US embassy cable - 05KATHMANDU2547

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002547 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, H 
NSC FOR RICHELSOPH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PHUM, ECON, EINV, NP 
SUBJECT:  KING SHOULD SEIZE INITIATIVE AND CALL CEASE-FIRE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL MONITORS 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 
 
Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1. (C) In separate meetings on November 21, the Ambassador 
suggested to Vice-Chairmen Kirti Nidhi Bista and Tulsi Giri 
that His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMGN) call for a 
cease-fire with international monitoring.  If the Maoists 
accepted, Nepal would be closer to peace.  If the Maoists 
refused, the international community would recognize that the 
insurgents were not interested in peace.  In either case, the 
King would have seized the initiative as the proponent for 
peace.  The Vice-Chairmen undertook to consider the proposal 
and discuss it with King Gyanendra.  They both objected to 
Senator Leahy's November 18 statement, carried widely in 
Nepali press; Giri asserted that the Senator was inciting the 
Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) against the King.  The Ambassador 
pushed back, noting the Senator's words reflected the deep 
U.S. concern about Nepal.  The Ambassador used the meetings 
to advocate on behalf of a U.S. company, STM Wireless, which 
is investing in Nepal and working with the World Bank on a 
rural telephone project.  End Summary. 
 
Ambassador: King Should Announce Cease-Fire 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Explaining that he was growing very worried about 
Nepal, the Ambassador suggested to each of the Chairmen in 
separate meetings that the King take a single, dramatic, 
effective step: go before the public, explain that the Maoist 
cease-fire was flawed, but, recognizing that everyone wanted 
peace, call for an effective cease-fire monitored by 
international observers.  The Ambassador noted that he saw no 
downside for HMGN; the King would in no way lose face.  The 
Maoists could respond in two ways.  If they accepted the call 
for a comprehensive cease-fire with international observers, 
not only would Nepal move closer to peace, but the Maoists 
would have to cease their extortion and abductions.  Their 
strength would decline because they would be unable to 
terrorize the populace and their funding would shrivel up. 
Because of this reality, the Maoists might well reject the 
King's offer.  If they did so, the Maoists' intentions would 
be clear to the people, the political parties and the 
international community.  People would recognize  that the 
Maoist cease-fire was merely a tactical ploy to strengthen 
their hand and to persuade the political parties to work with 
them against the King.  An appeal from the King for a 
monitored cease-fire would take the initiative away from the 
Maoists. 
 
3. (C) Vice-Chairman Giri responded that he disagreed with 
our analysis about the deteriorating situation.  He said that 
the Maoists had lost their fire-power, were losing influence 
in the villages and had none in the cities, and the people 
were getting bolder and more inclined to challenge Maoist 
pressure and actions.  Giri noted, however, that the Maoists' 
desire to talk with the political parties was only 
propaganda.  That said, he acknowledged that he saw no 
downside to the cease-fire proposal.  He undertook to discuss 
it with His Majesty, but commented that he was unsure how the 
King or "his security people" would react.  Bista also said 
the proposal was interesting, but remarked that HMGN could 
not suddenly change its policy.  He acknowledged, however, 
that there could be "complete chaos, anarchy, more bloodshed 
in the streets," but he claimed that "the government cannot 
be held responsible if that happens." 
 
V-Cs Object to Sen. Leahy's 11/18 Statement 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Vice-Chairman Giri stridently protested Senator 
Leahy's November 18 statement in Congress on Nepal.  Saying 
"we know U.S. and India are against us" and "are not helping 
us," he decried the Senator's words on Nepal as "a madman's 
 
statement."  He exclaimed that "inciting the army to choose 
the King or people is too much."  (Note: Giri especially 
objected to the following excerpt from the Senator's 
statement, the whole of which was broadly carried in the 
Nepali papers: "It may not be long before the army is faced 
with a fateful choice.  Will it continue to side with the 
palace even if it means turning its weapons on prodemocracy 
protesters and facing international censure, or will it cast 
its lot with the people."  End Note.)  Giri asserted that 
Nepal-U.S. relations were deteriorating, and claimed Nepal 
was warning the Indians to be careful because "America was 
using them."  The Ambassador pushed back and questioned how 
Giri could attempt to shift the blame to the U.S.  V-C Bista 
was a little more restrained in his reaction.  He said he 
understood America was a democracy and Senators could voice 
their opinions, but noted HMGN's dismay.  The Ambassador 
explained to them that the Senator's statement reflected the 
deep concern that the U.S., including Congress, had about 
Nepal.  The changes in the Leahy Amendment highlighted the 
universal desire to see the political parties and the Palace 
reconcile.  Both Vice-Chairmen expressed concern about the 
lack of security assistance from U.S. and India; Dr. Giri 
urged the U.S. to separate decisions about security 
assistance from political issues. 
 
Ambassador Advocates For U.S. Company 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador raised with both Vice-Chairmen the 
problems faced by a U.S. company, STM Wireless, which is 
investing in Nepal and working on a World Bank project 
installing telephones in the rural eastern part of the 
country.  After the King's February 1 takeover, HMGN 
prevented STM from installing the phones because of security 
concerns.  In order to allow STM to fulfill its contract and 
to make up its losses, the Nepal Telephone Authority (NTA), 
working with an Independent Technical Consultant, had 
initialed new agreements with STM, the World Bank in 
mid-September.  However, at the end of October NTA had sent 
all the concerned parties a letter ignoring those agreements 
and its own commitments.  The Ambassador asked that HMGN look 
seriously at the issue that involved U.S. investment and do 
the right thing.  Dr. Giri undertook to raise it with the 
Minister of Information and Communications following the 
latter's return to the country.  V-C Bista opined that "we 
can take care of it." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (C) Neither of the Vice-Chairmen appeared to have done any 
thinking along the lines of the Ambassador's proposal, but 
both appeared intrigued by its merits.  We hope the idea 
starts to trickle up to the King. 
MORIARTY