US embassy cable - 05ADANA220

UNCLAS ADANA 000220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRO, COMML PROPRIETARY INFO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EPET, ETRD, ELTN, ECON, TU, ADANA 
SUBJECT: OIL EXPLORATION, IRAQI BORDER TRADE CAUGHT IN TURKISH 
SECURITY WEB? 
 
REF: ADANA 144 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary:  AMCON Adana conoff's met with Chevron and 
Iraqi border province regional business officials on 11/9, 
taking the temperature on regional attitudes about cross-border 
trade and energy exploration potential.  Conoff's encountered 
frustration from multiple contacts, but a desire to persevere in 
the face of what they considered narrow GoT security agendas 
hampering potential regional economic development.  End Summary. 
 
2.(SBU)  In a 11/9 dinner meeting, a regional chamber of 
commerce official already knowledgeable of the Chevron proposals 
offered that he had discussed the potential of the project with 
regional Jandarma officials.  They reportedly had replied that 
the exploration proposal's potential clearly was of interest to 
provincial officials, but that it also was a "national security 
issue where the decision would be affected by regional security 
and personnel safety considerations."  (Note: Part of the 
proposed seismic exploration area, which is a smaller part their 
more extensive southeastern Sirnak province license area, is 
adjacent to the Iraqi border and much of it is in hilly country 
where Turkish military units have conducted counter-PKK 
operations in past years, although reportedly not in 2005.  End 
Note,) 
 
3.(SBU)  Meeting with Chevron-contracted international 
exploration staff officials on 11/10 in Cizre, conoffs heard 
resigned acceptance that their more ambitious and - more 
importantly, more authoritative data-yielding - seismic survey 
proposals for their TPAO exploration license area near Silopi 
once again had been postponed - this time until Spring/Summer 
2006.  As a result, Chevron had worked with the Turkish 
Petroleum Authority (TPAO) to seek Turkish General Staff (TGS) 
approval to do alternative less invasive and shorter-duration 
gravity and magnetic field studies in the license area. 
 
4.(SBU)  Based on regional security concerns, TGS reportedly 
decided to allow a qualified permit that would allow only 
Turkish national-staffed field work in the license area. 
Consequently, Chevron international staff had come to Silopi in 
late October to oversee the implementation of, and analyze the 
results from, a TPAO-led field survey.   Chevron officials in 
Silopi said that they were doing "what we are being allowed to 
do, rather than what you normally would do to conduct efficient 
exploration.  It is a something rather than nothing" approach, 
the lead Chevron-contracted international field staffer said. 
 
5.(SBU)  In a 11/13 meeting in Ankara with Chevron executives, 
conoff heard a corroborating characterization of the mixed value 
of the then concluding field work in Silopi, but a determination 
to persevere in the hopes that TGS would allow more meaningful 
seismic exploration starting in April/May 2006. 
 
6.(SBU) During a 11/9 meeting, Sirnak CCI President Halil Balkan 
expressed hope for a better economic future through exploitation 
of the regions oil and mineral resources, as well as expanded 
border trade with Iraq.  Balkan said that GOT political concerns 
had created problems for Sirnak business with Iraq.  He 
explained that when the GOT slowed Customs work at the border 
because the Kurdish flag was flown on the Iraq side or when the 
passports of travelers entering Iraq had been stamped with a 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) stamp, these GOT political 
reactions indicated that the GOT did not want northern Iraq to 
become prosperous, and was making such calculations at the 
expense of the economy of Turkey's southeast region. 
 
7.(SBU)  Balkan told us that the Sirnak CCI had taken its 
concerns to the Parliament, and the Ministries of Trade and 
Interior, but had received no responses.  Balkan opined that the 
government's predisposition to deny the KRG the status of a 
credible interlocutor and its continued assertion that there was 
"a vacuum of authority in Northern Iraq" seemed to be preventing 
the GOT from taking more calibrated and measured long-term 
decisions about the regions economic development.  (Comment: 
this sentiment was echoed by conoffs' 11/9 contact as well, who 
noted that he had a relative who worked with the KRG in northern 
Iraq.  He said his relative said that KRG officials felt Turkish 
officials would not accept them as interlocutors.  End Comment.). 
 
8.(SBU)  Baghdad minimize considered. 
REID