US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA10846

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010846 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2015 
TAGS: KJUS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, CO 
SUBJECT: DEMOBILIZATION TO RESUME; TIMETABLE UNDER 
NEGOTIATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) The GOC and AUC negotiators have agreed to extend the 
December 31 deadline for the remaining demobilizations of 
approximately 10,000 paramilitaries for an additional period, 
expected to be no more than 60 days.  Peace Commissioner Luis 
Carlos Restrepo has reiterated that the new deadline must be 
"credible and acceptable" to the country.  The groups that 
remain to demobilize include 3,000 from the North Bloc and 
some 7,000 from blocs "independent" of the AUC, such as the 
Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB).  End Summary. 
 
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DEMOBILIZATIONS TO RESUME 
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2. (C) On November 16, the GOC and AUC announced that they 
had reached agreement to resume demobilizations, suspended 
since early October.  According to Minister of Interior and 
Justice Sabas Pretelt, the GOC expects the December 31 
deadline to be extended by a short period.  In a radio 
interview November 17, Pretelt said demobilizations should 
not extend beyond January.  (Note: we understand that Uribe 
has an informal deadline of the end of February; any delay 
beyond that could have negative consequences for security 
requirements associated with the March congressional 
elections.)  Pretelt also said paramilitaries had agreed to 
refrain from political activities in the upcoming 
congressional and presidential campaigns.  He emphasized that 
extraditions would continue and that there would be no GOC 
deals with paramilitaries on extradition. 
 
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MOST RECENT DEMOBILIZATIONS 
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3. (SBU) Since late August, four paramilitary blocs have 
demobilized, bringing the total number of demobilized 
paramilitaries to 11,117.  In September, three groups 
demobilized: the 1,135 members of "Los Leales Front" of the 
Centauros Bloc in Casanare Department; 222 members from the 
North-West Antioqueno Bloc in Antioquia Department; and 325 
members of the Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) in Vichada 
Department.  The only commander to demobilize with his group 
in September was North-West Antioqueno Bloc leader Luis 
Arnulfo Turbequia, AKA "Memin."  The other blocs were under 
the control of AUC leader and Centauros Bloc commander 
Vicente Castano and BCB leader Carlos Mario Jimenez, AKA 
"Macaco." 
 
4. (SBU) In October, the dissident Tolima Bloc demobilized 
its 207 members in Tolima Department despite the suspension 
of demobilization activities announced earlier in the month 
by AUC negotiators to protest AUC leader Diego Murillo's, AKA 
"Don Berna," transfer to a maximum-security prison. 
According to a delegate from the Peace Commissioner's Office, 
Tolima Bloc chief Diego Jose Martinez, AKA "Daniel," 
negotiated independently with the GOC for the demobilization 
of his bloc and demobilized along with it.  (Note: According 
to official sources, the Tolima Bloc had financed itself with 
extortion of farmers, cattlemen and merchants, and theft of 
gasoline from the Puerto Salgar-Gualanday-Neiva pipeline.) 
 
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PARAMILITARY GROUPS LEFT TO DEMOBILIZE 
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5. (C) Approximately 10,000 paramilitaries remain to 
demobilize -- 3,000 from the North Bloc and about 7,000 from 
the BCB and other blocs that are "independent" of the AUC 
structure.  In an interview with Cambio magazine on November 
7, AUC and BCB political chief Ivan Roberto Duque, AKA 
"Ernesto Baez," said the groups that remain are the most 
militarily powerful blocs within the organization. (Note: The 
BCB, which is independent from the AUC, is estimated to have 
 
over 25 fronts and 6,000 to 9,000 members left.  Other 
independent groups are the Elmer Cardenas Bloc with 500 
members, the Mineros Bloc with 2,000 members, the 
Self-Defense Mid-Magdalena Bloc, and the two remaining fronts 
from the Centauros Bloc.) 
 
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OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME 
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6. (C) Security and Democracy Foundation (FSD) Director 
Alfredo Rangel said paramilitaries have been concerned about 
the following issues: refusal to exempt paramilitary leaders 
from extradition; the GOC's "failure to fully implement the 
Justice and Peace (J&P) law"; inability of the government to 
reclaim control of the areas vacated by the paramilitaries; 
uncertainty surrounding the issue of the centers where they 
will serve their sentences; the inefficiency of the 
reinsertion programs; and the absence of opportunities for 
the demobilized combatants.  Rangel claims the GOC's position 
has also been hardening, primarily as a result of accusations 
of paramilitary interference in politics; the death of a 
neighbor of President Uribe at the hands of reinserted 
combatants; pressure from the USG for extradition; and 
annoyance at the suspension of demobilizations.  On November 
9, Baez asserted in a RCN television interview that the only 
thing to keep demobilized combatants from returning to "the 
backcountry" in the face of the government's failure to make 
good on its commitments would be "for example, the setting of 
limitations on the extradition issue." 
 
7. (C) According to FSD researcher Juan Carlos Garzon, the 
remaining blocs will be the hardest for the GOC to process 
because their ties to narcotrafficking give them little 
incentive to demobilize.  RCN journalist Alfredo Bustillo, 
who follows the peace process and has covered the 
paramilitary phenomenon for several years, told poloff that 
BCB leader Macaco would rather demobilize at a later date, 
since he wants to guarantee greater narco-profits for his 
subordinates.  Cambio magazine on November 7 noted the 
paramilitary groups that are showing the greatest reluctance 
to demobilize are those that operate in areas with 
significant drug production.  In contrast, the groups that 
laid down their arms worked primarily in areas where there 
was little or no drug production.  The Cambio article 
concluded that the demobilizations so far have been a 
political move on the part of paramilitary leaders to 
convince the public that they support Uribe's peace process. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8. (C) According to officials from the Peace Commissioner's 
Office, the GOC does not have the resources or the logistical 
capacity to accommodate two or three demobilizations 
simultaneously over the next months.  Nevertheless, Uribe is 
determined to ensure the maximum demobilizations possible to 
free up logistical and security resources for the March 
Congressional campaign, and to run for reelection in May 
without this matter hanging over his head.  The remaining 
paramilitary blocs appear to be united only insofar as they 
fear extradition. 
DRUCKER