US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK7272

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 007272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PACAF FOR GENERAL HESTER 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2015 
TAGS: OVIP, PGOV, PREL, MARR, MASS, TH, Scenesetter 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PACAF COMMANDER GEN HESTER'S VISIT 
TO THAILAND 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (a and d) 
 
  1.  (C)  General Hester, all of us in Bangkok look forward 
to your visit as an opportunity to advance a number of key 
U.S. foreign policy objectives.  The Thai will likely ask you 
for your latest thinking on the future of our annual Cope 
Tiger Exercise.  In addition to promoting issues directly 
affecting the Royal Thai Air Force such as their pending 
decision to replace aging F-5's, you can urge the Thai to 
work with us to enhance our ability to monitor ship traffic 
in the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand and to share 
views on China and India's growing influence in the region. 
You may wish to express appreciation for Thailand continuing 
to let us use the air field and support facilities at the 
Utapao Royal Thai Navy Air Base and should be prepared to 
field questions about our willingness to provide safety 
upgrades there.  Thailand is a key ally in the Global War on 
Terror and senior officials will welcome your views on this 
subject as well as developments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
They will likely share opinions on Thailand's largest 
domestic challenge -- unrest in the predominantly Muslim 
provinces of southernmost Thailand.  End Summary 
 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
2.  (C)  Bilateral relations with Thailand are very good. The 
goodwill generated by America's quick and massive response to 
the December 26, 2004 tsunami is palpable.  American 
businesses have over $20 billion in direct investment in 
Thailand.  The United States is Thailand's largest export 
market and its second-largest foreign investor. 
 
3.  (C)  Nonetheless, there are several points of friction. 
Human rights remain a key concern.  The State Department's 
annual Human Rights Report cited the October 25, 2004 Tak Bai 
incident, during which poorly trained Thai military and 
civilian security forces forced nearly 1,300 Thai Muslim 
protesters into trucks to be transported to a military base 
nearly three hours away.  78 protesters died en route.  In 
response, JUSMAGTHAI has offered a comprehensive series of 
human rights courses administered by the Defense Institute of 
International Legal Studies (DIILS) for Thai officers and 
soldiers rotating to southern Thailand.  In early 2006, the 
USMC will administer a series of non-lethal weapons training 
courses for Thai soldiers as well. 
 
4.  (C)  Thailand's policy of "constructive engagement" with 
the military junta in Burma and provision of economic 
assistance to Rangoon is a source of continuing frustration 
for us.  The Thai government supports democracy in Burma but 
maintains, not altogether convincingly, that engagement with 
the SPDC is the only realistic approach it has to make 
progress on the major cross-border flows of refugees, illegal 
economic migrants, and methamphetamines it faces from Burma. 
Recently PM Thaksin has voiced growing frustration with 
Rangoon and his Ministers tell us that the Thai may be 
willing to be more critical, publicly, of the junta. 
 
PM THAKSIN 
 
5.  (SBU) In 2001, Thaksin became the first democratically 
elected civilian Prime Minister to win an outright majority 
in the Thai Parliament.  Thaksin won reelection in a 
landslide victory on February 6.  His Thai Rak Thai (Thais 
Love Thais) political party dominates domestic politics and 
controls 375 of the 500 seats in Parliament.  Thaksin comes 
from a prosperous Sino-Thai family in Thailand's second 
largest city, Chiang Mai, and placed first in his class at 
the National Police Academy.  He spent several years studying 
in the United States, earning a master's degree in Criminal 
Justice from Eastern Kentucky University and a Doctorate in 
Criminology from Sam Houston State University.  After a few 
years with the police, he left government service to run the 
family business (Shinawatra Corporation, or Shin Corp), which 
he turned into Thailand's largest telecom company, making 
himself a multi-billionaire. 
 
6.  (C)  Thaksin considers himself a personal friend of the 
President, drawing on their common Texas connections, and had 
a very successful meeting with President Bush on September 19 
in Washington.  They also met at the recently concluded APEC 
Leaders Meetig in Busan, South Korea.  The PM characterizes 
himself as a "CEO Prime Minister" and likes to be known for 
being decisive.  He is also impulsive.  His critics accuse 
him of authoritarian tendencies, of staffing the major 
institutions of the country with his family members or 
classmates, and of reinforcing the business interests of 
family and political allies through government policies. 
 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
7.  (C)  Perhaps because of its lack of a colonial heritage 
the Thai are more open to cooperation with other countries 
than many of their neighbors.  The Thai give us greater 
latitude in conducting military exercises than most other 
countries in the region.  We conduct a wide range of major 
exercises and training programs with Thailand each year, 
including Cobra Gold, our only joint/combined/multilateral 
exercise in the Asia Pacific Region.  Cobra Gold 2006 will be 
the 25th year we have held the exercise.  Over the past 25 
years, the exercise has transformed from a bilateral effort 
aimed at training to deter a conventional attack from 
Vietnam, to a multilateral exercise aimed at enhancing 
peacekeeping and other skills.  Cobra Gold 2006 will include 
participation by Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia and will 
have a special focus on Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement 
operations.  Thailand has been selected to be a key partner 
nation in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) -- a 
G-8 program aimed to train 15,000 peacekeepers in the 
Asia-Pacific region by 2010.  Cobra Gold in 2007 will be a 
GPOI capstone event. 
 
COPE TIGER 
 
8.  (C)  Our premier air force exercise with Thailand is Cope 
Tiger.  RTAF officials disagree with our suggestion to 
combine Cope Tiger with Cobra Gold.  During the November 7-8 
U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue, Air Vice Marshal Ittahaporn 
Subhawong, Director of Operations for the RTAF, said that the 
RTAF views Cope Tiger as instrumental in improving Thai air 
capabilities and that it was important to maintain Cope Tiger 
as a separate entity not focused on PKO like Cobra Gold.  At 
that time, BrigGen John Allen from OSD/ISA cautioned no final 
decision about consolidating the two exercises had been made 
and promised to relay the RTAF concerns to the appropriate 
authorities.  In asides, RTAF officials have told us that 
they will not agree to move Cope Tiger and will plan to hold 
the exercise bilaterally with Singapore, or even invite a 
third country, if we insist on moving it.  RTAF officials 
will be very interested in hearing any update about our 
plans. 
 
UTAPAO UPGRADES 
 
9.  (C)  PACOM experts recently characterized the Thai Naval 
Air Base at Utapao as our most important Cooperative Security 
Location (CSL) in the theater.  Due to Thai concerns about 
the term "CSL" we suggest you not use it when discussing 
Utapao.  Nonetheless, it would be entirely proper for you to 
thank the Thai for allowing us to use Utapao as the hub for 
military assistance during Operation Unified Assistance and 
for their continued willingness to permit us to use it for 
U.S. aircraft transiting the region.  Thai officers and U.S. 
officials in country agree that Utapao needs some safety 
upgrades in order to continue to be of use to us.  In 
September, a PACAF assessment team visited Utapao to 
determine what systems need enhancement or upgrading.  During 
the Strategic Dialogue, Rear Admiral Narongpol Na Bangchang 
of the Royal Thai Navy asked about the Utapao survey led by 
PACAF and the likelihood of Thailand receiving U.S. funded 
upgrades.  He was told at that time that the report was still 
being compiled and that it would be released shortly. 
 
F-16 SALE 
 
10.  (C)  Thailand recently announced its plans to replace 
aging F-5s in the RTAF fleet.  Although the RTAF presently 
has 59 F-16s in its inventory, reports six months ago 
indicated that the RTG was leaning towards purchasing Saab 
Gripens or SU-30s because of a belief (which we have worked 
to overcome) that Saab or Sukhoi could offer a better 
business deal to Thailand.  We have worked hard with 
Washington to ensure that Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Rice 
and the President all urged Thailand to either use its 
defense budget to upgrade its existing F-16s or to buy F-16 
Block 52s.  Most reports we have received lately indicate the 
Thai will now perform about 400 million USD worth of Mid-Life 
Upgrades (MLUs) on it F-16s.  However, we still hear 
persistent rumors that Thailand may make a token purchase of 
either SU-30's or Saabs to curry political favor with Russia 
or Sweden.  It would be entirely appropriate for you to ask 
your interlocutors for the latest information on the sale and 
to repeat the President's strongly expressed desire to PM 
Thaksin that Thailand purchase either MLUs or Block 52s. 
 
THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION 
 
11.  (C)  Southeast Asia is experiencing a period of dynamic 
change in part due to the rising influence of China and India 
in the region.  While emphasizing the vital role of the U.S. 
in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S. 
engagement -- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger 
relations with the two regional powers.  Bangkok views both 
countries as sources of unlimited consumer demand and hope to 
conclude Free Trade Agreements with both nations.  Some see 
Thailand playing a bridging role between the U.S. and China 
and India.  Given PACAF's recent participation in Cope India 
and your knowledge of the capabilities of the People's 
Liberation Air Force, it would be worthwhile for you to share 
views on the future roles of India and China. 
 
MARITIME SECURITY 
 
12.  (C)  Thailand is now cooperating with many countries in 
the region to monitor maritime traffic in the Andaman Sea and 
the South China Sea, including joint maritime patrols with 
Vietnam and Malaysia.  The Thai are also observers in the 
"Eyes in the Sky" (EITS) program.  Implemented in September, 
EITS seeks to mobilize the combined resources of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore to maintain maritime security in the 
Strait of Malacca.  In practice, EITS is of limited utility 
because it only involves token patrol flights by one plane 
each from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.  The Thai 
briefed us recently on an Indonesian proposal to set up ship 
patrols coupled with reporting stations in the region to be 
part of a "Combined Maritime Patrol" architecture.  This 
architecture would be multi-national and interagency -- 
running in parallel with EITS -- and would divide the Strait 
into five reporting zones, with reporting stations in Phuket 
(Thailand), Lumut and Sabang (Indonesia), Dumai (Malaysia) 
and Changi (Singapore).  Although there would be no single 
command and control center, each country would receive a full 
activity report from all sectors.  The Thai have explained 
that this project is currently in the "working-group" stage 
and the Thai side did not know when it would be implemented. 
Nonetheless, our experts believe that such an architecture 
could provide tactical feed from all of the stations into a 
Thai-U.S Maritime Operations Intelligence Fusion capability, 
now in the planning stages.  Time permitting, it would be 
useful to hear Thai views on both EITS and maritime security 
generally to determine whether we have opportunities to work 
together in this area. 
 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND 
 
13.  (C)  Prime Minister Thaksin's biggest domestic challenge 
is the unsettled security situation in the far southern part 
of the country.  Southern Thailand, in particular the 
southernmost Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, has experienced episodic violence since it was 
incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902.  However, 
since January 2004, we have witnessed a dramatic increase in 
the level of violence.  Press reports indicate that over 
1,000 persons have been killed either by militants or by 
security forces during this period.  Local Muslim separatist 
militants have attacked symbols of Thai and Buddhist 
authority, Buddhist civilians, and Muslims suspected of 
collaborating with the Government.  There continue to be 
daily incidents of violence.  In March 2005, Thaksin 
appointed a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed 
by highly respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun 
to look for alternative solutions to the long-running 
insurgency.  The NRC is expected to present its findings in 
early 2006. 
 
14.  (C)  Thai officials may ask you for U.S. equipment and 
technology such as UAVs to support efforts to monitor 
militant movements in the South.  We recommend you be 
receptive but noncommittal, and suggest that technical 
experts follow up.  You may also wish to point to our current 
efforts to improve human rights training for Thai soldiers 
and officers who will rotate to the South.  There are widely 
circulated rumors among the ethnic Malay Muslims that the 
U.S. has fomented the violence in the South in order to 
justify a U.S. security presence there.  This has made the 
RTG very sensitive about any visible U.S. assistance aimed at 
the South.  You should be aware of these concerns when 
discussing offers of possible U.S. assistance. 
 
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
 
15.  (C)  After a year and a half of lobbying from the U.S. 
and others, Thailand has still not endorsed the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) Statement of Interdiction 
Principles (SOP).  PM Thaksin has told us that he is 
reluctant to endorse PSI until another Muslim ASEAN state 
does so.  This key U.S. objective has been raised with senior 
Thai officials by the President, Secretary Rice and Secretary 
Rumsfeld.  It would be helpful for you to underscore the 
importance of PSI with your interlocutors perhaps by advising 
them that endorsement will allow us jointly to conduct a 
number of exercises and seminars to stop proliferation. 
 
WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT 
 
16.  (U)  I look forward to your visit and to discussing the 
broad range of our mutual interests. 
 
 
 
BOYCE