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| Identifier: | 05NEWDELHI8891 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NEWDELHI8891 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy New Delhi |
| Created: | 2005-11-23 12:42:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PARM KNNP AORC IN IR India |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 008891 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2015 TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, AORC, IN, IR, India_Iran SUBJECT: IRAN DEMARCHE DELIVERED, EU-3 ALSO PUSHING REF: STATE 212969 Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 1. (C) PolCouns delivered reftel demarche to Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security) Hamid Ali Rao on November 23, emphasizing the importance of India conveying through a strong national statement that the international community remains seriously concerned about Iran's nuclear program. Rao accepted our approach but offered no preview of GOI plans. Pressed by PolCouns on New Delhi's willingness to deliver a strong statement, Rao commented "the Iranians know the September 24 resolution is there," suggesting that the GOI is reluctant to deploy any further public pressure at a time when Indian domestic politics are seized with the IAEA issue. EU-3 Demarche to Foreign Secretary ---------------------------------- 2. (C) The EU-3 Ambassadors paralleled our approach to MEA's DISA division in a November 23 call on Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran. The UK High Commissioner, in particular, echoed our call for the GOI to offer a robust statement at the BOG meeting that does not appear to exculpate Tehran. Speaking to PolCouns, the EU-3 heads of mission reported a general sense of relief on the part of the Foreign Secretary that India would not face the politically uncomfortable prospect of another IAEA vote. The German Ambassador reported that the Indians believed, based on their own engagement with Iran, that Tehran was open to the idea of suspension, but only on their own terms. It was important, the German said, that Iran be allowed to chart its own course. The EU-3 also reported that Saran was seized with the danger of appearing to punish Iran for its acts of transparency. For instance, since Iran has now acknowledged the AQ Khan network's provision of design details for casting uranium hemispheres, that should not now become part of the dossier used to assail Iranian non-compliance with its NPT obligations. 3. (C) A UK High Commission contact gave D/PolCouns a further readout of the EU-3 Ambassadors' meeting with FS Saran, stating that the EU-3's demarche asked India to ensure that Iran was not let off the hook during national statements on November 24. Our contact reported that Saran agreed that the September 24 resolution remained valid, but cautioned that further pressure on Iran was not the right tactic now given that the IAEA had said Iran had done some of the right things; India felt excessive negative pressure now could be counterproductive. Saran assured the EU-3 that New Delhi is not backing away from its September 24 stance, however, and intends to urge Iran to take more positive steps toward cooperation with the IAEA. The Foreign Secretary also inquired about EU-3 next steps, our UK contact told us, and heard that the Europeans will continue to try to engage Iran in "talks on talks" to restart the negotiations. Our UK contact commented that the EU-3 are confident India would be plenty tough in raising AQ Khan's role in Iran's nuclear program, but that Indian pressure on Iran itself at this stage might be modest. BLAKE
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