders -- which appears quite unlikely in the near term -- a 
renewed political dialogue with opposition parties in 
Parliament, along with a quiet migration of some CUD MPs into 
Parliament and Regional Councils, seem to offer the most 
realistic way forward.  PM Meles needs to take concrete steps 
soon to facilitate that outcome, however.  The capacity of 
remaining CUD leaders to adapt to the post-unrest scenario 
will also be critical. 
HUDDLESTON 

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