US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI8892

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 008892 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, CE, IN, India-SriLanka 
SUBJECT: INDIA CAUTIOUSLY WELCOMES NEW SRI LANKAN PRESIDENT 
 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The GOI called Mahinda Rajapakse's victory 
in the November 17 Sri Lankan Elections a "wake-up call for 
India" and plans to use the new President's upcoming visit to 
New Delhi to stress the importance of maintaining the 
Cease-Fire Agreement while continuing India's already close 
relationship with its southern neighbor.  Outside the 
government, Sri Lanka watchers in New Delhi are seriously 
concerned that Rajapakse's hawkish views may squash the "last 
glimmer of hope" for the peace process.  MEA Joint Secretary 
(Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma) Mohan Kumar commented that the 
LTTE boycott of the elections was evidence that Prabhakaran 
"dumped" the United National Party's (UNP) Ranil 
Wickremesinghe in favor of Rajapakse in order to avoid a 
return to the negotiating table.  Despite the Sri Lankan 
Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate's hard-line campaign rhetoric, 
Kumar predicted that Rajapakse will moderate himself and the 
"no peace, no war" situation is likely to hold in the near 
term.  He suggested that the only way forward is to bring 
Norway back into the process, look for a Sinhalese consensus 
and give the LTTE a "take it or leave it" offer.  Kumar told 
us India is close to "crossing the rubicon" with a decision 
for greater involvement, but the GOI is still looking for a 
role which avoids making harsh statements against the LTTE 
without a credible ability to carry out these threats.  In 
addition to maintaining the Cease-Fire Agreement, the GOI 
will use Rajapakse's visit to Delhi to finish negotiations on 
the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and consider 
Indian support for large infrastructure projects in Sri 
Lanka.  End Summary. 
 
LTTE Boycott a Sign of Weakness 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In a meeting with PolCouns and Poloff on November 23, 
MEA Joint Secretary for Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma Mohan 
Kumar emphasized that Rajapakse's victory in the Presidential 
election was a "wake up call for India" about the LTTE's 
motives and the future of the peace process.  Kumar 
complained that Prabhakaran had used Ranil when he was making 
concessions to the LTTE and then "dumped" him in favor of a 
government that "was easier for the LTTE to tackle."  Since 
the CFA, Kumar noted, the LTTE has lost the Karuna faction, 
its control over parts of Jaffna and the ability to conscript 
child soldiers.  Calling the boycott a "sign of weakness," 
Kumar speculated that Prabhakaran concluded the only way out 
was to bring the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) to power, 
bide time and convince the international community that the 
Rajapakse government was unwilling to meet its demands to 
come back to the negotiating table, in hopes this would 
convince the world to soften its views of the LTTE. 
 
But Rajapakse Victory Strengthens the LTTE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Highlighting the benefits the LTTE gains from 
Rajapakse's victory, Sri Lanka watcher and Prabhakaran 
biographer M.R. Narayan Swamy concluded that the election has 
"squashed the last glimmer of hope in the peace process." 
Under the current cease-fire, he noted, the LTTE is able to 
continue weakening the state through its proxy 
administration, fundraising and targeted assassinations. 
Prabhakaran also knows that the GOSL will not be the one to 
restart the war, giving the LTTE greater control over events. 
 Narayan Swamy grimly predicted that Rajapakse's tie up with 
the JVP will prevent him from giving in to LTTE demands to 
negotiate, which will allow the LTTE to eventually blame 
Colombo for the diplomatic stalemate.  The LTTE will gain 
both sympathy within Sri Lanka and the international 
community, and time to prepare for an eventual return to war. 
 Thus, he offered, Rajapakse's victory strengthened the LTTE 
and brought them closer to the goal of Tamil Eelam. 
 
Rajapakse: Hawkish Campaigner but Moderate President? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
4.  (C) MEA's Deputy Secretary for Sri Lanka Anupam Rae was 
hopeful that Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse's hawkish 
campaign rhetoric was intended only to gain votes, and 
predicted that he will not destabilize the peace process. 
Although Rae admitted that Rajapakse is still an "unknown 
commodity," he observed that the new President will initially 
bide time while he feels out the pressure from the JVP and 
the international community.  Rajapakse can not afford to 
take the country back to war, he noted, but he also can not 
find a solution.  Therefore, Sri Lanka will be stuck in the 
"no peace, no war" predicament for the next few years. 
Calling Rajapakse a "pragmatic fellow," Kumar added that 
India will be pressuring him not to let the JVP "cajole him" 
out of the peace process. 
 
5.  (C) P. Sahadevan, a Professor of Sri Lankan studies at 
Jawaharlal Nehru University, was less optimistic about the 
JVP's likely influence on Rajapakse.  He observed that 
Rajapakse's first test will come when the Supreme Court hands 
down the final decision on the tsunami reconstruction PTOMs 
agreement.  If the agreement is constitutional, the 
international community and the LTTE will pressure Rajapakse 
to implement it, while the JVP will force him to abandon it. 
The JVP will also demand that the GOSL create an inclusive, 
multilateral peace process with less foreign intervention to 
find a solution within a unitary structure.  Since the LTTE 
will never agree to negotiations within these conditions, 
Sahadevan concluded that the JVP's presence in the coalition 
will prevent progress towards peace in Sri Lanka.  He 
suggested that the LTTE will agree to the quasi cease-fire 
situation as long as Prabhakaran thinks it is in his interest 
to be left alone to build the LTTE or unless he feels 
compelled to respond to Rajapakse's chauvinistic statements. 
 
GOI's Private Message for Rajapakse 
------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Joint Secretary Kumar suggested that the GOI's first 
post-election priority is ensuring that the cease-fire does 
not break down in light of Rajapakse's intentions to "review" 
the Cease-Fire Agreement, and welcomed the fact that this 
converged with US objectives.  "Everyone knows the CFA is 
flawed," he observed, "but its presence is crucial to 
preventing a return to violence."  He hoped to have a clearer 
understanding of the situation after the upcoming visits of 
Rajapakse (expected within the next month) and Eric Solheim. 
Kumar conveyed that the GOI message will stress the need for 
the new President to moderate his statements, keep the 
cease-fire going, bring Norway back into the process, and 
work towards a majority Sinhalese consensus solution to the 
conflict.  Kumar emphasized that Norway's continued presence 
is key to maintaining the cease-fire, but he suggested that 
they would be more effective speaking directly to 
Prabhakaran, rather than working through unreliable 
intermediaries.  Kumar underlined that the GOI needs to 
convince Rajapakse to keep talking to the LTTE, and added 
that if the Sinhalese majority can come to a consensus on the 
solution, then Rajapakse's hard-line image actually makes him 
ideally placed to put forward a devolution package. 
 
India Crossing the Rubicon on its Role in Sri Lanka 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
7.  (C) In light of the stalled peace process and the 
potential for further decline, Kumar commented that the GOI 
"prefers to be hands off," but "can't keep quiet" anymore. 
"India is crossing the rubicon," he indicated, but still 
looking for the best way to protect its interests in the Sri 
Lankan peace process.  He attributed this decision directly 
to Prime Minister Singh and Foreign Secretary Saran, but went 
on to describe the complications they face in looking for an 
appropriate response.  India probably will not join the 
Co-Chairs, he explained, because that will put them in the 
unwelcome situation of "making statements about the LTTE 
without any threat to back them up."  The US has the luxury 
of distance and the LTTE knows that American Marines are not 
coming to Sri Lanka, he observed.  On the other hand, India 
benefits from the LTTE's concerns that the GOI could bring in 
troops at any time.  He worried that New Delhi could lose all 
credibility if it issued statements without any recourse to 
action.  He noted that Foreign Minister Natwar Singh's 
removal meant that the Sri Lanka file was now squarely on the 
Prime Minister's agenda. 
 
8.  (C) Although the Norwegian government told Kumar that the 
LTTE would like India to play a facilitation role, Kumar 
insisted that the GOI will never accept.  If India 
facilitated, Prabhakaran would demand meetings and access in 
Chennai, forcing the GOI to lift the terrorist group's 
proscription.  This would have the negative effect of giving 
the LTTE a foothold into Tamil Nadu to meet with mainstream 
parties and gather support in the south.  He concluded the 
GOI was still deliberating on its role in the Co-Chairs 
process. 
 
Rajapakse Comes to Delhi 
------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Indian Sri Lankan watchers are predicting that the 
GOI will have a tough message for Rajapakse when he visits 
Delhi on his first Presidential visit.  Major General 
(Retired) Ashok Mehta, who served with the Indian Peace 
Keeping Force in Sri Lanka predicted that India will give a 
"message of disapproval" about Rajapakse's potential to 
"diminish the character of devolution."  Mehta and Sahadevan 
suggested that the GOI will hold back on signing the Defense 
Cooperation Agreement as a pressure point on Rajapakse to 
moderate his views on the peace process.  Sahadevan worried 
that if Rajapakse maintains his image as a hard-liner on the 
peace process, then the GOI will have to distance itself, 
which will indirectly lend support to the LTTE.  Although 
Rajapakse campaigned on closer relations with India, 
Sahadevan characterized him as a man who will not be seen as 
"hob-knobbing with the Indian leadership" like others in the 
Bandaranaike family. 
 
10.  (C) Desk Officer Rae noted that Rajapakse is likely to 
press for concluding the Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement and enlisting India's financial support in several 
large infrastructure projects.  The GOI will try to influence 
Rajapakse's role in the peace process, but Kumar predicted 
that this will not disturb the close, economic-based 
relationship between the two countries.  Rae noted that the 
GOI has almost finished an updated free trade agreement, 
which took most of its substance from India's recently 
concluded Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) 
with Singapore.  Rajapakse may also be looking to India to 
help fulfill his campaign promises to create a Special 
Economic Zone at Trincomalee and upgrade Sri Lanka's 
railways. 
Comment: GOI and USG Must Support Continued CFA 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
11.  (C) Compared to New Delhi's Sri Lanka watchers, the GOI 
was less gloomy about the implications of Rajapakse's 
victory.  Indian analysts see the election as a sign that Sri 
Lanka is farther away then ever from coming to a consensus on 
a solution, while MEA was hopeful that they could persuade 
Rajapakse to moderate his statements, maintain the 
cease-fire, and keep engaging the LTTE.  Given its negative 
past experience, New Delhi's top leadership is thinking long 
and hard about the future of its policy in Sri Lanka.  The 
GOI opposes Rajapakse's campaign rhetoric, but will maintain 
public agreement in order to avoid lending any indirect 
support to the LTTE.  While the Co-Chairs may not be the 
right forum for Indian involvement, we are encouraged that 
New Delhi will use its good graces with the new President to 
maintain its close relationship and support the Cease Fire 
Agreement. 
 
12. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
BLAKE