US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA10952

UNCLAS BOGOTA 010952 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT - ED SALAZAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, KJUS, MARR, CASC, ASEC, CO 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: 2005 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: SECSTATE 193439 
 
1. (U) The following is Embassy Bogota's submission to the 
2005 Country Reports on Terrorism.  Responses are keyed to 
questions in reftel's paragraphs 7-10.  Embassy POC is Poloff 
Liliana Gabriel, unclass email gabriell@state.gov 
 
2. (SBU) GENERAL ASSESSMENT: 
 
SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM:  The 
Government of Colombia, faced with its own direct terrorist 
threat, continued to support the Global War Against Terrorism 
through bilateral, multilateral, military, and economic 
activities against three Foreign Terrorist Organizations -- 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia (AUC).  In 2005, Colombia continued to 
work with neighboring countries to combat terrorist 
expansion, investigate terrorist activities inside and 
outside Colombia, and bring terrorists to justice.  The 
Government of Colombia continued its hard stance against 
terrorists throughout 2005.  Uribe's Administration, 
inaugurated in 2002, entered office on a "get tough with 
terrorists" platform and has maintained its focus to 
demobilize or defeat Colombia's terrorist groups. 
 
The Uribe Administration maintained ) in both theory and 
practice - its position against terrorism, and continually 
condemned all terrorist actions.  A few members of Congress, 
however, showed sympathies for either the paramilitaries, the 
ELN, or the FARC.  Nevertheless, these members of Congress 
usually limited any signs of support to unofficial actions. 
In October 2005, Department of Administrative Security 
(roughly an FBI counterpart) director and two high-ranking 
officials resigned in October 2005 after a flurry of 
accusations regarding collaboration with paramilitaries. 
President Uribe named an interim director and requested a 
full investigation.  (On November 22, Uribe named interim 
director Andres Penate as director, effective immediately.) 
 
DIPLOMATIC: Colombia has signed and ratified nine of the 12 
international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism.  In April 2005, the Colombian Government ratified 
the Hostages International Convention.  The remaining three 
conventions are in different stages of the Congressional 
ratification process.  Colombia neither recognizes nor offers 
diplomatic privileges to terrorist organizations.  In late 
2005 Colombia became the Chairman of the Organization of 
American States' Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism 
(CICTE) for a one year term. 
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT: The U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship 
continued to be the most successful in the world; Colombia 
extradited over 130 criminals, the vast majority of whom are 
Colombian nationals, to the United States in 2005.  The 
Colombian Government remained fully cooperative in cases and 
investigations involving Americans; it sought an exchange of 
hostages held by the FARC to release the three U.S. citizens 
kidnapped in February 2003.  In February, Colombia extradited 
FARC financier Omaira Rojas Cabrera "Sonia."  In November, 
Colombian officials arrested Farouck Shaikh Reyes in 
connection with distributing over 600 tons of cocaine to 
Europe and the United States with profits going to multiple 
Colombian illegal armed groups.  Leaders of the FARC, ELN and 
AUC have raised their concern over the threat of extradition. 
 
INTELLIGENCE: In 2005, all adult terrorist group deserters 
were debriefed by the military for detailed information on 
their terrorist cell before they entered the demobilization 
and reinsertion program.  In addition, the Justice and Peace 
law, intended to offer special judicial benefits and reduced 
custodial sentences for qualifying demobilizing terrorists, 
requires all participants to confess fully the nature of 
their crimes as members of their terrorist group.  Justice 
and Peace beneficiaries must also return all illicit profits. 
 
FINANCIAL ASSETS: The Colombian Government fully cooperated 
in blocking terrorist assets.  Throughout 2005, Colombian 
financial institutions closed many narco-trafficking and 
terrorism related accounts following the actions of U.S. and 
Colombian law enforcement agencies. 
 
MILITARY: President Uribe continued his strategy of military 
pressure on illegal armed groups in 2005, facilitating the 
military's nation-wide campaign to retake national territory. 
 Although FARC-dominated southern Colombia was the primary 
target for the inter-service military action, the military 
also carried out actions against the ELN and the AUC 
throughout the year. 
 
SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT: The Colombian Government made no effort 
to provide sanctuary, political, financial, or weapons 
support to any terrorist group, domestic or international. 
 
3. (U) SANCTUARY (SAFE HAVEN) ASSESSMENT: The Colombian 
Government has a massive offensive to retake national 
territory from the FARC, and a peace process to dismantle the 
AUC.  Whenever the Government has specific, credible 
information about a terrorist camp location, it attacks that 
area with military and police forces, to deny terrorists safe 
havens and strongholds. 
 
COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES: The Colombian Government 
cooperates fully with the United States in capturing, 
extraditing, and impoverishing terrorist groups.  There are 
no known weapons of mass destruction in Colombia. 
 
4.(SBU) INFORMATION ON TERRORIST GROUPS: Terrorist groups 
were once again active throughout the country in 2005. Car 
bombs, kidnapping, political murders, the indiscriminate use 
of landmines, and economic sabotage occurred.  None of the 
groups enjoy any financial support, training, recognition, or 
sanctuary from the Colombian Government. 
 
FARC: The FARC increased tactical-level terrorist and 
narcotrafficking activities despite the ongoing military 
campaign against them.  In 2005, the FARC's attacks targeted 
rural outposts, infrastructure, former control zones retaken 
by the Colombian Government, and several political 
adversaries.  The FARC kidnapped 11 people over the Holy Week 
holiday season in 2005 in Antioquia and Valle del Cauca 
Departments.  On May 24, the FARC attacked a town hall during 
a city council meeting in Puerto Rico, Caqueta Department, 
killing six municipal councilors and an official, wounding 
many others.  The FARC were suspected of bombing nine 
electrical towers in the Atlantic Coast region over Memorial 
Day weekend, and caused widespread power outages, which took 
several days to repair.  On June 25, the FARC carried out its 
deadliest one-day attack since President Uribe took office. 
Twelve simultaneous strikes killed 21 and wounded 11 soldiers 
in southeastern Putumayo Department.  On the evening of 
October 10, a remote-controlled 50-kilogram explosive device 
hidden in a parked car was detonated in northern Bogota as 
Senator German Vargas Lleras's motorcade drove past. Vargas 
escaped unharmed, but nine Colombians were injured. More than 
four hundred other Colombians sustained property damage. The 
investigation continues and although the FARC deny 
responsibility, the Colombian Government has not ruled out 
the FARC as the perpetrator.  On October 11, there was an 
unsuccessful mortar attack against the Presidential Palace, 
"Casa de Nario" using tactics regularly used by the FARC. 
Both the FARC and ELN continued attacks against the country's 
infrastructure and oil pipelines in 2003, albeit at reduced 
levels. 
 
ELN:  In September, the ELN showed renewed interest in 
 
establishing a dialogue moving towards peace talks with the 
GOC. In April, the ELN abandoned talks with a Mexican 
facilitator.  The group continues fighting but has limited 
resources and dwindling membership.  The ELN had its first 
mass desertion on June 8, when the 29-person bloc known as 
the "Heroes and Martyrs of Anori" surrendered to officials. 
The ELN publicized their project to remove landmines from one 
rural area in Sucre Department, but was unwilling to allow 
the Colombian Government to verify the removal by allowing 
military deminers to review the area. 
 
AUC and Other Paramilitaries: The Colombian Government and 
AUC signed the Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement in July 2003, 
establishing a cease-fire and setting the stage for peace 
negotiations and demobilization.  Approximately 11,000 of the 
estimated 20,000 paramilitaries have demobilized over the 
past two years. As of November, the Government's goal was to 
demobilize all AUC members by February 28, 2006 and ensure 
their reincorporation into civil society by the end of 2007. 
Most paramilitary cease-fire violations targeted civilians 
including massacres, kidnappings, selective killings, 
displacements, robberies, and the recruitment of children. 
Despite paramilitary cease-fire violations, the overall level 
of paramilitary violence continued to decrease, but 
paramilitary- authored murders stayed roughly at 2004 levels. 
 
 
IRA: Three suspected Irish Revolutionary Army (IRA) members 
were arrested in 2001 for illegal immigration documents and 
for training the FARC on IRA bomb tactics.  The three men 
fled Colombia while on parole awaiting final sentencing and 
resurfaced in Ireland in August 2005.  Colombia has requested 
extradition of the three men who were convicted of aiding a 
terrorist group.  Ireland's response to the extradition is 
pending. 
 
5 (SBU) INFORMATION ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION: There 
were no GOC actions taken against Al-Qaida in 2005 but the 
military conducted ongoing actions against the FARC, ELN, and 
AUC.  Military and police units around the country seized 
weapons caches, impounded narcotics stocks, infiltrated 
abandoned FARC camps, and rescued kidnap victims.  The 
Colombian Government cooperates fully with U.S. efforts to 
stop terrorist acts against the United States and U.S. 
citizens. 
DRUCKER