US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6952

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006952 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/CPD/CRUSNAK 
DOE FOR CHUCK WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2015 
TAGS: EPET, PREL, ETRD, TU, IZ, Iraq 
SUBJECT: TURKEY-IRAQ HABUR GATE - WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 4524 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. ANKARA 6870 
     C. ANKARA 4880 AND PREVIOUS 
     D. ADANA 205 
 
Classified By: CHARGE NANCY MCELDOWNEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  Geographical and political realities make 
Turkey the only neighbor of Iraq with the potential to meet 
Iraq's growing civilian and military needs for imported 
fossil fuels and consumer goods.  While there are certain 
short and medium term fixes that can increase the capacity of 
the single existing border facility, these improvements will 
be far from sufficient to meet the critical needs in Iraq, 
including those of Coalition forces.  Political engagement on 
the part of the United States will be needed to break the 
current logjam in Turkish-Iraqi discussions of building a 
second facility, the only solution that will meet Iraqi, 
Turkish, and U.S. interests.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Mission Turkey has read with interest and concern 
Baghdad's recent reporting on growing shortages of fuel 
products in Iraq and the impact this will have on domestic 
Iraqi stability and security and U.S. interests.  As Baghdad 
points out, these shortages are likely to create additional 
demand for the already substantial imports of fuel products 
via Turkey at the same time as the fuel requirements of U.S. 
forces in Iraq continue to grow.  Improving economic 
conditions in Iraq will result in increased demands on land 
transport via Turkey, which offers the only land route 
between Iraq and Europe. 
 
3.  (C)  We understand that Turkish companies currently 
engaged in the oil products trade believe they have the 
capacity to increase supplies to Iraq by as much as 50% with 
the appropriate financing (RefB).  However, neither Iraq's 
nor the U.S. Military,s growing fuel needs, not to mention 
growing needs for other imported goods, can be met via Turkey 
with the current border infrastructure.  In addition, and 
very importantly, relying on a single border crossing creates 
a major vulnerability should that crossing be closed by a 
calamitous event such as a terrorist attack or natural 
disaster. 
 
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Single Gate Bottleneck 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Habur Gate has long been identified as a bottleneck 
to increased trade with Iraq.  There are ebbs and flows based 
on many factors, but each day customs officials process an 
average 1000 to 1500 vehicles in each direction (for a 
combined flow of 2000 to 3000 daily).  Turkish customs 
officials generally process vehicles efficiently, maintaining 
appropriate security checks.  Customs officials have 
informally agreed to prioritize southbound tanker passage at 
about 50% of total trucks.  The majority of tankers crossing 
carry fuel for humanitarian or commercial needs on behalf of 
SOMO (State Oil Marketing Organization of Iraq).  Tankers 
carrying fuel to U.S. forces amount to 10-15% of total tanker 
numbers. 
 
5.  (C)  Repeated visits by Mission personnel, including a 
U.S. Military Liaison Officer who spends most of his time at 
or near the border, indicate that the Habur facility is 
operating near its maximum physical capacity.  A complex, 
organic balance of many competing factors and forces has 
developed over time.  We have learned -- the hard way -- that 
attempts to micro-manage or blatantly prioritize specific 
categories often create unintended consequences, including 
violence or strikes by drivers.  For example, attempts to 
expedite fuel flow to U.S. military depots created shortages 
of the SOMO-provided fuels used to power the tanker trucks 
themselves. 
 
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Short and Medium Term Fixes 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) While we believe that the Habur facility is operating 
near its capacity, there could be marginal short-term 
improvements in the facility's ability to put through 
additional trucks.  USG logistical specialists should be able 
to engage Turkish border officials on more efficient traffic 
management practices -- bearing in mind the risk of meddling 
with the current equilibrium (especially when angry, 
impatient truck drivers abound).  Sirnak Province has 
constructed a new holding yard that should increase 
flexibility with potential for improved management of 
processing and/or prioritization of certain categories of 
goods of USG interest.  For the moment, however, the yard is 
unpaved and operating procedures are ad hoc and unclear. 
 
7.  (C)  A medium term measure that could lead to a 
noticeable improvement in cross-border capacity would be to 
build one or more short, cross-border pipelines.  This would 
allow fuel to pass from the Turkish side of the border to the 
Iraqi side without having to be carried in a vehicle.  Such 
pipelines could be built in conjunction with "bag farms" 
(i.e. collapsible containers for holding fuels) on the Iraq 
side.  This concept could be applied both to civilian and 
military shipments.  We understand that the Turkish supplier 
TPIC has proposed, and indeed constructed as far as the 
border, such a pipeline.  However, TPIC and SOMO have 
apparently not been able to agree on the operation of a 
pipeline.  Agreement with SOMO could replace approximately 60 
tanker loads of fuel per day.  A similar facility could 
facilitate transport fuel to the U.S. military.  U.S. 
officials should explore the alternatives of construction of 
such a pipeline by a private company and by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers.  The Turkish authorities would have to be 
fully involved in any such enterprise. 
 
--------------------- 
Longer Term Solutions 
--------------------- 
 
8.  (C) It is clear however that the short and medium term 
fixes described above will not be sufficient to meet growing 
needs in Iraq.  Given the ongoing requirement for security 
controls on both sides of the border, we are of the opinion 
that substantially increased trade and military needs can 
only be accommodated by the building of one or more 
additional border crossing facilities on both sides.  Since 
new facilities would require the construction of supporting 
road networks in both Turkey and Iraq, this would be an 
expensive project that would likely take two years or so to 
complete.  At the same time, U.S. and Iraqi interests will 
continue to suffer from the limitations of the single Habur 
facility.  Delay in starting such a project only lengthens 
the hardships, especially understanding that U.S. policy 
recognizes that our engagement in Iraq should also continue 
for many years. 
 
9.  (C) The USG has engaged the GOT and the ITG on a second 
border gate, offering a TDA economic feasibility study as a 
way to facilitate an agreement on economic grounds, but has 
otherwise said that creation of a new crossing point is for 
the Iraqis and Turks to agree.  Yet, due to mutual suspicions 
that are deep and of very long standing, the Turks and Iraqis 
have been unable to agree on a location for the gate despite 
the compelling need.  In the meantime, our political, 
security, and military interests in Iraq are bearing the cost 
of the inability of the Turks and Iraqis to agree. 
 
10.  (C) From our perspective, there is little chance that 
the two countries will be able to gather the political will 
to find an agreement without a substantive engagement by the 
United States.  Such an engagement would have to offer 
support for assurances to be given by both the Turkish and 
Iraqi (including the KRG) sides.  For example, the Turks have 
offered to assure the GOI and KRG that imports through Habur 
would not be replaced by flows through a new gate.  The Turks 
would welcome this role.  Understanding that a more assertive 
U.S. role may complicate U.S. relationships in Iraq, we see 
no alternative. 
MCELDOWNEY