US embassy cable - 05WARSAW3903

UNCLAS WARSAW 003903 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/NCE DKOSTELANCIK AND MSESSUMS, DEPT FOR G, 
OES/IHA, OES/IHA FOR DSINGER AND RDALEY, DEPT FOR INR 
RLESTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO, SENV, ECON, EAGR, EAID, PREL, PL 
SUBJECT: POLAND: UPDATED INFORMATION ON AVIAN AND PANDEMIC 
INFLUENZA PREPARATION 
 
REF: A. STATE 209622 
 
     B. WARSAW 3830 
     C. WARSAW 3632 
     D. WARSAW 3364 
     E. WARSAW 3212 
 
1.  Summary.  Post has reported extensively on our positive 
relationship with the GOP in its effort to prepare for a 
potential avian influenza outbreak (see refs b - e).  Polish 
officials are actively preparing for the appearance of the 
disease, which they expect will occur in the Spring.  Rather 
than restate information from Warsaw reftels, post provides 
additional requested information here on a point by point 
basis.  All of the information provided in ref B remains 
valid.  End Summary. 
 
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Preparedness/Communication 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  Post is certain that GOP reporting on a potential disease 
outbreak will be both swift and truthful.  The GOP is 
committed to protecting its interests and ensuring the safety 
of its populace.  GOP officials have repeatedly stressed a 
willingness and ability to detect, contain, and eradicate any 
AI outbreak.  In addition, post believes the Polish media 
will also monitor AI developments when bird migration season 
begins again in the spring. 
 
3.  In the event of an AI outbreak, the GOP would work 
closely with EU officials.  Ministry of Agriculture officials 
might also seek assistance from USG animal health experts as 
a result of recent emergency management training conducted in 
Poland by specialists from the U.S. Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service.  Post also believes GOP officials would 
consult with the appropriate international organizations. 
 
4.  Ministry of Agriculture officials have reported that 
Poland is not producing a poultry vaccine for avian influenza. 
 
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Surveillance/Detection 
---------------------- 
 
5.  Poland could identify avian influenza, as well as the 
serotype and pathogenic strain, in the event of an outbreak. 
Post assumes that GOP officials would seek confirmation from 
the OIE reference laboratory in either Italy or Germany. 
Post estimates confirmation would take approximately three to 
five days from the time samples were sent. 
 
6.  Under current law, there could be a time lag between 
detection of an outbreak by regional officials and official 
notification to national officials.  However, local 
veterinary officials have the authority to order the 
immediate eradication of suspect flocks without first 
notifying national officials.  Also, response structures rely 
on existing resources in each county.  There are no 
mobilization plans to take resources from one part of the 
country and apply them to the source of the outbreak.  This 
could lead to the disease spreading before it can be brought 
under control. 
 
ASHE