US embassy cable - 05ANKARA6864

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TURKS CONSIDERING VISIT BY IRANIAN FM; STILL TIME TO TURN IT OFF

Identifier: 05ANKARA6864
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA6864 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-11-22 10:58:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL IR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

221058Z Nov 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006864 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, IR 
SUBJECT: TURKS CONSIDERING VISIT BY IRANIAN FM; STILL TIME 
TO TURN IT OFF 
 
REF: ANKARA 006546 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 1. (C)  Summary and Action Request:  Turkish MFA DG for the 
Middle East informed Charge November 22 that FM Gul intends 
to receive his Iranian colleague, FM Manouchehr Mottaki, in 
Ankara for a one-day working visit November 30; the initial 
impetus came from Tehran.  Charge stressed repeatedly that 
this was a bad idea; the optics were terrible and it would 
accomplish nothing aside from tarnishing Turkey's name with 
friends and enemies alike.  High level USG pressure, in the 
form of a Secretary Rice-Gul call, might turn this visit off: 
the Turks have not yet extended November 30 as a possible 
date, and Mottaki has a very checkered history in Ankara. 
End summary. 
 
2. (C)  Turkish MFA DG for Middle Eastern Affairs Oguz 
Celikkol called in CDA November 22 to convey that Iranian FM 
Mottaki - a former Iranian Ambassador to Turkey - has asked 
to making a one-day working visit to Ankara.  The Iranians 
originally offered November 24; the Turks plan to 
counter-propose November 30.  Per Celikkol, Ankara wanted to 
consult with the U.S. but did not believe this would be a 
major problem, since, unlike with Syria, the U.S. "was not 
isolating Tehran" and the Iranians have been invited to 
various international fora, including most recently the OIC 
Conference on Iraq held in Cairo.  MFA has not yet been in 
contact with the EU.  Protocol for the working visit would be 
minimal and Gul would send all the correct messages - that 
any nuclear ambitions by a country in the region are 
unacceptable, destabilizing Iraq is unacceptable, the 
rhetoric of Iranian President Ahmedi-nejad is unacceptable. 
 
3. (C)  Charge responded that the optics of an Iranian FM 
visiting a NATO - and EU candidate - capital would be 
terrible.  The Iranians are at an impasse with the EU-3, 
Tehran continues to work to destablize Iraq, and their 
President recently called for Israel to be wiped off the map. 
 The Iranians have done nothing for which they should be 
rewarded with an official FM visit to Ankara.  Turks should 
tell the Iranians that if their FM wants to come here, Tehran 
should first negotiate seriously with the EU-3. 
 
4. (C)  Celikkol stressed the need to send the message from 
one neighboring state to another that their behavior on a 
number of fronts was unacceptable.  Tehran needed to hear 
concern directly from a state in the region.  Charge said 
that talk and sending the right messages was important, but 
not/not at the FM level and not/not face-to-face in Ankara. 
If FM Mottaki had to come to Ankara, the Turks could send a 
strong message by having only one meeting and holding it at 
the airport.  Otherwise, the international perception of a 
working visit - coming within two weeks of FM Gul's trip to 
Damascus and on the heels of lukewarm GOT responses to 
Ahmedi-nejad's statements on Israel (reftel) - would be 
extremely negative.  Turkey would be buying itself trouble. 
 
5. (C)  Comment:  Celikkol opened the door a crack, 
indicating that while "the decision had been taken" to 
receive the Iranian FM, Ankara had not yet extended November 
30 as a possible date.  Celikkol pledged not to do so until 
we responded with instructions from Washington.  Although 
Celikkol claimed not to appreciate just how bad the optics of 
such a visit would be, the Turks may actually use pressure 
from the U.S. as an excuse to turn this off.  Gul recently 
tried to call Secretary Rice and was unable to get through; a 
return call from the Secretary at this moment would be very 
timely.  Mottaki, a former Iranian Ambassador to Ankara, left 
under a cloud in 1989, when Ankara recalled its Ambassador 
from Tehran as well - the Turks were unhappy with Tehran's, 
and Mottaki's, attempts to export Islamic revolution.  A 
Mottaki visit would release a storm of protest from secular 
parties and likely the military as well, not something the 
AKP government needs. 
MCELDOWNEY 

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