US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6878

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006878 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS OF EARLY ELECTIONS IN 
TURKEY 
 
REF: A. 2003 ANKARA 004161 
 
     B. ANKARA 004888 
 
(U) Classified by A/DCM James Moore, 12968, reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Turkey's ruling and pro-Islam Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government is resisting opposition 
calls for early elections.  Presidential politics are a major 
factor:  parliament will elect Turkey,s next President in 
May 2007, and the term of the current parliament, dominated 
by AKP, does not expire until November 2007.  Absent a major 
political crisis, AKP will stand pat.  The secular opposition 
is desperate to avoid having an AKP-dominated parliament 
elect the next President.  End Summary. 
 
AKP Resists Opposition Calls for Early Elections 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  (C) The Turkish parliament, elected to a five-year term 
in November 2002, is not required to go to new elections 
until November 2007 unless certain constitutional provisions 
are triggered.  Since AKP controls an overwhelming majority 
of the seats in parliament (357 of 550), new elections are 
unlikely, unless there is a major forcing event or AKP,s 
leadership decides that holding early elections is to its 
advantage. 
 
3.  (C) PM Erdogan has repeatedly stated that there will not 
be early elections, a point that AKP MPs, including at senior 
and leadership levels, have reiterated to us.  The PM,s 
statements, however, have not silenced AKP's opponents' calls 
for early elections.  The loudest pro-early election voices 
come from secular academics and journalists, opposition party 
leaders and the secular state establishment. 
 
Elections, By the Numbers 
------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) AKP won a landslide election in November 2002, when 
all but one other party failed to win enough votes to 
overcome the 10 percent threshold to enter parliament.  The 
result was an exaggerated parliamentary seat advantage for 
AKP:  with just 34 percent of the vote, AKP won 363 of 550 
seats.  The center-left Republican People's Party (CHP) also 
won a disproportionate share of seats:  178, nearly one-third 
-- despite only winning 19 percent of the vote. 
 
5.  (C) The center-right True Path Party (DYP) and the 
ultra-nationalistic National Action Party (MHP) both fell 
short of the threshold by less than two percentage points due 
in large part to the candidacy of charismatic billionaire Cem 
Uzan, whose Genc Party proved the spoiler, receiving 7 
percent of the vote.  Since the election, Uzan,s party has 
disintegrated.  DYP and MHP are the likely beneficiaries of 
the Genc Party's decline.  Were new elections were held 
today, more than two parties would likely cross the 10 
percent electoral threshold and the number of AKP and CHP 
seats would decline. 
 
The Role of Presidential Politics 
--------------------------------- 
 
6.  (U) Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer,s seven-year 
term expires in May 2007 and he is not eligible for 
re-election.  Turkey,s Constitution requires that the 
President be elected by a two-thirds majority of parliament 
(367 of 550) in the first or second round.  If no one 
receives a two-thirds majority, then the winner can be 
selected by a majority (276 of 550) in the third round.  If 
there is no third round winner, the top two candidates from 
the third round compete in a fourth round of majority voting. 
 If a president is not elected in the fourth round, new 
parliamentary elections must be held. 
 
7.  (U) Currently with 357 of 550 seats in parliament, AKP is 
in a position to dominate this process.  At very least, the 
party should be able to select its favored candidate by the 
third round. 
 
8.  (C) As May 2007 approaches, AKP,s opponents, spearheaded 
by CHP President Deniz Baykal, who see the Presidency as a 
secular pillar of the Turkish Republic and do not want a 
pro-Islam party to select the next President, will increase 
 
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the pressure on AKP to hold early elections.  Secular 
journalists will redouble their efforts to dig up stories of 
AKP corruption and malfeasance.  Opposition politicians will 
step up criticism of AKP,s domestic and foreign policies in 
their zeal to gain domestic advantage, a strategy (perhaps 
unintentional but irresponsible) designed to weaken AKP's 
hand, but which could have the byproduct of undermining 
Turkey,s EU membership process, IMF negotiations, or 
U.S.-Turkish relations. 
 
9.  (U) Baykal fired an initial volley after his unanimous 
reelection November 19 as CHP leader, stating publicly that a 
new parliament should elect the next President; parliament 
Speaker Arinc shot back the next day that the present 
parliament would elect the next President. 
 
Erdogan's Ambitions 
------------------- 
 
10.  (C) PM Erdogan is widely rumored to want to become 
President and his ambition enjoys wide support among AKP MPs. 
 However, Erdogan,s rise to the Presidency may not be in 
AKP,s interest.  In the 1990s, charismatic PMs Turgut Ozal 
and Suleyman Demirel were elected President, only to see 
their parties, effectiveness and popularity decline. 
Erdogan might well conclude that he needs to put his 
Presidential ambitions on the back burner in order to 
maintain AKP,s political dominance and promote AKP,s 
pro-Islam agenda. 
 
11.  (C) Moreover, under the current system, the Turkish PM 
is more powerful and influential than the President.  Erdogan 
may not wish to become President unless he can push through 
constitutional amendments to strengthen the Presidency, a 
difficult feat in Turkey's current political climate.  In 
such a case, Erdogan would be more inclined to remain PM, 
promote an AKP loyalist for the Presidency, then push through 
constitutional reforms to strengthen the Presidency, possibly 
assuming the office himself at a later date. 
 
Early Election Scenarios 
------------------------ 
 
12.  (C) AKP currently has little incentive to hold early 
elections, since they would likely result in AKP losing 
dozens of seats, even if the party increased its actual share 
of the vote.  There are three scenarios, however, under which 
AKP,s leadership could change its mind: 
 
-- AKP might decide to hold early elections if it assesses 
that an election would result in an increase in the number of 
AKP seats in parliament (Comment:  Possible but unlikely. 
End Comment).  AKP conducts extensive polling (REF B); the 
party currently expects to receive 40-45 percent of the vote 
and believes that two or three other parties could cross the 
10 percent threshold. 
 
-- AKP might be forced to hold early elections in response to 
a shock to the political system resulting in a dramatic 
decrease in AKP,s popularity.  This could be caused by an 
economic crisis, corruption or other scandals, an 
international relations crisis, or a political miscalculation 
that alienates a substantial faction of the party.  Were AKP 
MPs to defect or threaten to defect to another party in large 
numbers, AKP,s leadership might call early elections in an 
effort to purge the defectors from parliament and fend off a 
later, more organized challenge. 
 
-- Even if AKP,s popularity holds, the prospect of the 
current AKP parliamentary majority electing the President 
could so alienate Turkey,s secular state establishment and 
opposition that AKP could feel compelled to hold early 
elections to renew its mandate and silence its critics. 
Under this scenario, even if AKP expected to lose some seats, 
it would go to elections as long as its leaders are confident 
they would win a parliamentary majority sufficient to elect 
the next President. 
 
13.  (C) Comment:  Assuming a crisis does not push AKP to the 
polls, this parliament's longevity will be a reflection of 
how much Turkey has changed, both in terms of a parliament 
lasting an entire election cycle, and with regard to the 
leading role of a pro-Islam party.  And, if the secular 
establishment fails in its efforts to press for new 
 
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elections, and if it -- and the military -- can stand back 
and allow a pro-Islam party to select one of their own as 
President and Head of State, that would truly be a sign of 
major change here.  End Comment. 
MCELDOWNEY