US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1992

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001992 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR OIE DANIEL SINGER AND REBECCA S DALEY 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO, ECON, PREL, SOCI, EAGR, CASC, CE, KSTH, WHO, Avian Flu 
SUBJECT:  AVIAN AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA INFORMATION - SRI 
LANKA 
 
REF: A) COLOMBO 1592, B) STATE 209622, C) COLOMBO 1849, 
D) COLOMBO 1845, E) COLOMBO 1622 
 
1. (U) THIS IS THE SECOND CABLE REPORTING ON 
PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY TO PREVENT A HIGHLY PATHENOGENIC 
AVIAN INFLUENZA (HPAI) IN SRI LANKA (REF A) AND RESPONDS 
TO REF B QUESTIONS REGARDING SRI LANKA'S EFFORTS TO 
CONTROL AVIAN FLU AND ITS CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO AN 
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC. 
 
PREPAREDNESS/COMMUNICATION 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (U) PREPAREDNESS:  SRI LANKA IS STILL DEVELOPING ITS 
"NATIONAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS PLAN" 
(NATIONAL PLAN).  AI PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES ARE BEING 
ORGANIZED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH (MOH) AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND HEALTH (DAPH) OF THE 
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, WHO HAVE FORMED A JOINT 
STEERING COMMITTEE ON AVIAN INFLUENZA (STEERING 
COMMITTEE) AND A JOINT NATIONAL TECHNICAL COMMITTEE 
(TECHNICAL COMMITTEE). 
 
3. (U) THE STEERING COMMITTEE ACTS AS THE NATIONAL BODY 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE POLICY DECISIONS TAKEN ON 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF AI IN THE COUNTRY. IT WILL 
OVERSEE THE FINALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
NATIONAL PLAN, WHICH IS STILL IN THE DRAFT STAGE.  THE 
STEERING COMMITTEE IS CO-CHAIRED BY DR. H.A.P. 
KAHANDALIYANAGE, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF HEALTH SERVICES 
OF THE MOH AND DR. S.K.R. AMARASEKERA, THE DIRECTOR 
GENERAL ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND HEALTH OF THE DAPH.  OTHER 
MEMBERS INCLUDE DR. H.M. FERNANDO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
GENERAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES (WHO IN REF E WAS ALSO 
NAMED AS THE OFFICIAL POINT OF CONTACT FOR AI ISSUES), 
ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND 
HEALTH, CHIEF EPIDEMIOLOGIST OF EPIDEMIOLOGY UNIT MOH, 
DIRECTOR GENERAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
REPRESENTATIVES FROM MINISTRIES OF FINANCE, MEDIA AND 
TOURISM AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION (WHO) AND FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION 
(FAO). THE STEERING COMMITTEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
COORDINATING THE PREVENTIVE ACTIVITIES AMONG ITS VARIOUS 
MEMBER AGENCIES AND FOR MONITORING THE ACTIVITIES. 
 
4. (SBU) ON NOVEMBER 3, SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE STEERING 
COMMITTEE BRIEFED EMBASSY OFFICIALS ON ITS EFFORTS, AND 
GAVE A DRAFT COPY OF THE NATIONAL PLAN WHICH HAS NOT YET 
BEEN RELEASED.  WHEN THE NATIONAL PLAN IS FINALIZED, IT 
SHOULD BE RETRIEVABLE AT:  HTTP://WWW.EPID.GOV.LK.   IT 
APPEARED FROM THE BRIEFING THAT GSL OFFICIALS HAVE TAKEN 
BOTH PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION NEEDS INTO ACCOUNT IN 
THEIR PREPARATIONS. 
 
5. (U) THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE SET UP UNDER THE STEERING 
COMMITTEE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING THE GLOBAL 
AI SITUATION AND FOR IDENTIFYING HIGH-RISK AREAS AND 
POPULATIONS. IT WILL AIM TO ESTABLISH AN EARLY WARNING 
SYSTEM FOR SRI LANKA, RECOMMEND SUITABLE STRATEGIES TO 
PREVENT ENTRY OF DISEASE TO THE COUNTRY, EVALUATE 
ONGOING ANIMAL AND HUMAN SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES, 
STRENGTHEN CAPACITY OF LABORATORIES AND FACILITATE THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PLAN. 
 
6. (U) THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE CO-CHAIRED BY THE 
ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND HEALTH 
AND THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES 
OF MOH. ITS MEMBERS INCLUDE THE HEAD OF MICROBIOLOGY 
DEPARTMENT - UNIVERSITY OF KELANIYA, THE DIRECTOR HEALTH 
EDUCATION BUREAU, THE DIRECTOR OF ANIMAL HEALTH, THE 
DIRECTOR OF VETERINARY RESEARCH, THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
MEDICAL SUPPLIES DIVISION OF MOH, THE DIRECTOR OF 
ENVIRONMENT AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH OF MOH, DIRECTOR 
QUARANTINE OF MOH, THE CHIEF EPIDEMIOLOGIST, 
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL UNIT OF MOH, THE CHIEF ANIMAL QUARANTINE 
OFFICER, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF POULTRY DEVELOPMENT, 
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC HEALTH - VETERINARY SERVICES, 
VIROLOGISTS FROM THE MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
VETERINARY SURGEONS/EPIDEMIOLOGY AND VETERINARY 
SURGEONS/GIS MAPPING, THE VETERINARY RESEARCH 
OFFICER/VIROLOGY AND OFFICIALS FROM THE WHO AND THE FAO. 
7. (SBU) ANTICIPATED TRUTHFULNESS/TRANSPARENCY:  POST 
EXPECTS THAT SRI LANKA WILL DISCLOSE THE APPEARANCE OF 
AI FAIRLY RAPIDLY.  ALTHOUGH AN OUTBREAK OF MYOCARDITIS 
WAS NOT REPORTED QUICKLY TO THE WHO IN EARLY 2005(REF 
A), WHO'S SEAT ON THE STEERING COMMITTEE SHOULD ENSURE 
SPEEDY REPORTING.  FURTHER, THE STEERING COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS APPEAR EARNEST IN THEIR EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AI 
AND CONTAIN IT AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. 
 
8. (SBU) KEY OFFICIALS:  THE GSL IS HIGHLY BUREAUCRATIC. 
SPEEDY MOVEMENT ON PROJECTS DEPENDS IN PART ON THE LEVEL 
OF PERSONAL CONTACT A MINISTER OR MINISTRY SECRETARY HAS 
WITH THE PRESIDENT.  WE ANTICIPATE THAT NIMAL SIRIPALA 
DE SILVA, MINISTER OF HEALTH, NUTRITION AND WELFARE, 
MINISTER OF HEALTH AND MAITHRIPALA SIRISENA, MINISTER OF 
AGRICULTURE, IRRIGATION AND MAHAWELI DEVELOPMENT, BOTH 
JUST NAMED TODAY, WILL BE KEY CONTACTS FOR HIGH-LEVEL 
ENGAGEMENT.  IN THE CASE OF AN AI OUTBREAK, THE GSL WILL 
LOOK TO THE PRESIDENT FOR LEADERSHIP. 
 
9. (SBU) PRIORITIZING AVIAN FLU:  UNTIL AI HITS SRI 
LANKA, WE DOUBT THAT AI PREPAREDNESS WILL TAKE PRIORITY 
OVER TSUNAMI RELIEF, MAINTAINING THE CEASEFIRE WITH THE 
LIBERATION TAMIL TIGERS OF EELAM (LTTE), A REVISED 
NATIONAL BUDGET AND VARIOUS PROGRAMS THAT PRESIDENT 
RAJAPAKSE WILL ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT.  ADDITIONALLY, 
SINCE SARS DID NOT HIT SRI LANKA DESPITE ITS PROXIMITY 
TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, SRI LANKA HAS NOT FELT THE DAMAGE 
THAT SUCH A PANDEMIC CAN CAUSE. 
 
10. (SBU) BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION:  THERE 
IS A STRONG ADVISORY AND COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE GSL MINISTRIES/DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED IN AI 
PREPAREDNESS AND THE WHO.  WHO'S LOCAL OFFICER 
RESPONSIBLE FOR AI ISSUES IS DR. BIPIN KUMAR VERMA.  DR. 
VERMA SITS ON THE STEERING COMMITTEE, AND IS CURRENTLY 
ENGAGED IN ADVISING THE GSL ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF AI 
PREPAREDNESS, INCLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
PLAN.  WHO HAS ALSO BROUGHT AN EXPERT ON LABORATORIES 
FROM INDIA TO ADVISE SRI LANKA ON STRENGTHENING ITS 
LABORATORY SYSTEM.  POST HAS HELD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH 
WHO OFFICIALS ABOUT AI AND HAS DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY 
OF INITIATING A MULTI-LATERAL WORKING GROUP (OF 
INTERESTED EMBASSIES AND MULTI-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS) 
TO COORDINATE POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THE GSL AND PREPARE 
FOR OUTBREAK RESPONSE. 
 
11. (SBU) ON THE ANIMAL HEALTH SIDE, THERE APPEARS TO BE 
A GROWING AI COLLABORATION BETWEEN FAO AND DAPH.  DAPH 
RECENTLY SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL TO FAO FOR A TECHNICAL 
PROJECT INVOLVING DIAGNOSTICS AND TEST KITS, WHICH USAID 
UNDERSTANDS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY FAO.  FAO IS ALSO 
WORKING ON A PROJECT WITH BOTH SRI LANKA AND INDIA FOR 
CAPACITY BUILDING OF ANIMAL DISEASE LABORATORY WORKERS, 
WHICH WILL ALSO INCLUDE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIONAL 
LABORATORY WHICH MAY BE CONSTRUCTED IN INDIA, BUT COULD 
PROVIDE SUPPORT TO SRI LANKA. 
 
12. (SBU) FLU SHOTS:  NEITHER PUBLIC NOR PRIVATE 
FACILITIES PROVIDE ANNUAL FLU VACCINE IN SRI LANKA. 
ANNUAL FLU SHOTS HAVE NEVER BEEN ADMINISTERED HERE.  AT 
THIS TIME, THERE IS NO CAPACITY TO PRODUCE ANNUAL FLU 
VACCINES.  NO PRODUCTION OF H5N1 VACCINE IS UNDER 
DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA.  TAMIFLU IS NOT AVAILABLE IN 
SRI LANKA AND IS UNDERGOING AN EXPEDITED REGISTRATION 
PROCESS REQUIRED FOR ITS IMPORT INTO THE COUNTRY.  SRI 
LANKA IS NOT EMPLOYING VACCINATION AS A CONTAINMENT 
MEASURE FOR ANIMALS EITHER, AS ANIMAL HEALTH AUTHORITIES 
ARE NOT CERTAIN OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH VACCINES. 
DAPH NOTES THAT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DID NOT USE 
VACCINATION, AND IMPLEMENTED MEASURES AT THE OUTSET OF 
THE DISEASE TO ERADICATE IT WITHIN THEIR BORDERS. 
 
13. (SBU) A MODERATELY INFORMED POPULATION, BUT NOT 
ENOUGH INFORMATION FOR THE FARMERS:  GSL OFFICIALS 
DESCRIBED THE USE OF MEDIA OUTLETS AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE 
METHOD OF INFORMING THE PUBLIC ABOUT AI.  AS REPORTED IN 
REFS B AND C, THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED MEDIA HAVE TAKEN A 
SERIOUS BUT MEASURED APPROACH TO AI IN SRI LANKA, AN 
APPROACH MEANT TO DISPEL PANIC AND REASSURE THE PUBLIC 
THAT THINGS ARE UNDER CONTROL.  ALTHOUGH THE INDEPENDENT 
MEDIA HAVE PRESENTED THE AI STORIES WITH A GREATER SENSE 
OF URGENCY, THEY HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THE 
GSL'S ABILITY TO TAKE ON THE DISEASE SHOULD IT REACH SRI 
LANKA.  SUCH ARTICLES HAVE OFTEN INCLUDED INFORMATION 
REGARDING SYMPTOMS AND PREVENTION. 
 
14. (SBU) SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, AN OFFICIAL FROM THE SRI 
LANKA POULTRY ASSOCIATION WAS REPORTED TO SAY THAT 
FARMERS ARE GENERALLY NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT AI. 
INDEED, THOSE HANDLING BIRDS (AS EITHER SMALL SCALE 
FARMERS OR POULTRY INDUSTRY) MAY BE AT A FAIRLY LOW 
LEVEL OF AWARENESS.  IN AN ATTEMPT TO INCREASE 
AWARENESS, LEAFLETS ARE BEING DISTRIBUTED TO FARMERS, 
AND EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO 
INFORM THEM OF SYMPTOMS AND PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES. 
 
 
SURVEILLANCE/DETECTION 
---------------------- 
 
15. (U) DAPH IS UNDERTAKING ACTIVITIES TO PREVENT THE 
INITIAL SPREAD OF AI TO SRI LANKA AND TO IMPROVE 
SURVEILLANCE.  CURRENTLY, IMPORTATION OF LIVE ANIMALS 
AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS FROM ALL COUNTRIES IS PROHIBITED. 
DAPH IS ALSO MONITORING THE MOVEMENTS OF MIGRATORY BIRDS 
PASSING THROUGH SRI LANKA AND HAS IDENTIFIED AROUND 80 
MIGRATORY WATER FOWL SPECIES THAT ARE PROSPECTIVE 
CARRIERS OF AI.  SEVEN WILDLIFE PRESERVES AND NATIONAL 
PARKS IN THE NORTH, WEST AND SOUTHEAST WHERE BIRDS 
MIGRATE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS VULNERABLE AREAS.  THE 
NORTH WESTERN PROVINCE OF THE COUNTRY IS ALSO CONSIDERED 
VULNERABLE DUE TO WIDESPREAD PRACTICE OF SMALL STAKE- 
HOLDER FREE-RANGE POULTRY PRODUCTION. DAPH AND 
PARTNERING UNIVERSITIES ARE CARRYING OUT RANDOM BLOOD 
TESTS AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS (WITH PRIORITY ON THESE 
VULNERABLE AREAS) AND SCREENING BLOOD SAMPLES FOR THE AI 
VIRUS.  THE PEAK MIGRATORY PERIOD IN SRI LANKA IS 
SEPTEMBER THROUGH DECEMBER. THOUSANDS OF SAMPLES OF BIRD 
DROPPINGS HAVE BEEN TESTED IN THE VULNERABLE AREAS; TO 
DATE ALL HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE. 
 
16. (SBU) CURRENTLY, THE DAPH HAS A NETWORK OF 
APPROXIMATELY 350 ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICERS AT DISTRICT 
LEVELS, 30-40 VETERINARY SURGEONS IN EACH OF THE 
COUNTRY'S NINE PROVINCES, AND FIVE VETERINARY 
INVESTIGATION OFFICERS (VIOS) NATIONWIDE. DAPH HAS 
INSTRUCTED ALL AGRICULTURE AND VETERINARY PERSONNEL TO 
BE VIGILANT FOR, AND REPORT, EVEN MINOR SYMPTOMS OF AI. 
THE FIVE VIOS HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO CONDUCT TESTING IF 
ANY SYMPTOMS ARE REPORTED. 
 
17.  (SBU) WHEN A VIO RECEIVES A REPORT OF AI SYMPTOMS, 
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES ARE PLANNED: 
 
- A SURGEON WEARING PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT WILL COLLECT 
THE BIRD AND DELIVER IT TO THE VIO. 
- THE VIO WILL DELIVER A SAMPLE TO THE VETERINARY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN PERADENIYA (CENTRAL SRI LANKA - 
KANDY DISTRICT); CURRENTLY THE ONLY FACILITY WITH 
TESTING KITS FOR INITIAL INFLUENZA DIAGNOSIS. 
(SRI LANKA DOES NOT HAVE CAPABILITY TO DIAGNOSE H5N1.) 
- IF INITIAL LAB TESTS DO NOT ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY 
OF H5N1 (THROUGH OBSERVING CHARACTERISTICS NOT IN 
CONFORMITY WITH H5N1), THE SAMPLE MUST BE TRANSPORTED 
OUT OF SRI LANKA TO LABORATORIES IN INDIA, HONG KONG, 
SINGAPORE OR THE USA FOR FURTHER TESTING. 
 
18.  (SBU) DAPH AND THE MOH ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DIAGNOSTIC 
ABILITIES ARE SEVERELY LIMITED IN SRI LANKA AND THEY ARE 
IN NEED OF ENHANCEMENTS IN THE LABORATORY AND TESTING 
CAPABILITIES.  DAPH HAS REQUESTED THAT THE GSL PROCURE 
ADDITIONAL TEST KITS AND EXPRESSED THAT USG ASSISTANCE 
IN PROCURING TEST KITS AND TRAINING IN DETECTION OF THE 
VIRUS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. 
 
19. (SBU) TRANSPORT OF THE SAMPLES INTERNALLY MAY ALSO 
BE PROBLEMATIC AS MOST PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ANIMAL 
HEALTH (AND HUMAN PUBLIC HEALTH) OFFICES ARE SHORT ON 
VEHICLES.  ONE POTENTIAL OBSTACLE TO COLLECTION AND 
DIAGNOSIS MAY BE LONG ROAD DISTANCES (8-12 HOURS) TO 
VULNERABLE REMOTE AREAS.  MOH OFFICIALS ALSO FORESEE 
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
PROTOCOLS TO ALLOW THE QUICK TRANSPORTATION OF 
POTENTIALLY-INFECTIOUS SAMPLES OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY 
VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT.  TRANSPORT OF SAMPLES OVER LONG 
DISTANCES MAY ALSO RISK PROLONGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE 
VIRUS.  WITHIN THE PAST FEW YEARS, A SAMPLE WAS FLOWN 
OUT OF THE COUNTRY FOR DIAGNOSIS, AND WAS RENDERED 
UNUSABLE AT THE LAB.  THE OUTBREAK WAS NEVER IDENTIFIED, 
AS THE OUTBREAK ENDED BEFORE ANOTHER SAMPLE COULD BE 
COLLECTED. 
 
20. (SBU) NO COMPENSATION SCHEME IS CURRENTLY IN PLACE 
FOR POULTRY FARMERS WHO SUSPECT THAT THEIR BIRDS ARE 
ILL.  A PROPOSED COMPENSATION MECHANISM TO REIMBURSE 
POULTRY FARMERS IN THE EVENT OF AN OUTBREAK HAS BEEN 
PRESENTED TO THE CABINET BY AN INTER-MINISTERIAL 
COMMITTEE.  THE MECHANISM WOULD INVOLVE PAYING 
APPROXIMATELY USD 0.22 FOR A DAY OLD CHICK, USD 1.20 FOR 
A LAYER AND USD 1.00 FOR A BROILER.  THIS IS AROUND 50- 
60 PERCENT OF THE MARKET VALUE OF THE ANIMALS.  AROUND 
USD 800,000 WILL BE REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE 
CULLING OF THE ENTIRE POULTRY POPULATION IN THE COUNTRY. 
(COMMENT:  THE GSL COULD BE PENNY WISE AND POUND FOOLISH 
IN OFFERING BELOW-MARKET RATES FOR AI-INFECTED POULTRY. 
LESS THAN USD 1 MILLION MORE INVESTED IN ERADICATION 
COULD PRESUMABLY ENSURE AN END TO AI-INFECTED POULTRY BY 
OFFERING FARMERS FULL MARKET VALUE FOR THEIR FLOCKS. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
 
RESPONSE/CONTAINMENT 
-------------------- 
 
21. (U) STOCKPILES:  AS NOTED ABOVE, SRI LANKA HAS NO 
STOCKPILE OF TAMIFLU.  THE GSL HAS ANNOUNCED THAT SRI 
LANKA WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE WHO STOCKPILE SHOULD AN AI 
PANDEMIC REACH SRI LANKAN TERRITORY.  WE ARE STILL 
TRYING TO CONFIRM THIS.  NEVERTHELESS, WE UNDERSTAND 
THAT TAMIFLU HAS NOT BEEN REGISTERED IN SRI LANKA (A 
REQUIREMENT FOR LEGAL IMPORTATION), ALTHOUGH HEALTH 
AUTHORITIES SAY THAT THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO EXPEDITE ITS 
REGISTRATION.  ADDITIONALLY, HEALTH AUTHORITIES REPORT 
THAT SRI LANKA DOES NOT HAVE A REASONABLE STOCKPILE OF 
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR. 
 
22. (SBU) CONTAINMENT:  DAPH and MoH staff report that 
plans are being drawn up for quarantine or cordoning off 
areas, preventing movement of animals and products 
in/out, and culling infected stocks if necessary.  DAPH 
notes that any quarantine would be enforced by its 
Directorate and Animal Health Officers. 
 
23. (SBU) In light of the general readiness and 
operational status of Sri Lanka's security apparatus as 
a result of the civil conflict, and its fast response 
following the December 26, 2004 tsunami, containment 
could be effectively enforced - once the outbreak is 
actually diagnosed.  However, the potential for a 
lengthy delay from the incidence of an outbreak to 
official diagnosis to political action for containment 
is worrying.  Further, inadequate hospital facilities 
(Ref A) remain a continuing concern. 
 
24.  (SBU) COMMENT:  PUBLICATION OF THE NATIONAL PLAN 
REPORTEDLY WAS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON NOVEMBER 1. 
HOWEVER, THAT DATE CAME AND WENT WITHOUT PUBLIC COMMENT 
BY THE GSL.  UNTIL ELECTIONS ON NOVEMBER 17, THE COUNTRY 
WAS LED BY A LAME DUCK PRESIDENT.  GSL WORKING-LEVEL 
OFFICIALS MAY HAVE PRUDENTLY AWAITED THE NEW 
ADMINISTRATION SO THAT THEIR EFFORTS COULD BE 
APPROPRIATELY REVIEWED AND PUT INTO PLAY RATHER THAN 
CRITICIZED AS THE WORK OF THE PRIOR ADMINISTRATION.  WE 
HOPE TO SEE A SPEEDY PUBLICATION OF THE NATIONAL PLAN, 
FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 23 NAMING OF NEW MINISTERS AND 
OTHER HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS. 
 
25. (SBU) SRI LANKA LACKS SEVERAL CRITICAL RESOURCES - 
TAMIFLU, LABORATORY EQUIPMENT, UP-TO-DATE HOSPITALS.  IT 
ALSO CURRENTLY LACKS HIGH LEVEL INTEREST IN MAKING AI A 
PRIORITY.  NEVERTHELESS, WORKING LEVEL OFFICIALS 
CONTINUE DEVELOPING PLANS AND SEEKING RESOURCES TO 
COMBAT A POTENTIAL PANDEMIC. 
 
LUNSTEAD