US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU2302

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NEPAL: MAOISTS SEEKING DIALOGUE FOR TACTICAL ENDS

Identifier: 02KATHMANDU2302
Wikileaks: View 02KATHMANDU2302 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2002-12-04 12:30:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER PGOV NP Maoist Insurgency
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002302 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/IP/SA 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2012 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  MAOISTS SEEKING DIALOGUE FOR TACTICAL ENDS 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 2052 
 
     B. (B) KATHMANDU 2295 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1.  (C)  A December 3 statement by Maoist leader Prachanda 
claimed that the insurgents are suspending violent attacks 
against infrastructure and against mainstream political party 
members in order to create a conducive environment for 
dialogue.  Despite their frequent calls for dialogue with the 
Governent of Nepal (GON), however, the Maoists are likely not 
sincere about seeking a peaceful, permanent resolution to the 
conflict and may attempt to use dialogue for tactical 
purposes.  As long as the GON realizes this--and we believe 
it does--it should nonetheless remain open to the possibility 
of dialogue with the insurgents, both as a way to achieve 
progress on important humanitarian issues and as a way to 
forge common ground with the political parties against the 
insurgents.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
MAOISTS CLAIM NO MORE ATTACKS AGAINST INFRASTRUCTURE, 
MAINSTREAM PARTY MEMBERS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
2.  (U) The Maoist leadership continues to churn out turgid 
rhetoric alleging its willingness to seek dialogue with the 
Government of Nepal (GON)--despite an impending education 
strike that threatens to close all private schools in 
Kathmandu indefinitely (septel).  A December 3 press release 
from Maoist leader Prachanda reported that a "recent" 
Politburo meeting called on "all political parties, 
organizations, associations, and intellectuals to forge a 
joint movement to end the present imbroglio by stressing the 
need for dialogue and discussion."  To help create an 
environment conducive to dialogue, moreover, the Politburo 
reportedly directed party members "not to attack the workers 
of any political party (the party will denounce them if they 
are criminals or if they leaked information to the security 
forces and take the case before the responsible leader of the 
same party)."  According to the press statement, the 
Politburo also decided "not to sabotage physical 
infrastructure directly linked to the public welfare." 
Finally, the meeting reiterated its demands "for a roundtable 
discussion (with the GON, parties, civil society on 
modalities for dialogue), interim government, and the 
importance of a constituent assembly."  As of COB December 4, 
the GON had no official reaction to the press release. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
THOSE WHO OUGHT TO KNOW QUESTION MAOISTS' SINCERITY 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3.  (C)  Their frequent calls for dialogue notwithstanding, 
the Maoists are probably not sincere about seeking a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict, according to political land NGO 
sources who claim to have contact with the insurgents. 
Instead, the Maoists most likely want talks for their 
tactical value--both as a way to buy time and in order to 
exert concerted pressure from civil society, political 
parties, and the international community on the GON to accede 
to at least some Maoist demands.  According to these sources, 
the Maoist leadership feels able to negotiate from a position 
of strength against an interim government that it believes 
lacks popular and political support.  They also perceive a 
certain amount of favorable momentum from the international 
community in favor of dialogue that they believe they can use 
to their advantage.  Former Deputy Prime Minister and 
Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML) 
Central Committee member Bamdev Gautam observed to the 
Ambassador that Maoist calls for dialogue are likely a 
"tactic"; if so, the GON should remain aware of this 
probability and develop its "own tactics" as well.  He noted 
with regret the brutal slaying by the Maoists of a former UML 
local leader in the east just two days previously.  Krishna 
Pahadi of the Human Rights and Peace Society views the 
purported moratorium on killing political activists from 
other parties as an obvious bid to lure the mainstream 
political parties to side with the Maoists against the GON 
and the Palace.  Subodh Pyakurel of the human rights NGO 
INSEC panned the press release as a Maoist trial balloon 
calculated simply to test the reactions of civil society and 
mainstream political parties. 
 
4.  (C)  Sudip Pathak of the Human Rights Organization of 
Nepal (who claims to us and to the press to have an open 
channel to the Maoists) said the insurgents believe they have 
"matured" in their fight against the Royal Nepal Army and 
developed their fighting skills and their military 
organization.  (Note:  This view was also reflected in a 
recent extortion letter sent by the Maoists to a U.S.-owned 
business, which claimed "Our party has already developed a 
brigade level structure in its liberation army.  Today the 
people's war has progressed from the stage of strategic 
balance into the transitional phase of strategic attack." 
End note.)  At the same time, Pathak said, the Maoists (whose 
hard-core, armed strength he estimates at about 4,500) are 
fearful of being hurt by the post-9/11 global campaign 
against terrorism.  By ostensibly pursuing dialogue, the 
Maoists hope to deflect criticism of their terrorist tactics, 
persuade the world they are a political force, and avoid 
anti-terrorist sanctions.  Tighter border controls and 
greater vigilance by the Indians recently have also made life 
difficult for the Maoists, Pathak said, and may be 
influencing their push for dialogue. 
 
5.  (C)  Padma Ratna Tuladhar, a far-left political activist 
with covert links to the Maoists, sounded the only dissenting 
note.  Tuladhar says he believes the Maoists are "more 
serious" now than they were in late 2001, when Tuladhar acted 
as a facilitator in three rounds of abortive talks between 
the GON and the insurgents.  The Maoists feel there is 
"international pressure for dialogue," he asserted, noting 
that the EU and India in particular "are in favor of 
dialogue."  He acknowledged that tighter controls on the 
Indian side of the border might also be a factor in their 
willingness for talks.  To create a conducive dialogue for 
talks, the GON must withdraw its earlier designation of the 
Maoists as terrorists (a demand repeated by the Maoist 
student union as a condition for the cancellation of the 
educational strike), he added. 
 
--------- 
COMMENT 
--------- 
 
6.  (C) All indications are that the Maoists are trying to 
manipulate the perennial divisions within the body 
politic--this time between the political parties on the one 
hand and the Palace and the interim government on the 
other--for their own advantage (Ref B).  This latest press 
release, which exempts "party workers" alone among all other 
civilian targets of Maoist brutality, is just the most recent 
chapter in this effort.  Whether Maoist cadre keep 
Prachanda's pledge and suspend their customary violence 
against rival mainstream party activists and their 
destruction of infrastructure may provide a good indication 
of the Politburo's hold on its far-flung troops, but little 
else, we're afraid.  The Maoists may be willing to change 
their tactics temporarily to gain an advantage, but we see no 
sign that they have compromised at all on their ultimate 
end--the overthrow, through violence if necessary, of the 
constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy.  Like most 
of our interlocutors, we believe the Maoists may be pursuing 
dialogue in order to gain tactical advantage over the 
government.  As long as the GON realizes this--and we believe 
it does--it should nonetheless remain open to the possibility 
of dialogue, both as a way to achieve progress on important 
humanitarian issues and as a way to forge common ground with 
the political parties against the insurgents. 
MALINOWSKI 

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