US embassy cable - 05KATHMANDU2565

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FM PANDEY: BITTER TOWARD INDIA, NEED TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-NEPAL RELATIONS

Identifier: 05KATHMANDU2565
Wikileaks: View 05KATHMANDU2565 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2005-11-25 08:57:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER PHUM PGOV AMGT NP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
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DE RUEHKT #2565/01 3290857
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O 250857Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
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INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 9001
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 8839
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 3965
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3385
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 3692
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1703
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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, H 
NSC FOR RICHELSOPH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, PGOV, AMGT, NP 
SUBJECT:  FM PANDEY: BITTER TOWARD INDIA, NEED TO 
STRENGTHEN U.S.-NEPAL RELATIONS 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 2556 
 
Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1. (C) Hosting the Ambassador over one-on-one drinks at his 
home just hours after returning to Nepal from his 
international travel, FM Pandey was particularly bitter 
toward the Government of India (GOI), accusing them of 
brokering the recent Maoist-Parties understanding (ref A). 
Pandey indicated he wanted to try again to strengthen 
U.S.-Nepal ties.  He objected to Senator Leahy's recent 
statement about Nepal, but acknowledged that Nepal needed to 
improve its relations with the USG, including Congress.  He 
agreed the Ambassador's proposal that the King should call 
for an internationally-monitored cease-fire was worth 
considering.  End Summary. 
 
India Behind Maoist-Parties Understanding 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Foreign Minister Pandey asserted that His Majesty's 
Government of Nepal (HMGN) believed that India had brokered 
the Maoist-Parties understanding.  Pandey claimed that 
"calling for a constituent assembly is a way to achieve the 
Sikkimization of Nepal."  (N.B. India annexed Sikkim in 1974, 
hollowing a referendum in that once-independent kingdom.)  He 
stated that although the King's meeting in Dhaka with Indian 
PM Singh had been good, India had subsequently arranged for 
the Maoists and Parties to come together.  The Ambassador 
noted that, while the GOI might have made talks between the 
Maoists and Parties possible, Indian officials tell us that 
they continued to want reconciliation between the King and 
the political parties.  Pandey remarked that the extreme 
right faction in Nepal was already pushing to have the 
Parties declared supporters/sympathizers of terrorists, which 
would subject them to the treason provisions of the Offence 
against the State and Punishment Act, 1989.  The Ambassador 
noted that he had informed Washington that if the political 
parties signed an agreement with the Maoists and the latter 
returned to war, HMGN might act against the Parties.  The 
Ambassador warned Pandey, however, that the international 
community was likely to react strongly if HMGN did so. 
 
King Should Call For Internationally Monitored Cease-Fire 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador recommended to Pandey that the King 
could retake the initiative by calling for an internationally 
monitored cease-fire.  The Ambassador explained that the King 
should publicly announce that the current Maoist cease-fire 
is flawed -- abductions and extortion are up and the Maoists 
continue to murder and act against civilians.  But, 
recognizing that his people want peace, the King should call 
for a real case-fire; all three parties could sit down to 
discuss its parameters and invite international observers to 
monitor it.  Pandey eventually agreed to raise the proposal 
with the King. 
 
Let's Be Friends Again 
---------------------- 
 
4. (C) During the three-hour conversation, Pandey expressed 
irritation with both the U.K.'s Ambassador Bloomfield and 
with India's Nepal policy, charging that their goal was the 
crushing of Nepal's independence.  In that context, the FM 
appealed for a special relationship between the U.S. and 
Nepal.  He stressed that the U.S. should not let India drive 
its policy toward Nepal.  (Note: The FM had taken a very cool 
approach to the U.S. following the decision not to invite the 
King to the President's UNGA reception.  End note.)  Pandey 
suggested that he could travel to Washington with a letter 
from the King.  The Ambassador reminded Pandey that 
Washington did not much trust the King, whose actions in July 
(expanding the Cabinet with corrupt and criminal cronies as 
well as imprisoning former Prime Minister Deuba on corruption 
 
charges) had convinced the U.S. that he was more interested 
in power than democracy.  We were waiting to see the King 
take positive, concrete actions.  The Ambassador informed FM 
Pandey that he was being recalled to Washington for 
consultations. 
 
5. (C) Pandey voiced strong criticism of Senator Leahy's 
November 18 statement on Nepal.  He added that he realized 
that Senator Leahy himself did not write the statement, and 
acknowledged that Nepal needed to work better with the USG as 
a whole, including Congress.  He noted that he planned to 
write a letter to the Senator, and perhaps ask Nepal's 
Ambassador to meet with Senator Leahy to deliver it. 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador expressed deep concern about the 
Ministry's excessively slow response to various Embassy 
requests (e.g., clearance for material for the new Embassy's 
construction, extension of school visas, visas for employees 
working on the new construction).  Implying that the delay 
was indeed intentional, Pandey responded that our diplomatic 
note stating we would not transfer the weapons brought in to 
Nepal for the October-November Anti-Terror Assistance 
training had caused him lots of problems.  The Ambassador 
pushed back and explained that the Embassy had argued 
strongly for that training to take place, and the delay in 
transferring the weapons until we resumed lethal security 
assistance was a necessary compromise.  Pandey then asked the 
Ambassador to send him a note detailing the requests 
submitted to the MFA by the Embassy. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (C) The Maoist-Parties pact came as a shock, especially 
given HMGN's strong belief that India had brokered it.  FM 
Pandey sees his space constricting, and he appears almost 
desperate to garner some outside support.  In September he 
had turned away from the U.S., but has now returned to 
pushing for a better relationship.  In addition to being a 
reaction against India, this could be an acknowledgment that 
HMGN fears that the material support it will receive from 
China may not be enough to meet its needs. 
MORIARTY 

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