US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN2062

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 YEREVAN 002062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, DRL, EUR/ACE 
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID, KDEM, PHUM, PREL, AM 
SUBJECT: ARMENIA:  DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY, 2005-2008 
 
 
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MOVING THE ARMENIANS FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
1. (SBU) Armenia is at a crossroads in its democratic 
development.  While the political landscape has remained 
relatively consistent since the last elections, the next two 
years will test the government's commitment to its reform 
agenda.  As Assistant Secretary Fried said during his 
October visit to Yerevan, the next two years could push 
Armenia ahead of the pack in terms of democracy or could 
pull the country significantly backwards.  Slippage could 
have negative consequences at home (as the country prepares 
for parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 and 
2008) and abroad (as talks over the Nagorno-Karabagh 
conflict enter a crucial phase).  Armenia's impressive 
economic performance could be accomplishing much more for 
the country were it not for widespread corruption that 
threatens the integrity of democracy in Armenia.  Most 
businesses and government leaders now recognize this fact, 
but need to act soon in order to maximize the benefits of 
the country's double-digit GDP growth. 
 
2. (SBU) Progress in our bilateral relationship depends on 
Armenia's progress on democracy.  During the September 2005 
U.S.-Armenia Task Force on Economic Cooperation, we called 
on the Armenians to recognize the link between maintaining 
macroeconomic growth and strengthening democratic 
institutions.  EUR/ACE's Tom Adams reminded the Armenian 
side that our USG assistance can only work to its maximum 
potential when democracy is allowed to grow.  As another 
element of our bi-lateral relationship, the Millennium 
Challenge Account process relies on a concrete set of 
indicators that will determine Armenia's continued 
eligibility for the program and help us push the country in 
the right direction. 
 
3. (SBU) The GOAM recognizes that the revolutions in 2004 
and 2005 in Georgia and Ukraine have heightened 
international interest in democracy -- and free and fair 
elections -- in this region.  After flawed elections in 2002- 
2003, there is considerable pressure at home and abroad for 
transparent balloting during the next parliamentary and 
presidential elections (scheduled for 2007 and 2008).  All 
eyes are currently on the November 27 referendum on the 
proposed constitutional amendments as an indicator of the 
GOAM's commitment to free and fair elections.  The 
referendum serves as an important starting point for our 
strategy and will help identify those areas where special 
interventions are necessary to help Armenia to make the 
necessary reforms. 
 
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OUR STRATEGY:  MPP GOALS, SPECIALIZED ASSISTANCE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4. (SBU) Strengthening democratic institutions in Armenia is 
an integral part of Post's MPP goals.  We have convened a 
special working group from membership of Post's Assistance 
Coordination Group (ACG) to look at how we can better 
achieve these goals during the run-up to parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2007 and 2008.  Free and fair 
elections in 2007 and 2008 are our target.  The Democracy 
Strategy Working Group (chaired by the DCM) studied the 
experience of the 2002-2003 elections, the findings of 
various international observer missions, and the conclusions 
of the USAID-funded political party assessment as part of 
its brainstorming exercise.  We have identified ten areas 
where USG interventions can help make a difference.  USAID, 
the Public Affairs Section and Political/Economic Section 
will play key roles in carrying out these activities.  USAID 
has developed a proposed strategy of core programs that will 
shape the majority of our interventions. 
 
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I:  DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) We will continue to keep democracy at the top of 
our bi-lateral agenda with the Armenians, maintaining the 
momentum of recent high-level visits (including those of A/S 
Fried and Congressional delegations).  A consistent message 
by the USG that our partnership with Armenia depends on real 
commitment to democratic strengthening will help maximize 
the impact of our democracy promotion strategy.  We should 
not be shy about citing the USG's robust levels of 
assistance (USD 1.6 billion since Armenia's independence) as 
an investment in democracy that must reap dividends in order 
for us to justify it to Congress and the American people. 
Post will openly share our democracy promotion strategy with 
the GOAM and point to it as a prime opportunity to enact 
long-overdue reforms. 
6. (SBU) We offer our strategy as another way the USG can 
help move the country toward its stated goal to integrate 
with Western structures as a modern democracy.  The 
Ambassador will repeat this message with GOAM interlocutors 
and the press and we will stress this theme during the 
upcoming sessions of the U.S-Armenia Task Force on Economic 
Cooperation (USATF).  Discussions regarding Millennium 
Challenge Account funding should continue to focus on 
democratic reforms and the need to register continued 
progress on the MCC's democratic indicators.  As 
parliamentary and presidential elections approach, carefully 
timed visits by Department and Congressional delegations 
will offer useful public diplomacy opportunities to spread 
this message beyond the political elite to the Armenian 
population. 
 
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II:  A BETTER VOTERS' LIST -- THE CORNERSTONE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The Problem.  Inaccurate voters' lists were the 
most notable technical problem of the 2002-2003 elections in 
Armenia.  Considerable movement of people due to the Nagorno- 
Karabakh conflict, high emigration rates over the past 15 
years and inadequate monitoring systems exacerbated the 
problem.  Lingering doubts over the list are a source of 
political contention, contribute to voter apathy and are 
used by all segments of the political establishment -- 
either to justify boycotting elections or to justify 
imperfect balloting.  During the 2002-2003 elections, 
international monitors noted that some voters were 
registered in more than one precinct, or were not included 
on the list; the voters' lists even included the names of 
people who had died. 
 
8. (U) Our Involvement to Date.  In 2003, USAID (in 
partnership with the OSCE, a local NGO and the Eurasia 
Foundation) supported the development of software to convert 
the local state registries to voters' lists and to identify 
inaccuracies in the voters' lists.  In the 20 communities 
where they used the software, observers cited significantly 
fewer problems.  While effective for limited use, there were 
some problems with this software and it was not applied 
nationwide.  In 2002 and 2003, USAID (through IFES) 
supported Voters' Lists Advisory Committees (VLACs) to work 
with local authorities, election officials and the media to 
check local voter lists for inaccuracies.  The work of the 
VLACs resulted in over 32,000 edits to the voter lists in 
sixteen communities. 
 
9. (U) Our Intervention.  An accurate national voter 
registry will offer Armenians a reliable foundation for 
elections.  With proper registration of voters, every person 
who is entitled to vote will have a chance to have his or 
her voice heard and the GOAM will reduce the possibility of 
fraudulent voting.  USAID is prepared to support GOAM 
efforts to establish a national voter list in advance of the 
2007-2008 elections by helping to design, develop and 
implement a national voter registration initiative.  Our 
assistance will include the development of the voter 
registry system as well as procurement of necessary 
equipment to training personnel tasked with every aspect of 
the voter registry.  The Voters' Lists Advisory Committees 
will continue to play an important role in this effort and 
will help ensure that the process is transparent.  A 
reasonably accurate national voter registry will offer all 
Armenians (the voters, politicians and civil society 
monitors) an even playing field and will help increase 
confidence in the integrity of the democratic process. 
 
------------------------------------ 
III:  BETTER ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
------------------------------------ 
 
10. (SBU) The Problem.  Weak electoral administration has 
plagued previous elections in Armenia.  Despite the 
existence of clear regulations, election authorities are 
unable to administer elections in a fair and transparent 
manner.  This has negative consequences for both the 
integrity of election results in Armenia as well as for 
voter confidence and participation.  The Central Election 
Commission does not have the technical ability to provide 
all lower election commissions with copies of the electoral 
code, CEC decisions or other documents about how to conduct 
a free and fair election. 
 
11. (U) Our Intervention.  Post will supplement ongoing UNDP 
training for election commissions and will support the 
publication and nationwide distribution of all necessary 
technical documents so that commissions have the proper 
tools to administer elections fairly.  USAID will design 
study tours for election commission members to observe 
elections in other countries.  The Public Affairs Section 
will send groups of 5-6 election officials on International 
Visitors programs to observe the administration of the 2006 
elections in the United States.  USAID will also consider 
commodity support for election administration (similar to 
the procurement of transparent ballot boxes that USAID co- 
funded in 2003). 
 
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IV:  ELECTORAL ADJUDICATION AND THE JUDICIARY 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) The Problem.  The uneven adjudication of electoral 
grievances undermines the democratic process in Armenia. 
Courts do not always act in a transparent manner and often 
base their decisions on political pressures rather than 
clear guidelines.  A change in the composition of election 
commissions to include members of the judiciary (a mostly 
positive step) will create a staffing shortage in the 
judiciary during the upcoming elections.  There will be a 
need for legal professionals trained in electoral 
adjudication to fill this gap. 
 
13. (U) Our Intervention.  We have increased our support to 
the judiciary in recent years and will deepen our engagement 
around electoral adjudication.  USAID will provide 
specialized election adjudication training (keyed to the new 
election law, related violations and how to address them) to 
judges, lawyers and proxies.  We will support legal rights 
awareness programs related to administrative detentions and 
provide resources for those who report violation of 
electoral rights.  International Visitors programs will be 
timed to give Armenian judges and lawyers opportunities to 
observe election adjudication procedures (and best 
practices) in the United States.  ABA/CEELI will continue to 
implement cross-cutting programs for USAID and INL on a wide 
range of issues to complement these efforts. 
 
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V:  PARTICIPATION AND VOTER INFORMATION 
--------------------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) The Problem.  Experience has shown that the public 
is passive, even apathetic in the run-up to elections. 
Following flawed elections, however, voters have taken to 
the streets to protest in relatively high numbers.  The 
public's engagement in the election process is uneven and 
can be easily manipulated.  Part of the problem stems from a 
lack of information about issues and electoral rights. 
There are few opportunities for Armenians to get involved 
with elections or informed about issues beyond highly 
politicized rallies or spotty media reports which tend to be 
skewed toward a particular candidate.  The active 
participation of an informed and engaged public prior to the 
2007-2008 elections will increase pressure for free and fair 
elections and make it harder for authorities to commit 
violations. 
 
15. (U) Our Intervention.  We will support voter education 
campaigns utilizing a variety of mechanisms including 
televised debates, radio programs, town hall meetings, 
public service announcements, newspaper and billboard 
campaigns, election observation, parallel vote tabulation 
and Rock-the-Vote events with NGO partners.  Democracy 
Commission Small Grants programs will also be keyed to these 
themes and will target hard-to-reach parts of the 
population.  Ongoing civic education programs will include 
electoral rights as part of a nationwide curriculum for 
young Armenians who have proven effective in sharing 
information with heads-of-household throughout the country. 
Post's impressive array of NGO, alumni and exchange networks 
will ensure broad-based participation in these programs. 
 
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VI: POLLING AS A RELIABLE POLITICAL WEATHERVANE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
16. (SBU) The Problem.  Polling is underdeveloped in Armenia 
and the lack of reliable national polls leaves the public 
and political parties out of touch with important issues and 
attitudes.  The absence of reliable polling data means that 
irresponsible claims by the media or parties can go 
unchecked.  Political parties are less likely to concentrate 
on substantive policy issues if they do not know what 
matters to Armenians today. 
17. (U) Our Intervention.  USAID will develop the capacity 
of local survey organizations and will help stimulate the 
(apparently ripe) market of political client-based polling 
in Armenia.  Working with polling firms to develop 
appropriate techniques and procedures, we will engage 
reputable organizations who can provide world-class 
technical assistance on the appropriate role of polling in a 
democracy.  USAID may also directly support the conduct of 
some polls, thus shaping the political debate. 
 
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VII:  STRONGER POLITICAL PARTIES 
-------------------------------- 
 
18. (SBU) The Problem.  The 2005 Political Party Assessment 
noted that political parties in Armenia are weak and 
underdeveloped.  The report found that USG assistance to 
political parties to date had produced limited results and 
needed a fresh approach in order to be effective.  Parties 
often do not allow for the active participation of certain 
parts of Armenian society (including women and young 
voters).  Parties do not have neither the technical capacity 
nor interest to effectively communicate with their 
constituencies and develop issue-based platforms or 
discussions.  Instead of deepening political culture, 
political parties are often personality-driven entities with 
shallow internal structures that mutate with regularity. 
The role of political parties is therefore often confusing 
for voters and contributes to confusion and/or political 
apathy. 
 
19. (U) Our Intervention:  USAID will provide political 
parties with technical assistance and training about the 
utility and advantages of issue-based strategies, message 
development and dissemination, platform formulation and 
campaigning tactics.  Our programs will include a focus on 
women's involvement in parties and the engagement of first- 
time voters and university students.  Training for women 
candidates, NGOs and youth wings will feature prominently in 
our programs.  (Note:  Assistance of this kind will continue 
to be offered equally to all democratic political parties in 
Armenia.  The USG will continue to assure GOAM authorities 
that the purpose of this assistance is not to secure the 
election of a particular candidate or party.  We will be 
careful to include parties who are part of the governing 
coalition and opposition.  End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
VIII:  CONTINUING OUR FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
20. (SBU) The Problem.  As in many countries of the former 
Soviet Union, a culture of corruption in Armenia threatens 
to de-stabilize those democratic institutions that can help 
ensure a free and fair election.  Recent studies point to 
the cultural and institutional roots of corruption in 
Armenia and indicate that no part of society or the 
government is protected from corruption's negative effects. 
The perception of widespread corruption contributes to voter 
apathy and empowers those officials who view electoral 
violations as an accepted part of the political culture. 
 
21. (SBU) Our Intervention.  Post's on-going anti-corruption 
programs will include increased emphasis on how corruption 
undermines the integrity of elections and democratic 
institutions.  USAID is in the initial stages of design for 
a dedicated anti-corruption activity that will feature 
prominently as part of our strategy.  All USG assistance 
activities in Armenia include some aspect of anti-corruption 
in their programming.  The Assistance Coordination Group has 
compiled an exhaustive inventory of anti-corruption 
activities and will continue to highlight this document as 
part of outreach activities and during discussions with 
implementers and GOAM counterparts.  We will encourage 
partners in the diplomatic and donor community to follow 
this example as a way to increase political pressure on the 
GOAM to move from rhetoric to actual implementation of its 
2004 anti-corruption strategy. 
 
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IX:  A REAL ROLE FOR THE MEDIA 
------------------------------ 
 
22. (SBU) The Problem.  The media's bias and partiality 
become more evident during election cycles in Armenia.  It 
is common practice for politicians to pay for newspaper 
articles and media spots that favor their candidacy or blast 
their opponents.  The public is unlikely to look to the 
local media as a source of unbiased information regarding 
political issues or campaigns. 
 
23. (U) Our Intervention.  USAID-funded media programs 
already include technical assistance devoted to journalistic 
ethics and management during election.  We will increase our 
focus on campaign reporting and political advertising.  The 
Public Affairs Section will organize an International 
Visitors program for journalists and editors on the role of 
the media during elections in the U.S.  Digital video 
conferences at the Embassy will connect Armenian journalists 
with U.S. specialists on the subject of the role of media 
during elections.  An International Speaker program focused 
on issues of free and fair elections will include a 
component on the media and journalistic ethics. 
 
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X:  MONITORING AND THE INT'L COMMUNITY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
24. (SBU) The Problem.  Not all parts of Armenian society 
appreciate the importance of election monitoring in the 
democratic process.  Some election officials at the local 
levels view monitors with suspicion and have reportedly 
meddled with their activities.  At the highest levels, the 
GOAM still needs to realize that election monitors, both 
local and international, help underscore legitimacy when 
elections are free and fair. 
 
25. (SBU) Our Intervention.  Continued technical assistance 
to the It's Your Choice (IYC) NGO will ensure that 
nationwide observation will take place during balloting in 
2007-2008.  USAID will support pre-election assessments, 
media monitoring and observer training.  Post will 
participate in OSCE-ODIHR international observer missions 
and will contribute actively to seminars and roundtables 
devoted to these topics as part of our public diplomacy 
strategy leading up to the elections. 
 
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COORDINATING WITH THE DEPARTMENT 
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26. (U) Post appreciates Department support for these 
initiatives and looks forward to discussing ways we can 
maximize this golden opportunity.  We will continue to 
maintain close contact with EUR/ACE, DRL, ECA and USAID 
through our points of contact and EUR Desk Officer.  USAID 
is already busy developing its plan to implement these 
programs and has prepared two versions of detailed outlines 
of possible programming that it will forward to Washington 
as this dialogue continues. 
EVANS