US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA10892

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010892 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KJUS, PINR, CO 
SUBJECT: ELECTORAL GUARANTEES DECISION BOLD BUT RISKY MOVE 
FOR COURT; URIBE REMAINS STRONG FAVORITE 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 10686 
     B. BOGOTA 9896 
     C. BOGOTA 8695 
 
Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker, Reasons: 1.4 B & D. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) The Constitutional Court's ruling in favor of the 
Electoral Guarantees law was a bold but risky move that some 
say could call into question the court's legitimacy.  The 
court essentially rewrote the law to avoid sending it back to 
the Congress for amendments.  A Congressional rewrite would 
have likely made it impossible for President Uribe to run 
given the short time left before campaigns start.  However, 
the court may have overstepped institutional boundaries and 
solidified opposition to its "activist" character.  Despite 
murmuring that the court's decision places too many 
restrictions on Uribe's campaign, the president remains the 
overwhelming favorite.  He will win or lose based on the 
electorate's judgment of his record, not because of the 
court-imposed campaign restrictions or the effectiveness of 
opposition figures.  The perception that the decision was 
tough on Uribe can only help him, as it increases the 
likelihood that all will perceive the election, and thus the 
result, to be fair.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Court Rewrites Electoral Guarantees Law 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) The Constitutional Court essentially rewrote major 
portions of the Electoral Guarantees Law in its 7-2 vote to 
uphold the measure, a decision that gave the green light for 
President Uribe to run for reelection.  The court approved 
verbatim 12 of the law's 52 articles, rewrote substantially 
another 20, partially struck down 18, and threw out another 
two.  As one of Colombia's four co-equal high courts, the 
Constitutional Court's ruling is binding. 
 
3.  (U) The court's rewrites included: 
 
--Political Activity by GOC employees: the Court changed the 
law to prevent employees from engaging in partisan campaign 
activities. 
 
--Spending limits: the Court reduced the incumbent's spending 
limit to a level significantly below that for challengers 
(the incumbent limit for 2006 is the same amount as in the 
2002 campaign). 
 
--Campaign donations: the Court eliminated the provision in 
the law allowing corporations to donate to campaigns; now 
only individuals may donate. 
 
--Presidential community council meetings: the Court ruled 
that Uribe's weekly meetings cannot be televised live on 
public television. 
 
--Use of Presidential Palace: the Court added language 
prohibiting the incumbent from using the Palace for partisan 
campaign events. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Decision a Mixed Blessing for Uribe 
----------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The decision was a mixed blessing for Uribe.  It was 
friendly in that it allows him to launch his reelection 
campaign; the court could have struck down the law as 
unconstitutional, either in whole or in significant part (as 
the two dissenting judges wished), or returned the law to the 
Congress for a rewrite.  The latter option would have likely 
resulted in Uribe losing the right to run again because the 
Congress would not have had time to correct deficiencies and 
obtain the court's blessing before electoral campaigns start. 
 The decision was unfriendly to Uribe in that it places a 
number of key restrictions on his ability to campaign. 
 
According to the court, Uribe must announce his reelection 
bid by November 28 and the campaign restrictions outlined 
above kick in from that date. 
 
----------------------- 
Legitimacy in Question? 
----------------------- 
 
5.  (C) According to Uribe loyalists, the court's decision is 
consistent with its "activist" character and calls into 
question the court's long-term legitimacy.  Some of post's 
contacts in Uribista circles (in the presidency and the 
Congress) tell us that a second Uribe Administration could 
push (either via the Congress or public referendum) to 
abolish the court, arguing that it "legislates from the 
bench."  Such a move appears to have important adherents in 
the legal community as well.   Nevertheless, it would be a 
challenging legal prospect and could be distracting for an 
administration that will confront significant security and 
economic/tax issues if it has a second term. 
 
6.  (C) Prior to the 1991 Constitutional reform, 
constitutional issues were decided by the constitutional 
chamber of the Supreme Court.  One option for constitutional 
reforms would be to return to that system.  It was a less 
activist court, more "respectful" of government perogative. 
 
------------------ 
Uribe's Next Steps 
------------------ 
 
7.  (C) Uribe's first step after announcing his candidacy by 
November 28 will be to choose a political party to serve as 
his vehicle (see Ref C for information on the pro-Uribe 
parties).  The Conservative Party (PCC) is holding a national 
referendum November 27 to decide whether to support Uribe in 
coalition or run its own candidate.  Party head and Senator 
Carlos Holguin publicly stated that the PCC might run its own 
candidate if Uribe announces that his vehicle party is the 
nascent National Unity Party.   (Comment: Holguin's threat 
means little in real terms; the PCC has no-one that could 
challenge Uribe and the vast majority of its members are 
staunchly pro-Uribe.  End Comment.)  The most likely 
scenario, according to pundits, is that Uribe will select the 
dormant "Colombia First" movement that brought him to power 
in 2002, in order not to offend the egos of the leaders of 
the four major pro-Uribe parties.  The other parties would 
then join with Colombia First in coalition.  Uribe must 
formally register his candidacy by January 28. 
 
------------------- 
Opposition Strategy 
------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Opposition leaders, including members of the Liberal 
Party (PLC), Democratic Pole (PDI), and Democratic 
Alternative (AD), tell us that the presence of three or four 
leading opposition candidates on the ballot might force Uribe 
into a second round.  (Electoral rules mandate a second round 
runoff between the top two first-round finishers if no 
candidate attains 50 percent of the vote.)  Current public 
opinion data does not support their optimism, however.  A 
wild card is two-time former Bogota mayor and independent 
Antanus Mockus, who may be the only rival that could run 
close to Uribe in a second round.  Mockus announced his 
candidacy on November 19.  In a head-to-head contest against 
Uribe, however, it is not clear that Mockus would have the 
star quality needed to outshine the charismatic president. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) Uribe's campaign abilities are immense and his 
ability as president to make news is unmatched by any 
candidate.  He will win or lose based on the electorate's 
assessment of his record, not because of court-imposed 
campaign restrictions or the effectiveness of opposition 
figures.  The court's decision raised hackles among the 
political class for a number of reasons, some legitimate, 
 
some not.  The court was making a political point in its 
decision about the importance of ensuring that all candidates 
have as fair a chance as possible in an environment where one 
candidate is the 800 pound gorilla.  If Uribe is reelected, 
challenging the court could be a luxury he can do without. 
More immediately, the perception that the court's decision 
was tough on Uribe can only help the president, as it 
strengthens the likelihood that all candidates will be forced 
to admit the campaign, and thus the result, was fair. 
DRUCKER