US embassy cable - 05KATHMANDU2549

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002549 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, H 
NSC FOR RICHELSOPH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PHUM, MCAP, MASS, NP 
SUBJECT: COAS THAPA WELCOMES PROPOSAL THAT KING CALL FOR 
INTERNATIONALLY MONITORED CEASE-FIRE 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 
 
Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) In a November 22 meeting, COAS Thapa thought the 
Ambassador's suggestion that the King call for an 
internationally-monitored cease-fire was a good proposal. 
Thapa denied there was any cooling of our military-military 
relationship and welcomed a visit by PACOM Commander Admiral 
Fallon.  The Chief indicated that he was concerned that Nepal 
was not receiving U.S. security assistance.  The Ambassador 
stressed that we needed to see the King reach out to the 
political parties to agree on a way forward before we could 
provide the M-16s.  The recently enacted Leahy Amendment 
conditioning future FMF, reflected that concern.  COAS Thapa 
strongly objected to Senator Leahy's November 18 statement on 
Nepal, claiming that his comments about the army "invited 
civil war."  Thapa also emphasized that Nepal should not 
deviate from the two principles of constitutional monarchy 
and multi-party democracy.  He worried that India was moving 
away from those fundamental principles and sought an end to 
the monarchy.  End Summary. 
 
Ambassador: King Should Call For International Monitored 
Cease-Fire 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador suggested that the smartest thing the 
King could do would be to publicly announce that he wanted 
peace and call for a cease-fire hammered out in the presence 
of, and monitored by, international observers.  If the 
Maoists accepted it, Nepal would have a real cease-fire.  The 
insurgents would not be able to extort, intimidate and 
terrorize the populace as they continued to do during the 
current unilateral cease-fire, and thus their power and 
influence in the countryside would drop immediately.  Knowing 
their strength would decline, the Maoists might walk away 
from the King's call for an internationally monitored 
cease-fire.  If they did, they would reveal their true 
intentions to the international community and force the 
political parties to recognize that the Maoists' actions had 
been a tactical ploy.  COAS Thapa agreed this was a good 
concept and strategy.  It was "something we need to do."  He 
added that an extension of the cease-fire could also be 
helpful for elections.  When Thapa asked that the Ambassador 
raise this with the leaders of the government, the Ambassador 
informed him that he had discussed it with Vice-Chairmen 
Bista and Giri the day before. 
 
Importance of Military-Military Relationship 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador stressed the strong desire to continue 
a normal working relationship with the Nepali military. 
Thapa thanked the Ambassador and stated that Nepal would 
welcome a visit by Admiral Fallon, Commander US PACOM, noting 
that Lt. Gen Brown's visit had been productive.  The 
Ambassador also raised our concern that it appeared that RNA 
personnel were avoiding us  - they were reluctant to meet 
with us or attend our social events.  We had noted a real 
drop in contacts and worried about the signal the RNA was 
giving.  He stressed that we were trying to work for the 
betterment of Nepal and felt it necessary for the Parties and 
the King to reconcile to address the insurgency.  In the 
interim, if our military-to-military ties started to 
deteriorate, it would hurt our overall relationship.  Thapa 
denied that there was a policy to restrict contact.  He noted 
that Nepal was sending its Director for Military Intelligence 
to the U.S.  He added, however, that his officers needed to 
be careful not to make any political statements.  Thapa 
emphasized that there was no planned cooling of the 
relationship, but commented that the U.S.'s cancellation of a 
number of joint exercises had not gone unnoticed. 
 
Need Security Assistance 
------------------------ 
 
4. (C/NF) COAS Thapa said Nepal was fighting a "real war," 
and appreciated that the U.S. realized Nepal faced a major 
Maoist threat.  He lamented that Nepal was not getting the 
weapons it needed.  He said he had heard that the U.S. had 
pressured Korea not to sell Nepal 73mm rockets for 
helicopters.  When the Ambassador explained that we had not 
objected, Thapa corrected himself and said that India had. 
The Ambassador told Thapa that we had also informed Israel 
that we did not object to its sale of M-16 ammunition.  Thapa 
said that the Israelis had had to delay the sale, but that 
the ammunition was scheduled to arrive at the end of 
December.  Thapa complained again that INSAS rifles did not 
perform well in the heat of battle.  The Ambassador responded 
that he hoped we would soon see the conditions necessary to 
allow us to ship the almost 3,600 M-16s in storage.  Nepal 
knew what it had to do for this to be possible. 
 
Need For Reconciliation Between Palace and Parties 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5. (C) Describing his November 17-18 trip to New Delhi, the 
Ambassador explained that there was a convergence of policy 
between the U.S. and India -- we want to see reconciliation 
between the Palace and the political parties and we recognize 
that the Maoists still represent a real danger to Nepal. 
Thapa noted that the UML becoming closer with the Maoists 
made the situation more difficult.  He argued that the 
Parties should take the initiative for dialogue with the 
King, but they had not even responded to the King's Dashain 
message about talks.  The Ambassador countered that since the 
King controlled most of the power, the King needed to find a 
way to reach out. 
 
Leahy Amendment Underscores That Need 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador shared with COAS Thapa copies of the 
Senate Appropriations Bill containing the conditions for 
Nepal to receive Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Senator 
Leahy's November 18 statement on Nepal.  The Ambassador 
explained that, in addition to our ongoing interest in human 
rights in Nepal,  the new conditions reflected the concern in 
the U.S. that there be a reconciliation between the Palace 
and the political parties.  COAS Thapa objected strenuously 
to the Senator's comments that the RNA had to make choices 
between the people and the monarchy.  He accused the Senator 
of trying to get the RNA involved, when it had been trying 
hard to remain separate, from the political process.  He 
stressed Nepal's history of a "trinity: the people, the 
military and the monarchy."  He added, however, that the RNA 
would not go with any group that sided with the terrorists. 
He claimed that the Senator's words were "inviting civil 
war."  The Ambassador pushed back, saying that the Senator's 
views reflected a deepening sense of worry in the U.S.  The 
King was ten months into the current experiment, but there 
did not seem to be a way out.  Elections could be an option, 
but the political parties had legitimate concerns that needed 
to be addressed through dialogue with the King. 
 
7. (C) The Ambassador underscored that the U.S. remained 
concerned about human rights.  Thapa asserted that the RNA 
continued to make progress and provided access to 
organizations to places of detention.  He noted that although 
the ICRC still had reservations, they were close to reaching 
an agreement to resume visits to barracks.  The Ambassador 
stressed the importance of the RNA finalizing such an 
agreement with ICRC. 
 
India a Factor 
-------------- 
 
8. (C) Thapa emphasized that Nepal considered India an 
important factor.  He worried that the GOI might deviate from 
supporting the "twin pillars of constitutional monarchy and 
 
multi-party democracy."  He said he was already concerned 
about India arranging talks between the Parties and the 
Maoists.  In addition, India had not put enough pressure on 
the Parties to talk with the Palace.  He lamented that India 
had designs to get rid of the monarchy, Sikkimize Nepal and 
gain control of its water resources.  The Ambassador 
responded that the U.S. and India agreed that it was critical 
that the King seek a compromise with the political parties. 
We shared the concern that the Maoists were looming, waiting 
to seize power.  The Ambassador continued that the Government 
of India clearly understood the negative consequences if 
Nepal ended up with a radical regime. 
 
Constituent Assembly a Pandora's Box 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Thapa reiterated that there should be no deviation 
from the principles of constitutional monarchy and 
multi-party democracy.  He claimed that holding a constituent 
assembly would be like "opening Pandora's box."  He added 
that there were still rightists who could call for a return 
to the partyless democratic system again (panchayat system). 
He cautioned that if people tried to change the Constitution, 
"civil war and chaos" would result. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) COAS Thapa betrayed deep worry about the need for 
lethal security assistance.  He eagerly welcomed the 
Ambassador's proposal for an internationally-monitored 
cease-fire that would give the RNA a continued respite and 
more time to get needed assistance.  His explanations for the 
recent downturn in contacts between the military was weak, 
but hopefully he got our message. 
MORIARTY