US embassy cable - 05AMMAN9029

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JORDAN TO SEND CONFIDENTIAL EMISSARY TO SYRIA

Identifier: 05AMMAN9029
Wikileaks: View 05AMMAN9029 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2005-11-21 14:28:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL LE SY JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 009029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2010 
TAGS: PREL, LE, SY, JO 
SUBJECT: JORDAN TO SEND CONFIDENTIAL EMISSARY TO SYRIA 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 8948 
     B. STATE 205436 
     C. AMMAN 8766 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale, Reasons 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
1.  (C) Since receiving, and turning down, a message and 
invitation from Syrian President Bashar al-Asad conveyed by 
Walid al-Muallim (ref c), Jordan's King has continued to 
receive messages from Damascus.  The new Jordanian Ambassador 
to Syria presented his credentials in an unprecedented matter 
of days after his arrival, and shortly afterward had a longer 
audience with Asad.  The Syrian President gave him a 
handwritten note for King Abdullah, asking for Jordan's help 
in getting the U.S. and the UN to ease up in light of Syrian 
"cooperation."  Asad asked the King to come to Damascus to 
see firsthand the level of that cooperation.  The note 
asserted readiness to hand over any Syrian wanted for 
questioning to Mehlis anywhere, except in Lebanon. 
 
2.  (C) Maarouf Bakhit, the new Director of National Security 
to the King, raised this issue with Ambassador on November 
21.  He is well aware, after several conversations, of the 
importance we place on isolating and pressuring Syria.  He 
nonetheless noted the visits to Syria of Saudi Prince Bandar 
bin Sultan and Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul.  King 
Abdullah has no intention of traveling to Syria and is 
dismissive of Syrian claims of cooperation, but has agreed to 
a proposal to send Bakhit on an unpublicized visit.  The 
purpose would be to tell Asad in unvarnished terms that he 
has two choices: he can cooperate with the international 
community now, or he can cooperate later.  The longer he 
delayed, the more painful the process would be for him, his 
regime, and regional stability.  Bakhit would also ask that 
Syria handover two terrorist suspects who fled Jordan and are 
wanted in connection with the Aqaba Katyusha attacks, and 
whose network may have supported the hotel bombers. 
 
3. (C) Ambassador reiterated ref B points.  Bakhit recognized 
that the Syrians might arrange a press ambush for the 
"unpublicized" visit, and will have contingency press 
guidance that will emphasize the sternness of Jordan's 
message.  The trip is likely to occur in the next few days. 
 
4.  (C) Comment:  The visit serves no positive purpose from 
our perspective, but as a vulnerable neighbor of Syria, 
Jordan clearly feels compelled to keep a channel of 
communication open.  Bakhit has gone to pains to consult us 
and to assure us the message will be squarely focused on the 
need for full and immediate cooperation with the UN and with 
Mehlis.  On several occasions, the King has observed to 
Ambassador that the Saudis and Egyptians are actively 
undercutting that message, by seeking to build Arab League 
support behind Syria and against outside intervention.  The 
spirit of the Bakhit message will be that there is no such 
Arab consensus and cooperation with the UN is essential. 
 
HALE 

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