US embassy cable - 05SANSALVADOR3283

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SECURING US BORDERS AGAINST SALVADORAN GANGS: THE INITIAL SUCCESS OF INA 212(a)(3)(A)(ii)

Identifier: 05SANSALVADOR3283
Wikileaks: View 05SANSALVADOR3283 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy San Salvador
Created: 2005-11-22 19:41:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: CVIS KFRD PREL SNAR PTER KCRM SOCI KHLS PINS ES GANGS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 003283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/VO/I, WHA/CEN for Paul Degler 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS, KFRD, PREL, SNAR, PTER, KCRM, SOCI, KHLS, PINS, ES, GANGS 
SUBJECT:   SECURING US BORDERS AGAINST SALVADORAN GANGS: 
THE INITIAL SUCCESS OF INA 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) 
 
REF:  A) SAN SALVADOR 2942,  B) SAN SALVADOR 2718, 
C) STATE 109415 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Travel to the United States is now more 
difficult for members of Salvadoran-based gangs.  Since June 
2005, when the Departments of State and Homeland Security 
agreed that INA 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) renders members of 
Salvadoran street gangs ineligible for a visa, Post 
successfully used this finding to prevent gang members from 
legally immigrating to the United States, facilitated the 
arrest and deportation of a gang member illegally present in 
the U.S., and expedited the deportation of another gang 
member attempting to illegally enter the United States. 
Responsible use of the more explicitly gang-related 
ineligibility combined with increased cooperation between 
the United States and other countries affected by gang 
violence has the potential to further enhance U.S. border 
security.  End Summary. 
 
----------------- 
Focusing on Gangs 
----------------- 
 
2.  Since June 2005, when INA section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) began 
to apply to active members of organized Salvadoran street 
gangs, Post has entered circa 5,000 suspected gang members 
into CLASS (P hits).  Much of Post's information came from 
lists provided by El Salvador's National Civil Police (PNC) 
and the FBI. The Department's Consular Systems Division 
(CA/EX/CSD) assistance was critical to Post's ability to 
enter quickly this volume of data.  Further, Post is aware 
that DHS in the U.S. has increased CLASS entries of MS-13 
members in the US, which contributes to the number of gang- 
related entries in CLASS and provides opportunity for 
further findings of ineligibility of gang members. 
 
3.  Speedy entry of the names proved important as the INA 
ineligibility enabled Post to deny an immigrant visa to one 
applicant and to work with DHS to affect the deportation of 
another IV applicant who entered the U.S. illegally. (REFTEL 
B)  Post hopes that these entries - whether done by Consular 
or by DHS in the US - will result in additional findings of 
ineligibility not just in El Salvador, but in other posts 
and at POEs. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
The Most Recent Success -- Detection at the Border 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4.  In October, a DHS officer stopped an undocumented alien 
attempting to illegally enter the U.S. near Brownsville, 
Texas.  During routine namechecks, the DHS agent discovered 
the Post-entered P3A2 hit.  Not knowing the meaning of the 
hit, the DHS officer contacted Post for clarification and 
more information.  Based on this call, Post obtained 
additional case information from El Salvador's Anti-Gang 
Task Force and forwarded the subject's previous criminal 
history for DHS to present to the immigration judge hearing 
the subject's case.  Instead of releasing the undocumented 
alien pending an immigration court hearing, because of this 
information the judge ordered the subject detained until 
deported.  Post expects this suspect gang member to be back 
in El Salvador within a few days. 
 
5.  Post believes additional technologies can improve upon 
current success.  One technology already available at our 
fingertips is biometrics. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Why Use Biometrics to Tackle Salvadoran Gang Travel? 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
6.  El Salvador employs a USAID-sponsored biometric 
technology as part of the Salvadoran national identity card. 
This ID card, issued to all Salvadorans 18 and older, 
includes biometrics which are compatible with IDENT 
software.  Because of this link, Post is actively pursuing 
methods to increase the ability of the GOES to take the 
biometric prints of gang members and share this information 
with U.S. authorities.  If cooperation expands, neither visa 
applicants nor detainees will be able to hide their gang 
associations behind false identities.  Consular officers and 
law enforcement officials alike will gain a reliable 
additional tool for combating gangs and protecting U.S. 
borders.  Our ability to track and combat the international 
movement of Salvadoran gang members will assume greater 
importance if, as some observers anticipate, the gangs 
attempt to expand their sources of revenue and influence 
through transnational alien smuggling and narcotics 
trafficking. 
 
7.  To test the compatibility of GOES and USG software, Post 
recently facilitated a test enabling electronic fingerprints 
and other information about gang members to be rapidly 
shared among the PNC, El Salvador's National Civil Registry, 
the FBI, DHS's IDENT data base, and consular data bases. 
This test demonstrated that the systematic sharing of gang- 
related data can improve the positive identification of gang 
members and help prevent them from penetrating U.S. borders. 
(REFTEL A) 
 
----------- 
What Next? 
---------- 
 
8.  In our experience, the expansion of this ineligibility 
to active Salvadoran gang members is a useful tool to 
protect our borders.  But how do we make the best use of it? 
A few possible ideas: 
 
In El Salvador 
 
-- Further assist the PNC and the Salvadoran National Civil 
Registry to increase their capability to take electronic 
fingerprints of gang members. 
 
-- Facilitate closer cooperation between the two Salvadoran 
agencies by outlining the methods through which U.S. 
national intelligence organizations, federal law enforcement 
agencies and local government authorities achieved more 
effective communications after September 11. 
 
-- Establish procedures for the systematic or regularized 
sharing of gang-related information between U.S. and 
Salvadoran government entities. 
 
Beyond El Salvador 
 
-- Joint training for consular and DHS officers in the 
various aspects of gang identification and the application 
of INA ineligibilities to strengthen the ability of the two 
organizations to work together more effectively. 
 
-- State Department, Consular Affairs and/or CA/FPP training 
in the field to increase regional knowledge of gangs. 
 
-- Conduct an anti-gang conference in WHA/CEN area to 
increase cooperation and info exchange, and to streamline 
use of the 212 ineligibility among WHA/CEN consular 
sections. 
 
-------- 
COMMENTS 
-------- 
 
9.  Post actively uses this new interpretation of Section 
212(a)(3)(A)(ii) to fulfill our Mission goals and secure 
U.S. borders.  Other posts may find the tool equally 
helpful, and Post welcomes Department or other Embassy 
comments or questions which may help us collectively take 
best advantage of this ineligibility throughout the region. 
 
Barclay 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04