US embassy cable - 05KATHMANDU2548

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
NSC FOR RICHELSOPH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, MASS, MCAP, NP 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REVIEWS POSSIBLE PARTY-MAOIST 
AGREEMENT, CHINESE WEAPONS SALES WITH INDIAN AMBASSADOR 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 2516 
     B. BEIJING 18209 
     C. BEIJING 18123 
 
Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
Welcoming a UML-Maoist Agreement? 
---------------------------------- 
 
1. (C) In a November 21 discussion on developments in Nepal, 
the Ambassador and Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee discussed 
a reported agreement between the political parties and the 
Maoists.  The Ambassador related that British Ambassador 
Keith Bloomfield had approached him at a social function on 
November 18 to report that CPN-UML General Secretary MK 
Nepal, upon his return from New Delhi over the November 19-20 
weekend, would announce an agreement with the Maoists.  The 
terms of the agreement reportedly were that the Maoists would 
put their weapons under international supervision at the time 
of constituent assembly elections to be organized by an 
interim government.  Bloomfield had asked that the USG 
endorse such an agreement if announced.  (Note: MK Nepal did 
not make such an announcement over the weekend, but said that 
the Maoists would make an announcement in about a month. 
According to UML sources, any agreement between the UML and 
the Maoists would need approval by the UML's Central 
Committee and Standing Committee; presumably the seven-party 
alliance would also need to discuss and approve it.  End 
Note.) 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador explained to Mukherjee that he had said 
to Bloomfield that while the USG would welcome anything 
bringing the Maoists back into the political mainstream, "the 
devil would be in the details" of any such agreement.  He had 
noted that the proposal Bloomfield had outlined was the same 
program the Maoists had long been pushing; it appeared to 
contain nothing preventing the Maoists from resorting to 
violence before constituent assembly elections.  The 
Ambassador had conveyed to Bloomfield that such an agreement 
could be highly dangerous to the Parties, who would be 
greatly at risk if the Maoists moved back to violence after 
signing a pact with the Parties. 
 
3. (S/NF) Mukherjee agreed that we had to push the political 
parties to be cautious.  He commented that the Parties say 
the right things to us, but were under a great deal of 
pressure that could force them in strange directions.  The 
Indian Ambassador stressed that he did not know what the 
Indian intelligence agencies were doing regarding arranging 
and organizing meetings for Maoists or Party leaders in 
India, that was "left to RAW."  That said, Mukherjee 
stressed, Indian policy pushed for reconciliation between the 
King and Parties and recognized the danger of pushing a 
flawed agreement between the Parties and the Maoists. 
 
Chinese Arms Sales to Nepal? 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (S/NF) The Ambassador also relayed to Mukherjee the 
details of his November 18 discussion with Chinese Ambassador 
Sun Heping (ref A), who had categorically denied that China 
had large commercial weapons sales to Nepal in the works. 
The Ambassador compared Sun's assurances to the responses we 
had received in Beijing (refs B, C), which had been somewhat 
ambiguous about the sales.  Noting that China had now 
received strong demarches from the U.S. and India, the 
Ambassador commented to Mukherjee that it appeared that the 
commercial deal might not be going through.  Mukherjee agreed 
and said he would ask his Defense Attach to investigate 
further.  The Ambassador remarked that the indication that 
the Chinese were not providing large-scale military support 
to Nepal dovetailed with an apparent desire on behalf of the 
Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to see the Maoist three month 
cease-fire extended and the government reciprocate.  The RNA 
might well be getting nervous again about its lack of weapons 
and ammunition the Ambassador speculated.  Mukherjee stated 
that in his last meeting with Chief of Army Staff Thapa, 
 
Thapa had pushed India to release security assistance in the 
pipeline; if the RNA was going to receive AK-47s from China, 
Thapa would not have been so concerned about getting the 
Indian INSAS rifles, Mukherjee concluded.  The Indian 
Ambassador added that, in his next meeting with COAS Thapa, 
he would encourage Thapa to highlight to the King the Army's 
dire needs and the desirability of a cease-fire. 
MORIARTY