US embassy cable - 05HARARE1591

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MBALEKWA ON UPM STRUCTURE, PLATFORM, STRATEGIES

Identifier: 05HARARE1591
Wikileaks: View 05HARARE1591 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2005-11-22 09:31:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI Other Political Parties
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001591 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, Other Political Parties 
SUBJECT: MBALEKWA ON UPM STRUCTURE, PLATFORM, STRATEGIES 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1420 (B) HARARE 982 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Eric T. Schultz under Section 1 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) In a November 18 meeting with poloff, United People's 
Movement (UPM) principal Pearson Mbalekwa said the party was 
concentrating on building organizational structures and a 
platform that would make it competitive in local elections by 
next year.  He said that the movement continued to draw 
strength from ruling party personnel and would aggressively 
hammer wedge issues to further divide the ruling party.  He 
confirmed that the UPM was talking to but not actively 
courting both MDC factions and had no plans to join in any 
MDC-led mass action.  Mbalekwa inquired about international 
NGOs and other players that might be willing to help the 
movement with training or travel needs.  End Summary. 
 
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Developing Structure, Platform 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) According to Mbalekwa, the UPM had formal structures 
in all provinces save Mashonaland Central and Manicaland.  A 
"national executive" that included Mbalekwa, independent MP 
Jonathan Moyo, and ex-ZANU-PF Masvingo Chairperson Daniel 
Shumba among others met once every two weeks.  He claimed 
response in urban and rural areas was "tremendous" due to 
wide disgust with ruling party mismanagement and public loss 
of confidence in the MDC.  Significant players in the ruling 
party and state apparatuses, such as the CIO (Mbalekwa's 
former employer), remained sympathetic to or aligned with the 
UPM, even if their association remained private.  He claimed 
Emmerson Mnangagwa was satisfied with the movement's progress 
and remained quietly behind the group but would not comment 
on plans for Manangagwa's association to be publicly 
disclosed. 
 
3.  (C) Mbalekwa reported that the party was working on a 
manifesto that would be released in the coming months and 
that the party would begin to contest rural and urban council 
elections in the coming year.  He shared with poloff a 
pamphlet (pouched to AF/S), which laid out party principles 
and goals.  The manifesto was focused on pro-democracy 
rhetoric and on the need to address Zimbabwe's economic 
crisis.  In particular, Mbalekwa said the GOZ's conceptually 
popular but ultimately failed land reform program was a 
divisive issue ripe for UPM exploitation.  The UPM's plan was 
to restore confidence in the agricultural sector by 
compensating previous farm owners (largely with international 
participation), conducting a comprehensive land audit, and 
establishing a freehold title system. 
 
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Overcoming ZANU-PF Advantages 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Mbalekwa said the UPM planned to actively exploit 
existing tensions in the ruling party.  Reported GOZ plans to 
amend the constitution to consolidate presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2010 and to permit a Vice 
President to complete a President's remaining term, for 
example, were resented widely as a strategem to perpetuate 
Zezuru dominance.  According to Mbalekwa, Mugabe had 
recognized the potential explosiveness of the issue and 
squelched efforts to include the measure in the 
constitutional amendment package adopted in September.  To 
exacerbate succession fissures and thwart the plan, the UPM 
would foment calls outside and inside the party for elections 
to be consolidated and held in advance of 2008. 
 
5.  (C) The ex-ZANU-PF Central Committee member acknowledged 
that the ruling party's patronage system presented an 
obstacle but stressed that the UPM was equipped to overcome 
it.  The key was convincing people that the system made them 
vulnerable not empowered.  Mbalekwa claimed that the UPM 
could succeed in this effort because, unlike the MDC, it had 
?liberation? credentials and organizational skills. 
Moreover, the government had proven afraid to pursue 
politicized seizures of farms from UPM figures like himself 
with "liberation" credentials and that had weakened the 
patronage system?s deterrent effect on ruling party members 
considering joining the UPM. 
 
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Relations With MDC 
------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Mbalekwa noted that the UPM had met with both MDC 
factions but was inclined to let the dust settle on factional 
conflict before it proceeded any further with potential 
collaboration or alliances.  Not wanting to inherit MDC 
factional rifts or its foreign associations, the UPM would 
want to take on MDC luminaries individually, rather than as 
factions that would then operate as such within the UPM.  He 
noted that the masses were sick of ZANU-PF but were put off 
by the MDC's foreign associations and well-established 
inability to deliver and predicted that the UPM would easily 
displace the MDC as the main opposition to the government 
before the next general elections. 
 
7.  (C) Mbalekwa criticized the interest of the MDC and some 
in civil society in mass action.  Zimbabweans were exhausted 
and needed more education and organization before such 
tactics would be productive, Mbalekwa concluded.  The UPM 
would eschew mass action for now, focusing instead on 
recasting the national debate to the ruling party's 
disadvantage and on mobilizing people for coming elections. 
He predicted that the experience, connections, stature, and 
savvy of UPM principals would enable the party to overcome 
ruling party intimidation and election-rigging measures, 
unlike the na e and unprepared MDC. 
 
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Party Financing 
--------------- 
 
8.  (C) Mbalekwa said the UPM had adequate "seed money" and 
was producing pamphlets, t-shirts, and rallies in order to 
project itself.  It was establishing networks in the 
diaspora, where he claimed there was great interest.  Party 
principals hoped to travel to the South Africa, the U.K., 
Australia, and the United States next year to tap diaspora 
coffers but needed to first build greater credibility at 
home.  In the meantime, the party was looking for funds to 
support training and travel and Mbalekwa asked for Embassy 
assistance in identifying NGOs and other players who could 
help support its activities. 
 
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Comment 
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9.  (C) The UPM?s most identifiable principals - Emmerson 
Mnangagwa and Jonathan Moyo - each carry heavy liabilities 
with both domestic and international audiences for their 
association with past ruling party oppression.  In addition, 
like the opposition MDC, it lacks resources or a reliable 
platform from which to deliver its message in an environment 
where the ruling party directs the full power of the state to 
its advantage.  That said, Zimbabwe's dysfunctional political 
landscape and leadership vacuum suggest obvious opportunities 
for a third force and the UPM is well-positioned, especially 
in the event of a ruling party crack-up over Mugabe?s 
succession, to take advantage of those opportunities. 
SCHULTZ 

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