US embassy cable - 05DHAKA5652

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 005652 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KISL, PTER, BG, BG Terrorism 
SUBJECT: LEVERAGING A NEW OPENING TO ENCOURAGE BDG ACTION 
AGAINST EXTREMISTS 
 
REF: A. DHAKA 05627 
     B. DHAKA EXDIS 04867 
     C. DHAKA 05650 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, reasons para 1.4 b, d. 
 
 1. (S) Summary. There is dawning BDG recognition that its 
normal strategy for dealing with terrorism -- denial and 
procrastination -- is cracking in the face of JMB's 
continuing campaign of violence.  We therefore have a new 
opening to press the BDG to combat extremism by delivering 
directly and authoritatively to PM Zia a stark message that 
states our concerns about extremist violence, explains our 
benchmarks for measuring BDG performance and the situation in 
Bangladesh, cites the benefits of taking on the extremists, 
and convinces her that she can do this without sacrificing 
her political alliance with Jamaat Islami and her party's 
prospects in the 2007 election.  Since Zia would give us 
virtually any assurance we want, the message would be just 
the start of a long and sometimes difficult process of 
engagement.  End Summary. 
 
The BDG Terrorism Template 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (S) Whether it is an act of political or extremist 
violence, the BDG response is basic and predictable: 
 
A) It condemns the incident, affirms its commitment to bring 
the perpetrators to justice, and, perhaps a few days later, 
speculates that the attackers' motive was to embarrass 
Bangladesh and the BDG.  Someone, sometimes the PM herself, 
will say an Indian or opposition political party hand was 
behind the attack. 
 
B) Low-level suspects are quickly rounded up.  Often, whether 
it is the stabbing of a prominent poet or an attack on a 
cultural event viewed by Islamists as pagan, detainees are 
released within weeks, and there is no subsequent movement in 
the investigation.  In a few high-profile cases, people are 
detained for long periods without trial.  The exception to 
the rule was the conviction of two dozen mostly BNP-linked 
activists for the 2004 murder of opposition Awami League (AL) 
MP Ahsanullah Master.  However, in that and other incidents, 
no "masterminds" are ever identified. 
 
C) The BDG characterizes the incidents as violations of the 
criminal code without broader implications for the mainstream 
political process, the orientation and objectives of Islamist 
agenda, or the BNP's political alliance with, Jamaat Islami 
(JI) and IOJ. 
 
D) Most importantly, the BDG waits for the uproar at home and 
abroad to blow over, while blaming others -- like alleged 
non-cooperation by a victim's family -- for the stalled 
investigation.  This strategy was particularly successful 
after the massive 2004 Chittagong arms haul, which implicated 
a senior figure in the PMO and his long-standing relationship 
with the Pakistani ISI.  Although court proceedings have 
recently begun against several low-level suspects, 
procrastination ended up defusing external demands that the 
BDG identify and punish the culprits.   The same approach 
succeeded in outlasting pressure to solve the August 21 
attack on the AL leadership, the May 2004 attack on the 
British High Commissioner in Sylhet, and, thus far, the 
assassination of former AL finance minister Kibria. 
 
3. (S) This template, however, is cracking as it tries to 
deal with Jamaat ulMjahidhin Bangladesh (JMB), the group 
blamed for a series of bombings, killings, and threats across 
the country (reftels).  The August 17 bomb blasts are now 
recognized as having been the opening salvo, and the BDG's 
failure to "solve" the case is constantly apparent.  In 
addition, the JMB's target list has expanded from judges to 
reporters, government officials, at least one minister, 
police officers, and various public and government 
facilities.  Some of these threats are probably hoaxes with 
no real connection to JMB, but they fuel the anxiety of many 
Bangladeshis who are normally complacent about corruption and 
political violence as accepted features of Bangladeshi life. 
The widespread Bangladeshi belief, right or wrong, that the 
assassination of the two provincial judges was a bungled 
suicide attack has fanned press speculation about other JMB 
suicide squads allegedly trained and waiting in the wings for 
action. 
 
Cracks in the Facade 
-------------------- 
4. (C) On November 21, local papers pictured new x-ray 
machines and other security equipment installed at the BDG 
secretariat in Dhaka response to fears of a JMB attack. 
 
SIPDIS 
Rajshahi BNP MP Nadim Mostapha, who along with two junior 
ministers is widely believed to have patronized Bangla Bhai, 
indirectly denied the allegations in a November 20 meeting 
with journalists, when he asserted that Islamist extremists 
took root during the Awami League government and Bangla 
Bhai's rise was due to the coordinated desire by a broad 
cross-section of local political and religious leaders for 
relief from criminals.  At least two backbench BNP MP's have 
publicly charged the BDG with complicity in Islamist 
violence, with one saying the attacks on judges reminds him 
of the onslaught on intellectuals in the run-up to 
Independence War against Pakistan.  Several ministers, 
including Finance Minister Saifur Rahman, have reportedly 
voiced concerns about their personal security. 
5. (C) The most striking remarks, however, came from the BNP 
loyalist mayor of Rajshahi, Mizanur Rahman Minu, who on 
November 19 told reporters that the BDG had under-estimated 
the Islamist threat.  Minu, who has been embarrassed by the 
certificate of good character he issued in 2004 to detained 
Ahle Hadith spiritual leader Prof. Galib, may have been 
engaged in some authorized spin control, as he also stressed 
his confidence that the BDG would defeat extremism.  On 
November 21, judges from across Bangladesh are meeting in 
Dhaka to assess BDG security for them and their courthouses. 
It is unclear of courtroom boycotts will end, and how the 
broader civil service -- already displeased by BNP promotion 
and assignment polices -- will react if attacks on government 
targets intensify.  . 
 
Suggested Approach 
------------------ 
 
6. (S) At the end of September (ref b), we assessed our top 
challenge as waking up the BDG from its state of denial about 
the profile and threat of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh. 
We continue to believe that Bangladesh is at a turning point, 
but the JMB's expanding campaign of violence is changing the 
domestic political calculus.  The BDG is being forced to 
traverse uncharted territory as it deals with this challenge, 
but it still remains reluctant to elevate its response 
against JMB attacks from a tactical, law enforcement-oriented 
approach to a more strategic undertaking that recognizes that 
religious extremism is a core problem.  We continue to 
believe that PM Zia is the key decision-maker, that she is 
subject to bad advice and selective information, and that we 
must engage with her directly and with authority to 
concentrate her focus in a positive manner. 
 
7. (S) The USG message include: 
 
A) In clear terms, our great concern about growing extremism 
in Bangladesh and the BDG's response to political and 
religious violence. 
 
B) Our benchmarks for measuring the success and credibility 
of the BDG's campaign against extremism, ranging from holding 
senior BNP figures accountable for their links to extremists 
to elevating DGFI's CT wing to a CT bureau.  Also important 
is a more direct and open defense of Ahamdiya rights. 
 
C) Our commitment for a calibrated program of USG support 
pegged to BDG's performance in key areas (see below). 
 
8. (S) Someone probably other than the USG should make the 
political argument to Zia that the greatest threat to her 
re-election now is not losing the electoral support of Jamaat 
Islami, which needs the BNP at least as much as the BNP needs 
it, but the eroding credibility of her own party.  While some 
of the detained JMB bombers have past or current ties to JI, 
there is no compelling evidence that JI leaders condone the 
attacks or that explains why they would think the attacks 
would work to their advantage.  Instead it is BNP leaders who 
have been convincingly linked, in the case of Bangla Bhai and 
HUJIB's Mufti Hannan, to Islamist terrorists. 
 
9. (S) As she has when we discussed previous terrorist 
incidents with her, Zia will seek to disarm us by insisting 
that her government is totally committed to fighting 
terrorism, that the root causes of these incidents lie 
largely outside of Bangladesh, that the USG should provide 
more CT and other support to Bangladesh, that Bangladeshis 
are moderate people, and that the JI and IOJ are committed to 
the political process and effectively constrained by their 
inclusion 
in the ruling coalition. 
 
Carrots and Sticks 
------------------ 
 
10. (S) We know there are significant obstacles to offering 
BDG the juiciest carrots, such as duty-free access to the 
U.S. garment market or MCA membership, as well as to some of 
the most effective sticks, like limiting Bangladeshi 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations.  However, this 
is largely irrelevant since PM Zia and her clique are not 
driven by constituency groups or interests, which is one 
reason they seem isolated from mainstream political opinion. 
Instead, they rely on back-room maneuvering with other 
politicians for advancing their twin goals of retaining power 
and making money. 
 
11. (S) In that context, image is everything.  The BDG wants 
MCA status not to boost its development efforts but because 
they could sell it domestically as USG validation of their 
governance.  Also, it wants duty-free access to the U.S. 
garment market at least in part because many senior 
politicians have garment factories.  Image is why PM Zia 
badly wants an Oval Office visit, and image -- in the 
aftermath of the Kibria killing and negative international 
press coverage of Bangla Bhai -- is why the BDG arrested 
Prof. Galib and banned two extremist groups, including JMB, 
in February. 
 
12. (S) The "shame card" has always been our best card 
against the BDG, provided it is deftly played, but it has a 
new potency today because of the JMB onslaught.  If the USG 
were a visible, satisfied, and active partner with the BDG in 
the war on terrorism and extremism, that would be a 
significant electoral asset to the BNP in the run-up to the 
next election.  The converse is also true, however.  Either 
way, an energized USG-BDG CT partnership would run a strong 
risk of being caught up in the zero-sum world of Bangladeshi 
politics. 
 
13. (U) This is the third of a three part assessment of 
Bangladesh 100 days after August 17. 
CHAMMAS